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This dissertation is a case study of the historical 
interaction between the New York Times and The National 
Organization for Women, 1966-1980. It investigates 
whether commercial news media can be used as a political 
resource by social movement groups. Using archival and 
content analysis methods, the study investigates the 
development of media strategies by NOW and then assesses 
whether these strategies "succeeded," through an 
analysis of NOW's representation in the Times, over a 15 
year period. The study found that news was a resource In 
some ways. Through resource investments in media work, a 
general strategy of reflexive appropriation of news 
conventions (media pragmatism), and the creation and 
maintenance of relationships with some key women 
reporters, NOW was able to produce some routine access 
to news over time. Despite some marginalizing coverage 
vi 
In the early years, NOW's legitimacy as a source in the vii 
Times increased generally over 1966-1980. However this 
"success" had important limitations. NOW's news access 
and the legitimacy of its representation shifted 
depending on the kind of issue NOW was addressing and on 
the context in which the group was being judged. If NOW 
talked about more traditionally "public" issues (such as 
sex discrimination in employment), it was represented as 
a more legitimate source and its stories were more 
likely to be placed in the news sections. When the 
organization talked about "newer" issues or invoked more 
structural frames -- such as child care issues or 
structural "sexism" or patriarchy frames -- these 
stories would be placed in lifestyle or "women's page" 
sections and in the context of these stories, NOW's 
organizational legitimacy was likely to be questioned. I 
argue that these and other patterns in the NOW-Times 
relationship indicate a general "processing" of NOW's 
discourse by the Times through a pUblic-private filter 
which worked to contain NOW's public communication and 
which makes news a contradictory resource for feminists. 
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Introduction and Overview 
Social movements, especially the "new" social 
movements such as the women's, environmental, and peace 
movements, have come to be seen as important 
transformative agents in modern societies. As one of the 
few sources of both critical ideas and effective 
mobilization in contemporary societies, the new social 
movements (NSMs) have come to center stage as agents of 
social change (Habermas, 1981; Touraine, 1985; Giddens, 
1987; Boggs, 1986; Eyerman and Jamison, 1991). 
In particular, the women's or feminist movement has 
been credited with the potential to radically transform 
society. Feminism, it is said, has produced fundamental 
challenges to traditional or "old" political 
distinctions, (such as that between public and private 
concerns), and it has subtly, but radically, extended 
what can even legitimately be considered a "political" 
issue (Habermas, 1981; Offe, 1985; Van Zoonen, 1994). 
However, we have very little information about how 
the new movements have (or will) achieve these 
transformative goals. How have the new movements 
produced new knowledge to challenge existing paradigms? 
How have they communicated these challenges? What are 
the concrete communication strategies involved in 
building and diffusing new political agendas or 
1 
identities? In particular, what role(s) do media play In 2 
the mass communication of new social movement 
discourses? 
As the maJor source of political information for 
citizens in modern societies, news media are still one 
of the most critical bottlenecks in the distribution of 
new knowledge by and about emergent social movements. 
Whether (and how) the new movements can strategically 
produce access to news media, and what kinds of control 
(if any) they can exercise over the representation of 
their issues and identity must be key questions in any 
assessment of the transformative potential of the new 
movements. 1 
This dissertation lS a case study of the 
relationship between one new social movement 
organization, The National Organization for Women (NOW), 
and news media. Through a close historical analysis of 
the experlences of NOW in interaction with media, 
followed by an analysis of the outcome of NOW's 
strategies in news content, the study asks whether 
commercial news media can be a resource in the 
mobilization and strategic effectivity of new social 
movements. 
Some critical media observers (cf. Gitlin, 1980) 
have dismissed news as a political resource for social 
movements, saying that news, because of its commercial 
basis and its links to powerful groups in society, will 
always tend to -marginalize- challenging VOlces. This 3 
approach to media-movement relationships what we 
might call a -strong hegemonyll model -- has gained quite 
wide acceptance in critical media studies. It is also a 
model, despite its tendency to be disempowering, that is 
held by many movement activists as well. 
But the strong hegemony model of media and social 
movements is long overdue for a theoretical overhaul. 
The position that news media will inevitably marginalize 
-real ll criticism and incorporate all other kinds, is at 
once too deterministic to accommodate the day-to-day 
complexity of media-movement relationships (only two 
outcome categories for what is a complex historical 
engagement), and also too vague to be particularly 
helpful. 2 Perhaps most importantly the strong hegemony 
model obscures the reflexivity of movement strategists 
and the contradictory nature of news itself -- both of 
which, recent studies suggest, may be key to the use of 
news as a political resource by strategic movement 
sources (Ryan, 1991; Hackett, 1991; Barker-Plummer, 
1995, 1996). 
In this study I propose a new model for analyzing 
media-movement relations -- a dialogic model. A 
dialogic approach to media-movement interactions moves 
beyond a deterministic approach and allows us to see the 
media-movement relationship as two-way, shifting and 
reflexive. It treats news as a discursive resource --
that is a system of knowledge -- that can be 
strategically appropriated by movements, even though 
this appropriation may corne with some unintended costs. 
A dialogic model sees movement strategists as reflexive 
agents, and both movement and media discourses as 
socially constructed and essentially overdetermined. A 
dialogical interaction may well end in marginalization 
for a movement, but in this framework that is an 
empirical not a theoretical question. In a dialogical 
framework media-movement relations are essentially 
indeterminate because the actors involved can learn 
about and use the structures that may have previously 
constrained their interactions (Giddens, 1984). 
Not only does a dialogical approach to media-
movement relations have more purchase on the empirical 
(messy and contradictory) reality of these interactions 
than a marginalization model, but it allows us to 
construct an ethical model of such relations in which we 
allow our subjects to be reflexive agents (not hopeless 
objects of media coverage) and in which we can account 
for any effects of our own communications about the 
process within the theory itself (Krippendorff, 1995, 
1996) . 
The study is structured In two parts. First it 
investigates the development of NOW's media strategies, 
asking how NOW leaders understood news as a political 
resource, how they managed the organization's 
4 
relationship with news media, and what such symbolic 5 
work "cost" the movement -- both materially and 
ideologically -- over time. Second, the study then 
analyzes the outcome of the NOW-news interaction In news 
content. Through a content analysis of NOW's 
representation over time in The New York Times, the 
study assesses how well NOW was able to communicate its 
discourse "through" news media. The study tracks how 
news re-presented NOW's political agenda and its 
organizational legitimacy as a speaker for women's 
concerns. Overall the study ask what kinds of "success" 
NOW experienced in using news as a political resource, 
and what such suc~ess "cost" the organization. 
The study draws on NOW's archived historical 
papers, on an original content analysis of the 
representation of NOW in the New York Times, 1966-1980, 
and on accounts of early feminist movement mobilizing by 
journalists and activists. 
Movements and Media: 
Mass Communicating New Knowledges 
Observers of the new social movements have tended 
to assume that the innovative content of new movement 
discourses will itself be transformative (cf. Habermas, 
1981; Giddens, 1987), but the transformative potential 
of social movements is as likely to rest in their 
ability to strategically articulate, mass communicate, 
and mobilize people around their ideas, as it lS In 
ideas themselves. As Snow (1988) has pointed out, 
movements can have no effects at all until they reach 
and resonate with audiences, whether these are elite 
policy makers, grassroots activists or potential 
sympathizers. 3 
The importance of mass communication to the new 
social movements is especially clear. The goals of the 
new movements (such as the environmental, women's and 
peace movements) are themselves essentially 
communicative. Their alm lS not to overthrow governments 
but to produce a revolution in meaning. They seek to 
persuade people to change behaviors, values, and 
identities through publicizing irrationalities or 
inequalities in society and by making available 
alternative sources of information for identity 
formation (Larana and Johnson, 1994; Touraine, 1985; 
Eyerman and Jamison, 1991). 
As producers of new knowledge and "framers" of 
social reality in new and challenging ways, the NSMs may 
be especially important strategic communicators early in 
the public opinion and public policy formation process 
-- that is In the making of "new" public issues. Fraser 
(1990, 1992), for example, has suggested that it is 
largely due to the communicative efforts of feminist 
groups that such issues as sexual harassment, domestic 
6 
violence, reproductive choice and child care have become 7 
"public" (and problematic) areas of social life at all. 
However, we have no clear idea how these issues 
were "created" or communicated by movement groups. How 
did feminist groups identify, publicize and "make" 
sexual harassment a public issue? What communication and 
mass communication strategies did they use and how 
successful were these strategies? What role(s) did media 
play in this process of publicity? 
A critical first step in understanding the 
communicative practices and potential of the new 
movements may be taken by focusing on their relationship 
with news media organizations. Just as other political 
actors in modern societies have discovered, movement 
strategists realize that news access, and especially 
legitimate access or "voice" in the news, is critical to 
being heard and taken seriously in the public sphere 
(Bonk, 1988; Bobo, Kendall and Max, 1991; Ryan, 1991) 
Before they can change society, and public or policy 
makers attitudes more generally, movement communicators 
have to successfully access and use news media. 
News has both distributive and authoritative value 
for movements. It can help movements reach mass 
audiences they could not otherwise afford to reach 
and in doing so movements may be able to influence 
decision making on their issues. But access to news 
brings more than just visibility for sources. News 
access -- especially routine and legitimate VOlce in 8 
the news -- is also associated with credibility and 
authority in American politics. Ericson et al. (1989) 
have suggested in fact that routine access to news in 
modern complex societies, where struggles over public 
policy and cultural practices often take place through 
news media, is a form of symbolic or cultural capital 
that lS critically tied to other forms of social power. 
As for-profit, capitalist organizations, interested 
in audience maximization and in serving advertising 
clients, news media are unlikely to be straightforward 
or easy targets for movement communications. In fact 
most of the routine tendencies of capitalist news media 
are indeed likely to work against the serlOUS 
representation of movements. From the political 
positions of their owners, to the day-to-day collection 
of the "information subsidies" produced by state and 
corporate organizations, media routines, ideologies and 
practices are not predisposed towards the sympathetic 
diffusion of movement discourses. And as low resourced 
sources, usual outside the already-constituted "beats" 
that reflect institutional power, movement organizations 
are also likely to find it difficult to make themselves 
newsworthy. 
However, news lS more than simply a rationalized 
information product. It is also a complex, historically 
developed and professionally produced discourse or form 
of knowledge (Van Dijk, 1988; Hartley, 1982; Altheide 9 
and Snow, 1979). As such, news may attain some relative 
autonomy from its economic base for a variety of reasons 
-- not least of which is the fact that its legitimacy as 
a form of knowledge for its practitioners and consumers 
depends at least on the appearance of such autonomy. 
In fact, as Hallin (1992) has recently suggested, 
news media in the United States need to be understood as 
overdetermined institutions that produce contradictory 
and overdetermined texts. News organizations are at one 
and the same time driven by commercial, cultural and 
political forces. Such overdetermination does not 
preclude structure in news practices and discourses, 
rafher it brings our attention to mUltiple structures. 
It challenges our ability to produce simple cause-effect 
relationships between forces and their outcomes, but 
does not deny that these forces may indeed have some 
structuring effects. In the case of news and movement 
interaction, the problem becomes one of identifying the 
structuring forces for both news and movements that 
reproduce and/or challenge hegemonic realities. 
A Dialogical/Structurationist Framework 
Media-movement interactions are best understood as 
historically dialogical relationships. That is, they are 
interactive, reflexive and strategic relations which 
take place not only between individuals and 
organizations day-to-day, but also, ultimately, between 10 
discourses (or systems of meaning) which influence each 
other historically. 
Like other social agents, movement strategists and 
media workers are at the same time complex, 
knowledgeable and strategic agents, who have some 
autonomy to create the relationship In a unlque way, and 
also, determined subjects acting out (or at least 
constrained by) the underlying "rules" and resources of 
their respective organizations' practices and discourses 
(Giddens, 1984). That is, movement strategists and media 
workers actively draw on their respective discourses but 
they are also produced by them. For example, journalists 
inceracting with the feminist movement may, even as they 
seek to understand feminism on its own terms, bring to 
the interaction categories of analysis (such as the 
public/private divide of liberal politics) that 
constrains their ability to "see" the movement. This 
kind of constraint affects what they consider to be 
"real" news as much as any consciously learned criteria 
of "newsworthiness." But while they may draw reflexively 
on one set of constraints (i.e. be aware of and try to 
stretch the definitions of "newsworthiness" that they 
know), they are reproducing another at the same time. 
To add to this complexity, both sets of agents are 
reflexive about their own and each others' discourses. 
That is, both media workers and feminists are able to 
infer patterns and conventions (the rules) about their 11 
own and each others discourse, and to encode their 
communications within that framework in order to better 
work with or manipulate the other. 4 Giddens (1984) has 
called this kind of human activity llreflexive 
appropriation ll of the rules of human actions and 
interactions, and he has suggested that it is exactly 
this kind of recognition and reflexive appropriation 
that complicates, and challenges, any deterministic 
model of social change. 
In the case of feminism and news, then, not only 
are two discrete systems of meaning interacting 
historically (one processing the other in systematic 
ways), but the agents of each discourse may 
strategically learn and employ the llrules ll of their own 
or each others' practice in the interaction. This kind 
of llreflexive appropriation of the rules ll is most 
apparent, for example, in the centrality that some 
movement strategists attribute to learning about and 
using the llrules ll of news (e.g. event-oriented, 
personality centered, individualistic, narratives) for 
their own purposes. But it is also the case that news 
itself has been changed as feminist journalists bring to 
it new categories of experience (such as sexual 
harassment or the category called llwomen's issues ll ) and 
change that discourse too. 
Seeing the media-movement relationship as 12 
dialogical does not preclude that it is an imbalanced 
interaction. It is likely that movements continue to 
"need" media more than media "need" movements. Neither 
does a dialogical relationship preclude that the outcome 
of media movement dialogs over time may indeed be 
something we might call "marginalization" or 
"incorporation." But such a framework does draw our 
attention to the likely complexity of such a process. 
For example, in a dialogical model, "incorporation" may 
be seen as the processing of one discourse 
systematically through the lens of another In ways that 
strip the original of key elements. But this processing 
may not always be the result of news categories being 
imposed, but (as is the case In this study)it can be the 
outcome of movement groups themselves using media 
conventions to package their ideas. 
These multiple, reflexive interactions 
individual, organizational and historical-discursive 
make the media-movement relationship extremely complex 
and overdetermined. But such a model is likely to have 
more purchase on reality than more reductionist 
either/or frameworks. When we see movements and media 
engaged in dialogical struggle, instead of inquiring how 
a movement is "covered" by news, we ask: How do 
movement strategists and journalists interact? How have 
movement organizations understood news as a resource and 
how have they experienced its constraints, both in terms 13 
of the Ycost" of accessing news and in constraining 
their identity formation? What strategies have they 
developed to control their interactions with news media 
and how have those strategies fared in interaction with 
news media routines and processes? In short, what has 
worked and what hasn't? 
As such a dialogical understanding may produce 
critical or strategic knowledge -- knowledge that may be 
used to produce change. 
What Structures Dialogic Relations? 
Resources, Strategies and Ideology 
In a dialogic framework, then, we expect the media-
movement relationship to be two-way, reflexive and 
strategic, and the outcome of news-source interactions 
to be overdetermined. But it is still a critical 
question as to what factors delimit or enhance these 
interactions from the point of view of a movement 
organization. Giddens (1984) has noted that social power 
is implicated, and reproduced, ln all interactions, but 
we still need to ask what aspects of interactions make 
them less or more likely to reproduce structures in 
hegemonic (i.e. as they were before) or challenging 
ways? 
In the context of media-movement relations, this 
means that we are still left with questions about what 
is likely to structure that relationship in ways that 14 
are useful for movement groups. For example, what 
resources or practices of movement groups are associated 
with successful interactions? And, what is "success" in 
this framework anyway? 
In this study I identify and investigate three 
general factors that have a significant impact on the 
outcomes of media-movement relations: the role of 
resources (such as money, skills, competencies, 
organization and so on) in structuring the interaction 
for a movement organization, the role of reflexive 
strategies (for example, developing and using news 
conventions), and the role of ideology and identity 
factors, in NOW's ability to access and control its 
interactions with news. 
I draw these three general structuring forces from 
a synthesis of three different but overlapping 
approaches to understanding news -- the political 
economlC, sociological and ideological/hegemonic studies 
of news and its sources. First, from the political 
economic literature (cf. Gandy, 1982, 1989) I draw 
questions about the resources needed to access media. I 
argue that resources are fundamental to any successful 
interaction and in this study I investigate NOW's 
mobilization of resources generally, and try to 
determine what kinds of resources were most useful In 
producing successful dialogic relations with media. I 
trace NOW's mobilization of members, staff and 
communicative competence over time and analyze how such 
resources were associated with media access. 
From the sociological news literatures I draw 
questions about media access strategies. These studies 
(cf. Tuchman, 1980; Gans, 1980; Fishman, 1980) have 
emphasized the centrality of media routines and 
practices to understanding news. In source studies, such 
as this one, then, strategies that try to use and/or 
subvert these routines are likely to be important. In 
this study, I investigate NOW's development of media 
strategies across time, describing the group's shifting 
understanding of media and the concrete practices and 
strategies the organization developed to use access news 
and to control its representation within news content. 
In particular, I am concerned with investigating the 
practices and outcomes of what Giddens (1984) has called 
ureflexive strategizing U in which agents learn about and 
try to use the urulesu of systems and discourses which 
would previously have constrained them (in this case the 
urules u of news, such as news conventions, routines and 
practices. ) 
Finally, from the critical ideological approach to 
news media (cf. Gitlin, 1980; Goldman and Rajagopal, 
1991), I draw questions about the structuring properties 
of a group's ideology or identity. In this framework, it 
lS the content of movements -- i.e. their ideas -- that 
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is seen to structure the media-movement relationship 16 
rather than the groups' resources or media strategies. 
Movements llsuccess ll (or usually failure) in this 
framework is seen to be more a result of what they are 
than what they do. 
This Vlew of a movement group's ideology/identity 
is very problematic however, because it tends to see 
identity as something pre-structured and independent of 
media relations. But a movement's identity is not a 
stable object. It is a construction that is constantly 
being reconstructed over time. In fact a movement's 
public identity (how it is perceived by most people 
including people who are part of the group or who may 
then join the group) is the result of interaction with 
media, not a precursor to it (van Zoonen, 1992).5 
Still, it is important that we try to discover how 
a movement's identity at different times, and its 
interpretation by journalists, may influence its 
relationship to media. So in this study I compare some 
elements of NOW's llinternal" identity with its media re-
presentation (which I am calling its public identity). 
For example, I ask what was NOW's llagenda" at different 
points and how was this re-presented by news. And, how 
was NOW's self-image as a spokesperson for all women re-
presented by the Times. 
I draw my construction of NOW's llinternal" identity 
from its own records and documents and then compare this 
construction to the Times construction of NOW. This is 17 
not a perfect solution -- neither of these identities 
are "authentic." Both are likely to be the result of 
strategic communication which will shift over time. But 
by comparing the representation of NOW in the records 
(internal newsletters, policy statements, minutes, etc.) 
over which its leaders at least had some control, with 
re-presentations of NOW's identity in news media, we may 
be able to map some patterns in the "processing" of NOW 
that may give us some leverage on the question of what 
role(s) NOW's varylng (and strategically produced) 
identity played in its media relations. 
These three traditions in news studies -- the 
political economic, sociological and ideological -- have 
often been set up in opposition to one another, each 
being presented at different times as "the " answer to 
the question of what determines news content. However, I 
argue here that news as a professional, commercial and 
cultural institution reflects the influences of all of 
these factors (Hallin, 1994). In a 
dialogic/structuration approach, the question becomes, 
not which one factor determines the outcome of any news 
interaction, but how and in what contexts do all of 
these factors interact and/or overlap to produce a 
complex outcome. Only empirical investigations that 
include all these factors for analysis can in fact sort 
out the overlapping roles of these determinants. 6 
What Constitutes Success? 
Assessing Outcomes in a Dialogical Framework 
It is difficult to assess the roles of these three 
factors, however, until we also have a working 
definition of success. In a general sense we can define 
success In this study as the relative ability of 
movements to use the rules of news as resources rather 
than constraints, but still, what outcomes would 
constitute successful strategic appropriation of news? 
How would we know if a movement has succeeded in 
reflexively appropriating news conventions? What are 
some measurements of communicative success? What 
constitutes a successful reflexive media strategy? 
For example, what would constitute a successful 
interaction of NOW with the Times? Is it simply the case 
that being talked about is enough? As Ericson et al. 
(1989) have suggested there is a vast difference for 
sources In being covered by news (i.e. being talked 
about) and having routine news voice which they 
associate with a form of cultural capital in modern 
media saturated societies. What kind of treatment by 
news constitutes reasonable representations? Should NOW 
be represented in the same way that it would represent 
itself? And what should that representation cost the 
movement organization? Is access successful if it takes 
all of an organization's time and resources? 
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For the most part, source studies have avoided this 19 
question. Gitlin (1980), for example, in his important 
study of media and movements does not explicitly state 
what kind of representation of SDS would have been a 
llgood ll outcome for the group. Other news studies have 
(implicitly at least) equated success for sources with 
simply being mentioned or being quoted in news accounts 
(cf. Sigal, 1973; Gans, 1980; Barker-Plummer, 1989, 
etc.), though the relationship between being cited and 
controlling the representation of an issue is surely 
quite problematic. 
More nuanced accounts of media content have 
suggested that source success can be seen in processes 
of- -definitional authority- (cf. Hall, 1978) in which 
powerful sources define issues first and then others 
have to respond. But even these concepts have their 
problems. As Schlesinger (1990) notes, for example, the 
text-based (or -media-centric") idea of definitional 
authority suggested by Hall et al. (1978) may not be 
particularly helpful in assessing source success because 
it does not trace the process through which such 
authority is produced, but rather infers it from the 
already powerful social locations that these sources 
hold outside of media discourse. 7 
Indeed the difficulty of defining success within a 
dialogical or constructivist framework has led some 
researchers to abandon it as an overly -instrumental" 
concept that has no place in a constructivist/dialogical 20 
framework of media in society (cf. Van Zoonen, 1992). 
But even in a dialogical framework we still need some 
indicators or assessments of whether what movements are 
doing is having useful outcomes, both for their own 
sake, and for the sake of developing useful models of 
media-movement interactions. 
In this study I use a four tiered system of 
assessment of NOW's success: access, voice, placement 
and control. Access lS simply a question of visibility. 
Voice refers to NOW's ability to be quoted l.e. 
being allowed to speak. Placement refers to the context 
of NOW's stories and the associated value of different 
news sections. Control refers to NOW's ability to 
maintain control of its organizational agenda and 
identity In its media representation. The measurement of 
control here is essentially comparative -- it attempts 
to gauge how much of NOW's own issue choice and framing 
came through into news content. It is assessed by 
comparing NOW's agendas and identity strategies with 
their media representation at key points. 
These dimensions of success are analytically 
separable, and can, to some extent be understood, 
hierarchically. We can say for example that access is 
basic to all other levels, that voice is an additional 
level of successful interaction, and that legitimate 
representation or control of one's identity makes a 
voice more credible and more likely to be listened to. 21 
Control, over one's identity and one's agenda, is In 
this framework the ultimate Hsuccess H of strategic 
interaction. In reality of course, anyone story might 
have overlapping and contradictory elements of all of 
these, and my alm lS not to put these forward as 
definitive a-priori categories of success, but simply to 
use them to organize a discussion in which it will 
become clear that they are exploratory and inter-related 
concepts. 
Design of the Study 
Understanding and assesslng a dialogical 
relationship over time requires a willingness to move 
back and forth between perspectives and methods. In this 
study I draw on various sources of information (archival 
papers, historical accounts, news content) and use 
different types of analyses (historical, case study and 
content analysis) to deal with different aspects of 
these questions. Archival sources (such as NOW's 
historical archive at Schlesinger Library, Radcliffe and 
the Women and Media Archive at the University of 
Missouri) were invaluable resources in reconstructing 
NOW's media resource investments and media strategies. 
Secondary sources such as accounts and histories of the 
early movement (and its relationship to the press) by 
activists made it possible to expand the analysis of 
movement media strategies beyond NOW and indeed to 
compare NOW's strategies with other movement groups. 
Memoirs and articles by journalists about covering the 
early movement were critical to understanding how the 
interaction was experienced from the news workers 
perspective. Finally, the study draws on an original 
content analysis of 377 stories about NOW in the New 
York Times in order to track the outcome of the 
interaction over time in at least one outlet. 
NOW as a Case Study Organization: 
A Note on Generalizability 
Both NOW and the New York Times are key 
organizations in their respective sectors. NOW lS 
arguably the most important organization in the second 
wave US women's movement. Though it has been seen as too 
IIliberal ll by some groups and too II radical" by others, 
there is widespread agreement in the US women's movement 
that NOW played a central role as the public voice of 
feminism for many years, and that even now, with the 
number of women's issue groups mushrooming, it is 
perceived as a central movement organization. As a 
recent history of the movement notes, "The fact is that 
if the National Organization for Women were to collapse 
and disappear, it would be taken as a signal of the end 
of this era of feminism, " (Carabillo, 1993, p. viii). 
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The New York Times also plays a central role in 23 
American political life where it is often presented (and 
accepted by professional journalists throughout the 
country) as the pre-eminent journal of record in the 
American media sector. The Times coverage of new 
movements and ideas is often the harbinger and active 
trend-setter for other mainstream media. 
These two organizations are important In and of 
themselves, then, and their interaction may have some 
historical significance beyond any issues of 
generalizability. But of course, the investment of time 
and energy in a case study is usually made in the hope 
that inferences can be made from the experience of one 
organization to others, or that we can at least derive 
questions from this interaction that will be useful in 
addressing the experiences of other organizations. 
From the perspective of generalizability, NOW lS 
both a typical and an atypical movement organization. 
Like all movement organizations, NOW is staffed mostly 
by volunteers and by (badly) paid staff activists who 
work there for political rather than career reasons. It 
has multiple political goals at anyone time and works 
on mUltiple fronts (such as legislative, educational and 
media). It is funded mostly by membership fees and often 
stretches its resources and staff to their limits --
working continuously in what one observer calls ·crisis 
mode.· Like other advocacy or movement organizations NOW 
1S often in the position of responding to, rather than 24 
initiating public issues and events, and compared to its 
perceived opponents in the political arena (such as the 
Pentagon or right wing research institutes) the 
organization is chronically under-financed. As such, 
then, NOW can be compared to many other under-financed 
and overburdened movement or advocacy organizations. 
However, NOW is also untypical of other movement 
organizations in that it was, at least in the early 
years, perhaps better organized, more ·professionally· 
managed and more focused on developing media as a 
resource than many other women's movement organizations. 
Many of its original members (as I describe more fully 
in'chapter five) were already in communication related 
positions or had some contacts with the press in 
previous professional positions, so that the 
organization's early access to news media may not be 
typical of some other groups, Also, NOW was, and is, a 
predominantly middle class organization led by women who 
possessed high degrees of organizational skills and 
competence. These aspects may make NOW atypical. Many 
movement organizations are likely to be less media savvy 
and less able to calIon such resources. 
Perhaps the most compelling reason to choose NOW as 
a case study organization for understanding and 
assessing the possibilities of using news as a movement 
resource, though, is the fact that NOW sees itself, and 
is positioned by others In the movement, as an 
essentially strategic and pragmatic organization. 
Spanning the boundary between more radical (and 
marginalized) organizations and mainstream media and 
political organizations, NOW is an organization of self-
consciously "militant pragmatists" whose aim has always 
been to both enter and change the system. As such it is 
a compelling example of an organization which struggles 
constantly with the tensions of incorporation In 
relation to news and other political institutions. It is 
this self-consciously strategic and boundary spanning 
position that makes NOW an excellent organization to 
which to address strategic questions about news. For NOW 
th~ problem is no longer whether to use the "master's 
tools" (in this case media), but how and at what costs 
and in what contexts. Like many other contemporary 
social movement organizations, NOW leaders have 
developed strategies to work both within and outside of 
the dominant institutions. 
At the least, we can draw from NOW's experience, 
questions about media and communications strategies 
which we can then address to other organizations In 
other historical contexts. At a time when social 
movement studies are moving towards communicative, 
constructivist and "consensus-mobilization" models of 
social movements and social change (cf. Klandermans, 
1988; Melucci, 1989; Gamson, 1989), developing a 
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strategic understanding of news media as a symbolic 
resource (or not) in that process, can only enhance our 
general understanding of communication and social 
movements more generally.8 
In the end, though, generalizability may be in the 
eye of the beholder, so I have included in the study 
(chapter four) a brief political profile of NOW as a 
movement organization so that readers can decide for 
themselves whether and how far to generalize from NOW's 
experiences in interaction with news media. 
Chapter Overview: 
Chapter Two, Movements, Media and Social Change: 
Towards A Dialogical Model places the case study first 
within the literature of critical social movement/social 
change theory and then within news theories. The chapter 
reviews recent work on the communicative or "symbolic 
challenge" of the new social movements and argues that a 
dialogic understanding of media-movement relations lS 
essential to our understanding of these processes. 
Chapter Three, Research Design and Methods, 
describes in detail the key research questions of the 
study, the data collected and drawn upon, and the 
measures and methods of analysis developed to answer 
these questions. As both an institutional analysis, 
drawing on NOW's historical records, and a content 
analysis of media outcomes of that interaction, the 
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chapter is broken into three parts, first describing the 27 
institutional analysis, then the content analysis and 
then the relationship between the two. 
Chapter Four, A Brief Political Profile of NOW: 
Militant Pragmatists, offers a brief historical profile 
of the National Organization for Women, the feminist 
organization that is the subject of the case study. I 
outline NOW's historical formation, describe its role in 
the US women's movement, and map its political agenda 
and identity shifts over time. 
Chapter Five, The Structuring Role of Resources: 
The Political Economy of NOW's News Access, focuses on 
questions of resources and media access. The chapter 
investigates what kinds of resources were important In 
producing media access, describes NOW's resource 
mobilization practices and relates those resources to 
its media access. I argue that the resource base of any 
organization is going to structure its ability to access 
media, and that particular kinds of resource (such as 
communicative competence, information, organization and 
money) are especially important. The chapter also notes, 
however, that there is no straight line between resource 
mobilization and media Usuccess U -- rather resources 
make it possible to produce media strategies which 
produce access, thereby turning material resources into 
symbolic power. 
Chapter Six, NOW Media Strategies: The 
Possibilities and Constraints of Media Pragmatism, 
describes how NOW understood and developed media as a 
political "resource." The chapter describes how NOW 
developed media kits, appropriated news conventions into 
their own communications, and built relationships with 
key women journalists. This strategic approach to news 
was not always shared by other women's movement groups 
and in this chapter I also briefly describes the media 
strategies of other movement groups to contextualize 
NOW's media strategies within the women's movement as a 
whole. The chapter also draws on accounts of covering 
the movement produced by women journalists, and 
illustrates the dialogic relationship between news and 
feminism as it was manifested in the concrete 
relationships between feminists and journalists, who 
were both working within constrained organizational 
contexts. I argue that NOW's media strategies were an 
example of reflexive appropriation of news conventions, 
and as such they produced both particular kinds of 
success and limitations for the organization. 
Chapter Seven, News Outcomes 1: Patterns in Access, 
voice and Agenda Control, 1966-1980, describes and 
assesses patterns in NOW's news access and discusses the 
organization's ability to transfer its issue agendas to 
news. Defining "success" in terms of access, VOlce, 
placement and control, the chapter analyzes patterns ln 
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the Times' processlng of NOW's access and issues. I 
argue that NOW achieved some limited success in becoming 
llexpertll sources, but that the Times systematically 
processed NOW's feminist agenda through a traditional 
liberal public-private framework. 
Chapter Eight: News Outcomes 2: Patterns in the 
Times' Processing of NOW's Identity, 1966-1980. This 
chapter describes patterns in the Times treatment of NOW 
in terms of its organizational identity and its 
legitimacy as a llspeaker ll for women's issues over time. 
I argue that NOW did not undergo either a 
straightforward umarginalization" or llincorporation. ll 
Rather the organization, partly through its own efforts, 
and the efforts of sympathetic journalists (and through 
the general legitimating effects of longevity) became 
somewhat institutionalized as a source, but that 
legitimacy was limited in important ways by the topic of 
the stories and the context of NOW's coverage. 
Chapter Nine, News as a Political Resource? An 
Overdetermined Dialogical Model, summarizes the study's 
findings about NOW's interaction with news media. It 
discusses the role(s) of resources, strategies and 
ideology in NOW's strategic mobilization of news and 
publicity as social movement resources, and discusses 
the generalizability of NOW's experience with news media 
to other social movement groups. Finally, the chapter 
discusses what, if anything, NOW's experience can 
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contribute to general news theories. I conclude that 30 
NOW's interaction with media, and the outcome of that 
interaction was in fact overdetermined by resource, 
strategy and ideological factors on both sides. As such, 
deterministic models (such as Gitlin's strong hegemony 
model, for example) are inadequate to explain these kind 
of interactions. I suggest that we need to develop an 
understanding of these interactions as dialogical 
interactions. 
NOTES 
1Movements do, of course, have access to other forms of 
mass communication. Self-published newsletters and 
newspapers, as well as electronic communication 
possibilities opened up by new computer networks (such 
as PeaceNet) may make a significant difference to 
movement mobilizing in the future. However, such 
chqnnels are currently limited to internal movement 
communication -- that is they are written by and 
distributed to people already interested in or active in 
the movement. If we are to understand a movement's mass 
communication possibilities, that is its ability to 
influence ideologies, issues and identity formation 
processes at the societal level, then access to existing 
mass communication channels becomes central because that 
is how most people will, initially at least, hear about 
movements and their ideas. 
2 For example, how will we know "incorporation" when we 
see it? The "strong hegemony" model is discussed at more 
length in chapter two, but it is worth noting briefly 
here that the problem with the concept of 
"incorporation" as used by Gitlin (1980), for example, 
is that it presented as a self-evident category -- i.e. 
as a somehow already known and definable outcome of 
interaction -- rather than as a process that needs 
empirical description. 
3This lack of focus on mobilization and communication 
processes is also typical of the older grand theories 
that put forward the working class as the central agent 
of social change, but did not investigate or elaborate 
how such mobilization would work. Ferree and Miller 
(1985) call this a classic confusion of a class in 
itself with a class for itself. 
4 Journalists and activists may also be members and 
strategic users of many other discourses too, but here I 
am limiting the discussion to feminism and news. 
5 See chapter three for a more thorough discussion of 
the problems of identity as a predictor. 
6 See chapter three for more discussion of these 
factors. See also Barker-Plummer, B. (1993). From Gates 
to Dialog: Towards a Communication Model of the News-
Source Relationship. Presented to the Political 
Communication Division, International Communication 
Association, Washington DC. 
7 Hall et al. (1978) attribute the definitional control 
of state sources in the news to their social location 
outside of the news, but they do not investigate the 
process through which this external location is 
translated into definitional control, so they cannot say 
how or why such "success" comes about. For example, 
what resources, practices, or strategies produced that 
definitional authority? Is it possible that other kinds 
of sources could also create definitional authority for 
themselves if they followed the same strategies? As 
Schlesinger (1991) and Miller (1993) have also noted, it 
is only through understanding the source strategies, of 
even very powerful sources, that we can understand how 
news access is related to power, and whether that access 
can be extended to more groups in society. 
8 For example, studies on the contemporary labor 
movement have stressed the emerging importance of a 
strategic understanding of communication and media 
strategies (cf. Ryan, 1992; Douglas, 1989), and 
activists and theorists of the peace movement have come 
to see media as a ground for struggle over public 
understandings rather than as a force for automatic 
exclusion (cf. Hackett, 1991, Bruck, 1992). 
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Chapter Two 
Movements, Media, and Social Change: 
Towards a Dialogical Model 
The overdetermined nature of social life and social 
research has been well described in recent social 
theory, such that the analysis of any social institution 
or practice must be seen as part of a larger system of 
interconnected patterns in the structuration of 
resources, power and agency (Resnick and Wolfe, 1987; 
Kellner, 1990; Giddens, 1984). Even so, researchers have 
to start somewhere in their attempts to understand 
processes of social reproduction and change, and Resnick 
and Wolfe (1987) suggest that we deal with this 
complexity by choosing an "entry point" that offers 
opportunities to analyze how different forces in the 
system interact. 
The "entry-point" of this study is the complex 
relationship between a social movement and news media. 
Social movements, especially the "new" social movements 
(NSMs) such as the women's, environmental, and peace 
movements, have come to be seen as the central 
transformative agents in modern societies, and as such 
to be critically implicated in processes of social 
change (Habermas, 1981; Giddens 1987; Touraine 1985) 
News media are also centrally implicated in processes of 
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social reproduction and change (Hall et al, 1978; 
Kellner, 1990, etc.) and form one of the most crucial 
bottle-necks in the communication of new knowledges. As 
such the media-movement nexus offers a rich entry point 
into understanding how new critical discourses emerge, 
how they are strategically articulated and mass 
communicated by movement organizations, and how they are 
processed for mass audiences by news organizations -- In 
short it allows us to investigate questions about the 
possibilities for social change through communication in 
mass mediated societies. 
The Symbolic Challenge of the New Social Movements 
Social movements, especially the nnew n social 
movements (NSMs) -- such as the women's, peace, and 
environmental movements -- have recently corne to the 
fore in contemporary politics and in contemporary social 
theory as the central agents of social change in modern, 
complex societies. In the eyes of many political 
observers the new movements have taken the place of the 
working class as agents of change (Laclau and Mouffe, 
1985; Habermas, 1981; Giddens, 1987; Offe, 1985; etc.) 
As Boggs (1986) has described them, the NSMs are the 
most important nemerging forms of radicalism in the 
west.n 
The contemporary emergence of the NSMs has been 
explained in a variety of ways, but most of these 
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accounts point to the new movements as arising ln 
response to a general crisis of legitimacy in modern 
political institutions. Habermas (1981), for example, 
sees the new movements as the outcome of larger social 
contradictions which he describes as a lllifeworld/system 
world overlapll that has produced a general lllegitimation 
crisis.ll In this framework the NSMs are involved in 
attempts to resist the increasing rationalization and 
technicizing of everyday life that is endemic in 
contemporary capitalist societies and to encourage 
and/or renew participatory democracy. Movements are thus 
centrally involved in the reclamation of the llcivic ll 
aspects of social life, in attempts to reclaim and 
extend the public sphere in resistance to the 
encroachments of the state and corporate spheres. 
Boggs (1986, p. 223) has also noted the importance 
of this civic or democratizing aspect of the new 
movements. Though he is less sanguine than Habermas ln 
his assessments of the likely success of the NSMs 
democratizing efforts, he notes that their potential is 
to radically reshape contemporary politics: 
Popular movements linked to the demands of anti-
nuclear activists, ecologists, urban communities, 
women, minorities and youth, correspond to changing 
economic realities, social and cultural forces, and 
political constellations that are only beginning to 
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coalesce and that, In time, promise to reshape 
class and social conflict. These new phenomena 
amount to an emergent social bloc that would 
revitalize civil society against incursions of 
the bureaucratic state, commodity production, the 
spiraling arms race -- against bourgeois hegemony 
in general (p.223). 
By all accounts the new movements have challenged 
both traditional and critical models of social change 
(Touraine, 1985; Giddens, 1987). Part of the difficulty 
the NSM's pose comes from their much less tangible 
relations to concrete class bases than the Hold H social 
movements such as the Labor Movement. Made up mostly of 
a particular fraction of the middle class (e.g. 
teachers, professionals, social workers, students, 
etc.), the new movements evince no simple relationship 
between their goals and their members' material or class 
base. In fact as Larana et al. (1994) have noted the new 
movements have a disturbing tendency to Htranscend class 
structure. H 
The new movements have been linked not to the 
moment of production in capitalist relations, as the 
labor movement had been, but rather to the moment of 
consumption. As Castells (1983, p. 320) has put it, 
H[new social movements] do not relate directly to the 
relationship of production, but to the relationships of 
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consumption, communication and power." This distinction 36 
as Rodriguez (1995, p. 10) notes, is crucial if we are 
to understand why the new movements are likely to affect 
society symbolically as much as materially: 
If social class was a category constructed to 
explain conflict over material production, social 
movement is a category built to explore conflicts 
over the production of symbolic goods and 
social meanings. 
The primary challenge of the new movements is best 
understood, then, as a symbolic challenge -- as a 
challenge to how we understand our relationships to each 
other and to our physical environments. The "success" of 
the NSMs is linked to the production and communication 
of new ideas or new identities. 
This symbolic focus does not mean that the new 
movements are not interested in material issues. A key 
goal of the women's movement, for example, has been and 
will be, equitable distribution of wages and job 
opportunities across genders. Similarly the 
environmental movement's mobilization against 
destruction of the natural environment is often based in 
a political economic analysis of who benefits from such 
destruction and its Bcosts" to us all. But the key point 
remains that strategically the new movements for the 
most part have envisioned their goals in communicative 37 
terms -- i.e. as the production of a new "consciousness" 
of gender, racial, ecological and other everyday 
relations. And they have tried to reach these goals 
through persuasion, education and publicity, rather than 
through violence, or challenges to production such as 
strikes or collective bargaining. l 
The NSMs focus on identity and communication 
issues, coupled with their tendency to focus on the 
"politics of everyday life" -- such as issues of 
interpersonal relations, cultural identity and family 
relations -- rather than traditional political lssues, 
has caused some observers to dismiss them as "extra-
political" movements which are not important unless, or 
until, they interact critically with state institutions 
(Offe, 1985; Eder, 1985). But as Boggs (1986, p. 4) 
notes, the challenge of the NSMs is only partially aimed 
at traditional political arenas. For the most part the 
NSMs are as concerned to reach directly to publics as 
they are to persuade policy makers, and it is in this 
symbolic work, in which they seek to change general 
self-understandings and public knowledge that their 
central challenge lies: 
... the fact that they [the new social movements] 
have nowhere overturned the status quo should not 
obscure their historical importance in posing new 
issues, shaping consciousness, and openlng new 
areas of political discourse. Indeed, many time-
honored debates have already been fundamentally 
recast in both substance and tone. 
Movements as Mass Communicators, Movements as Media 
It is this role as knowledge producers, and 
communicators of that new knowledge to other 
organizations and publics, that makes the new movements 
so central in contemporary explanations of social and 
ideological change. The NSMs are both the creators and 
the carriers of new knowledges, new identities, and 
essentially new ways of seeing and living social 
relations (Eyerman and Jamison, 1991; Touraine, 1985; 
Habermas, 1981). As Snow et al. (1988, p. 198) have 
described it, the new movements are key players in the 
"politics of signification:" 
Movements function as carrlers and transmitters of 
mobilizing beliefs and ideas ... they are also 
actively involved in the production of meaning for 
participants, antagonists and observers. Movements 
can thus be construed as functioning in part as 
signifying agents and, as such, are deeply 
embroiled, along with the media and the state, in 
what Stuart Hall (1982) has referred to as the 
"politics of signification." 
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Melucci (1985, p. 797) focuses on this 
communicative capacity of the new movements when he 
notes that the movements' challenge is essentially a 
"symbolic" or "prophetic" challenge because movements 
function as important sources of identity in society. 
Indeed, besides mass media, the NSMs may be one of the 
critical resources in modern societies from which 
citizens build identities. These "identity resources" 
are produced by social movements as they mobilize, and 
it is this knowledge production capacity that makes the 
new movements critically important. As Melucci (1985) 
notes, this understanding is one that envisions 
movements as a kind of media themselves.: 
Actors In conflicts are increasingly temporary and 
their function is to reveal the stakes, to announce 
to society that a fundamental problem exists in a 
given area. They have a growing symbolic function; 
one can probably speak of a prophetic function. 
They are a kind of new media. 
This "symbolic " function of the new movements lS 
at the heart of their importance. It is in their 
mobilization of information (and consequently meanings 
and the possibilities for identity-building and the 
redefinition of social relations) that the new movements 
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produce challenges to the system. Like media they 
collect, process and disseminate information from which 
individuals can create new identities. 
Movements and Strategic Communication 
For the most part, knowledge production by the NSMs 
lS quite deliberate and strategic. 2 Indeed it is one of 
the distinguishing features of the new movements that 
they focus so centrally in their strategizing both on 
mobilizing information and on the process of pUblicity 
-- of making known publicly what they consider to be 
problematic (Fraser, 1992; McLaughlin, 1993). Despite 
quite small numbers (relatively speaking) of members for 
example, the environmental movement and the feminist 
movement have been prodigious producers of information, 
studies, new knowledges and new ways of knowing. 
The women's movement has been particularly 
implicated in this process of making public areas of 
social life that had previously been seen as "private" 
or at least unproblematic The now publicly accepted --
if contested -- political categories such as "sexism," 
"sexual harassment," "date rape," and so on, are the 
outcome of this process of publicizing that the women's 
movement has seen as so important to its success (cf. 
Fraser, 1992; McLaughlin, 1993) 
It is also a key aspect of the new movements in 
fact that they are self-reflexive about their roles in 
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problematizing areas of social life and producing new 41 
identities. The US women's movement, for example, with 
its development of "consciousness raising" as a movement 
practice has created a practice in which both making 
"public" and the creation of new identities are central. 
Consciousness raising (CR) allows participants to bring 
to discursive consciousness areas of life that were 
previously experienced on a practical level, and then to 
rebuild identities based on that new recognition. For 
example, consciousness raising practices allowed women 
to realize the power embedded in traditional family 
roles and chores, 1n everyday language forms and modes 
of address, and in the commercial representation of 
women in popular culture (Koedt et al. 1973; Freeman, 
1975) . 
At the social level, this problematizing role 1S 
also apparent as the women's movement works to 
communicate these insights and to "raise the 
consciousness" of society. Indeed it is one of the most 
profound effects of the women's movements of the united 
States and western Europe, that they have placed on the 
public agenda mUltiple "problems" or issues that 
previously had not even been seen as political. This 
"agenda," which includes issues such as reproductive 
rights, equal opportunity, sexual discrimination in 
education and employment, child care and family leave 
policies, and so on, is in fact the outcome of 
continuous, self-reflexive publicizing by the movement 42 
of areas of social life that had previously been seen as 
either "private" or unproblematic. Most recently as 
Fraser (1992) has noted, we can also understand the 
struggle over Clarence Thomas's confirmation, and over 
sexual harassment issues more generally, as part of this 
process of bringing to social consciousness -- of 
bringing to publicity -- the embedded power 
relationships involved in workplace expressions of 
sexuality. 
Such attempts at "publicizing" are of course not 
unproblematic or straightforward, and as Fraser (1992) 
notes, formidable forces can be arrayed to re-privatize 
or to re-inscribe gendered power lines around who has 
the right to decide what shall be made public. But it is 
an indication of the relative force of the women's 
movement's "symbolic challenge" that such "issues" are 
even on the public agenda at all. 
This central focus in the feminist movement of 
making public and discursive , areas of life that had 
been previously experienced as private, is fundamentally 
reflexive process and is critical to understanding the 
real challenge of the NSMs. As Giddens (1984) has noted, 
the "structures" of modern society, far from existing 
outside of our lives and pressuring us from above, are 
in fact reproduced in interaction. We bring to bear on 
every interaction the embedded "rules" and 
maldistributed "resources" of our social systems, and 43 
for the most part power relations are reproduced at the 
level of practical consciousness -- i.e. as non-
discursive agency, through a kind of "going on" in the 
world (Giddens, 1984). One way to challenge such "going 
on" is to bring activities pursued at the level of 
practical consciousness to the level of discursive 
consciousness -- to make public -- the power, 
assumptions and history embedded in such interaction. 
Through their focus on publicizing previously "private" 
areas of social life the women's movement (and perhaps 
the NSMs in general) are involved in fundamentally self 
reflexive symbolic work. It is this reflexive production 
of ~mancipatory knowledge that 1S the real "challenge" 
of the NSMs. It is these kinds of reflexive 
appropriations of knowledge about everyday routines that 
make it possible for individuals to re-produce 
structures differently across time -- to produce change. 
The New Social Movements, through their reflexive 
production of knowledge about the power embedded in 
everyday life are critically important in producing such 
change (Giddens, 1987, p. 48): 
Organizations and social movements, it might be 
argued, are the two ways in which reflexive 
appropriation of knowledge about the social world 
is mobilized in the modern world. 
Movement Communication and Agenda-Building 
One of the key social arenas in which this 
strategic symbolic work of social movements takes place 
is that of public policy agenda-building. In the general 
symbolic struggles over what areas of social life will 
be subject to public debate, social movements may have 
emerged in the last few years as key players, especially 
at very early stages of problem formulation. 3 
As Kingdon (1984) and others have noted, public 
policy issues -- that is the issues or experiences that 
will be seen by policy makers as important and 
actionable -- are not self-evident in society. Rather, 
the particular list of problems and solutions that 
become central is the result of ongoing struggles and 
negotiations by interested political actors. The public 
-agenda- in this sense, is created through the 
interaction of various sets of political actors -- the 
executive branch, (especially the president and his 
staff, but also his political appointees), civil 
servants/bureaucrats, academics and researchers, media, 
and interest groups (Kingdon, 1984). According to 
Kingdon, this set of ·players· takes part in various 
recurrent -stages· of policy development and each are 
more or less important at different stages. These stages 
are outlined as (1) setting the policy agenda (2) 
specifying alternatives from which a choice is made (3) 
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forcing an authoritative choice such as a vote or 
presidential enactment and (4) implementing the 
decision. 
Kingdon's analysis lS important In that it moves 
public policy analysis away from assumptions about the 
objective importance of some issues rather than others, 
pointing out how policy formation is in fact a 
fundamentally political struggle. His perspective opens 
up the policy process to include a variety of actors who 
may influence the outcome, whereas previously policy 
studies tended to focus on policy making as the domain 
of technicians. However, Kingdon's policy building model 
is also missing some crucial steps. Despite his focus on 
the inherently constructed nature of the policy agenda, 
Kingdon's model of policy building still begins with the 
selection by policy elites between a set of somehow 
self-evident "issues." (The first "stage" of the Kingdon 
model is one in which elites choose between available 
issues). But how did these "issues" get to be issues In 
the first place? How did there come to be a list of 
possible choices from which policy actors could choose? 
How were such areas problematized at all? Perhaps 
because he does not focus centrally on either media or 
movement organizations, Kingdon does not address these 
questions. 
But surely the process of making concerns into 
issues is not trivial. The social, communicative, and 
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strategic creation of a social problem is in fact a 
significant part of the overall politics of 
signification. In this process -- the precursor to 
policy elite choices -- political actors take a social 
experience, or concern and make it a public issue. They 
select among experiences and work to strategically frame 
and construct a certain set of them as (a) problematic 
(b) public and (c) important. 
In fact it is at this early stage In agenda 
building -- the "problem formulation" stage-- that 
social movements may be the most important players. The 
new movements, as observers have noted, are centrally 
involved in the production of new "problems." The issue 
of sexual harassment is an example of this phenomena. It 
lS not that sexual harassment did not occur before the 
1970s, but that it was not framed as a public problem 
before then. It was through the symbolic work of the 
feminist movement that sexual harassment became first 
problematized and then publicized, as a systemic 
problem. 
This problematizing work is closely linked to what 
Goffman (1986 [1974J) and others have called framing in 
which the ways that events or issues are presented can 
significantly alter the ways that they are understood by 
audiences and policy makers (cf. Iyengar, 1991; Kahneman 
and Tversky, 1984). Framing can be either intuitive or 
strategic. In public policy agenda building it is likely 
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to be a process of strategically creating an 
interpretive framework that contextualizes information 
in specific ways and so encourages a particular 
interpretation by audiences (Gitlin, 1980; Gamson, 
1992) . 
Movements are In fact significant producers of 
these frames at the societal level. Indeed it may be 
that framing and other llsignwork" is the central 
activity of movements (Snow, 1988, p. 198): 
We use the term framing to conceptualize this 
signifying work precisely because that is one of 
the things social movements do. They frame, or 
assign meaning to and interpret, relevant events 
and conditions In ways that are intended to 
mobilize potential adherents and constituents, to 
garner bystander support, and to demobilize 
antagonists. 
The importance of how an lssue lS framed cannot be 
overestimated in political struggles. Golding and 
Middleton (1982) and Iyengar (1991) have illustrated, 
for example, what a difference it makes to policy and 
public opinion whether poverty lS understood as a 
structural or a personal problem. Similarly Hall et al. 
(1978) describe how llmugging" can be framed and reframed 
by authorities to bolster or challenge public images of 
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minority groups and to contribute to the abridgment of 48 
their civil liberties. Stone (1989, p. 282) has ln fact 
suggested that this fundamentally symbolic work in 
which lssues are identified, publicized and linked to 
other lssues -- in at the heart of all policy agenda 
building: 
Difficulties become llproblems ll 
amenable to human intervention 
human problems 
through narrative 
construction by interested groups in the policy 
arena. This making of problems, of causal stories, 
is the precursor to any agenda setting activities. 
Actors construct stories that explain the roots of 
a problem and its solutions and then tell that 
story [or sell it] to policy makers. The llwinning ll 
story is the one that becomes the standard 
explanation (p. 282). 
The agenda building process, then is essentially a 
definitional struggle in which different groups produce 
their own (interested) narratives about what is 
important and what should be done by policy makers. 
Movements may playa central role in this process, 
especially at very early stages in which they are key 
framers of what areas of social life may be seen as 
problematic at all. 
However, we are still very far from understanding 49 
how it is that this symbolic work, this problematizing 
and framing, is achieved (or not) on a day-to-day basis. 
For example, how do "movements" select aspects of social 
life for attention and how do they "make" them public 
issues? Is the process of problematizing an activity of 
movement leaders, or do movements collectively define 
problems? Are all movements equally capable of "making" 
public issues? What frames are likely to work and which 
do not? What skills, resources and contexts are 
necessary for this symbolic work to proceed? And, most 
critically for this study, where lS mass media in this 
process? If movements "make" social problems through 
strategic framing, how is it that those frames corne to 
be shared (or not) by others? Do media unproblematically 
transfer movement frames? Or are movement issues and 
frames transformed in important ways by mass media 
organizations and discourses? 
Media Roles in Movement Communication: 
News as a Resource in Agenda-Building 
The symbolic challenge of movements must In fact be 
located in their mass communication strategies. It is 
through their articulation and publication of knowledge 
-- either in their own media or through their 
interactions with established media institutions -- that 
movements are likely to be able to produce influence on 
the public agenda or on individuals' understanding of SO 
issues. If we are to understand the potential symbolic 
challenge of the new movements, it is essential that we 
begin to focus on how social movements articulate and 
mass communicate their messages. 
In this process of diffusion, movement interactions 
with commercial news media are critical. As the major 
source of political information for citizens in modern 
societies, news media are still one of the most critical 
bottlenecks in the distribution of new knowledges by and 
about emergent social movements. Whether (and how) the 
new movements can strategically produce access to news 
media, and what kinds of control (if any) they can 
exerClse over the representation of their lssues and 
identity must be key questions in any assessment of the 
transformative potential of the new movements. 
In addition to its ability to deliver messages to 
large audiences regularly and cheaply (compared to 
sending communications directly to millions of people), 
news has also been shown to have significant and varied 
effects on audience perceptions of public issues, events 
and leaders. For example, news constructions of the 
world have been documented to "set peoples agendas" and 
tell them what is important (McCombs and Shaw, 1978; 
Iyengar and Kinder, 1987); to "prime" audiences 
interpretations and evaluations of political issues and 
candidates, to influence how people will "frame" (or 
understand) social problems (cf. Iyengar, 1991; Gamson, Sl 
1992), and to llmainstream" peoples' political opinions 
(cf. Gerbner et al., 1980), and so on. As such, news 
access -- the ability to routinely speak and be heard 
from within news accounts of the world -- is a highly 
sought after symbolic resource in political life. 
Gandy (1982, p. 198), for example, has argued 
convincingly for the importance of news as a political 
resource for corporations in the Unites States, who he 
suggests, are "subsidizing" public decision-making in 
their favor by providing information for journalists. As 
Gandy explains, "An information subsidy increases the 
demand for certain information by lowering its price to 
the·consumer ... The journalist's costs of producing news 
are reduced through a variety of techniques utilized by 
sources to manage the information market." In this 
framework, news lS a political resource, then, because 
it allows successful news sources to influence the 
decision-making of audiences (Gandy, 1982, p. 198). 
Besides subsidizing decision-making news access lS 
also associated with a certain authority In public life. 
Because news discourse lS a privileged form of knowledge 
In political life -- that lS it lS generally considered 
to be an authoritative version of reality -- access to 
news is also associated with high levels of cultural 
legitimacy. As such, news offers sources another form of 
power beyond the chance to distribute self-interested 
information; it offers membership in a group of 
"knowers." It is this association with authority that, 
according to Ericson, Baranek and Chan (1989, pp. 3-4), 
makes news a form of cultural capital for its regular 
sources: 
News lS a representation of authority. In the 
contemporary knowledge society news represents who 
are the authorized knowers and what are their 
authoritative versions of reality .... It indicates 
who is in possession of knowledge as "cultural 
capital," and thereby articulates who are members 
of the "new class" who derive their labor and 
property membership from the production, 
distribution and administration of knowledge. 
In this knowledge/power framework, representation 
In news confers authority on the source, because news 
itself has come to hold a special place as an 
authoritative version of reality. 
Access to news lS a political resource for 
organizations, then, because it is a modality of power. 
News voice translates into legitimacy in the knowledge 
system for the speaker, and news' distributive capacity 
allows the speaker to communicate that knowledge widely, 
and so structure the public information environment. In 
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media-saturated societies, access to news lS a key part S3 
of making one's "account count" in the public sphere 
It would seem to be a fundamental democratic 
question, then, to ask who is able to access news In 
order to speak to other citizens, how such access is 
produced strategically, and at what costs to 
organizations. But as Schlesinger (1991) has recently 
noted, with few exceptions (cf. Gandy, 1982; Ericson et 
aI, 1989), media scholars have tended to take a very 
"media-centric" view of the newsmaking process and 
ignore the activities of sources. However, as 
Schlesinger (1991, p. 61) points out, it is only by 
studying sources, that we will tie the study of news 
back onto the study of communication and social 
power/social change more generally: 
The key issue at the heart of the study of sources 
is that of the relations between the media and the 
exercise of political and ideological power, 
especially but not exclusively by central social 
institutions which seek to define and manage the 
flow of information in a contested field of 
discourse. 
News as a Social Movement Resource 
If the question of source strategies has been 
underdeveloped in media studies generally, work that 
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investigates how critical sources such as NSM s might 54 
access media, lS especially rare though questions about 
the parameters of these relationships abound: For 
example, should social movements be thought of as 
sources in the same way that corporate or governmental 
sources are? What difference does it make when sources 
are challenging or critical? Or when they are under-
resourced? Or they produce knowledge in forms that may 
not be immediately obvious to journalists? All of these 
are likely to be true of movement sources. Is news 
likely to be a form of cultural capital for social 
movements? And, if so, is it one that they can afford 
both materially and ideologically? 
Gitlin (1980) has suggested that movements are 
untypical sources who will always be denied 
authoritative access but instead will be ucovered u and 
marginalized. Based on his case study of Students for a 
Democratic Society (SDS), Gitlin (1980, p. 281) has 
argued forcefully that news will never adequately carry 
social movement discourses because of the economic, 
organizational, and ideological connections that news 
organizations and news discourses have to dominant power 
relations In society. Though movements will be 
attracted to commercial news media as a way of "getting 
the word out," Gitlin concludes that news media are 
likely to cover them and their concerns in ways that 
will be counter-productive to critical social change. He 
argues that commercial media, through their professional 55 
"routines" and practices -- which are themselves 
embedded in capitalist and profit-oriented ideologies 
will serve to "frame" critical social movements and 
their activities in trivializing or marginalizing ways. 
In this hegemonic model, news media are central players 
1n the systematic suppression of critical voices: 
.... an opposition movement 1S caught in a 
fundamental and inescapable dilemma. If it stands 
outside the dominant realm of discourse, it is 
liable to be consigned to marginality and political 
irrelevancei its issues are domesticated, it's 
deeper challenge to the social order sealed off, 
trivialized and contained. If, on the other hand it 
plays by conventional political rules in order to 
acqu1re an image of credibility -- if, that is, its 
leaders are well-mannered, its actions well-
ordered, and it's slogans specific and "reasonable" 
-- it is liable to be assimilated into the 
hegemonic political world viewi it comes to be 
identified with narrow (if important) reform 
issues, and its oppositional edge is blunted (p. 
281) . 
But Gitlin's conclusions may be too much too soon. 
SDS was one, early, and relatively short-lived 
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organization whose own development of media strategies 56 
was quite limited. But more importantly, the reform or 
revolution dichotomy that Gitlin invokes here, In which 
movements must either be marginalized if they are 
radical, or incorporated if they are liberal, raises 
certain difficulties. It is an overly deterministic 
framework based on qualities of movements that are far 
from self-evident. For example, this approach begs the 
question of how we corne to know what a movement "is" at 
all. As Melucci (1985, p. 792) has observed, though 
historians and observers often talk about "movements" as 
if they were already constituted entities, who act in 
coherent ways, in fact "movements" are social 
constructions that are created and maintained through 
communication practices across time. And one of the 
forces with which movements interact in forming 
identities, are media themselves. As Van Zoonen (1994) 
has suggested, it is not really a question of whether 
news covers a ngiven n (liberal or radical) social 
movement in a "true" way or not, but a question of how 
the various "identities," strategies and organizational 
practices of a movement interact with the complex, 
though structured, selection "rules" of news media to 
create particular outcomes. 
Gitlin's radical/reformist framework, however, not 
only assumes that movements have some essential quality 
that can be used as a predictor (i.e. radical or 
reformist) but it gives us only two "outcome" 
possibilities (trivialization or incorporation) for what 
is a complex, communicative interaction between two sets 
of organizations and discourses across time. Social 
change, especially ideological change, is never such an 
all or nothing process, and as more resent studies of 
movements have suggested a movement's identity 
(especially the new movements) are much more complex and 
contradictory than a reformist/revolutionary dichotomy 
would allow (cf. Melucci, 1989). 
Perhaps the most limiting aspect of a closed 
hegemonic model such as Gitlin's, is that it seems to 
deny the ability of social movement actors to learn 
about and strategically use dominant systems and 
discourses -- in this case journalistic routines and 
practices -- as resources themselves. 4 Movements can, 
potentially at least, learn about news organizations' 
routines, practices and discursive logics, and take part 
in framing themselves. 
Giddens (1984) has suggested that this kind of 
reflexivity -- the ability to access and discursively 
use the urules u as resources -- is itself a fundamental 
aspect of human agency, and one that challenges 
deterministic explanations for human practices in many 
different circumstances. In the context of social 
movements this reflexivity and strategic use of 
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constraints may sometimes make news discourse a movement 58 
resource. 
Ryan (1991) suggests, In fact, that it lS through 
the strategic use of the very journalistic routines that 
Gitlin credits with destroying the student movement, 
that challenging groups can begin to strategically 
"frame" themselves in newsworthy and culturally resonant 
ways. In a study of how one local labor union 
repositioned itself in news media through strategic 
reframing of its issues from ·special interest" to 
·justice,· Ryan describes the day-to-day strategic 
communication practices, or "framing contests" that 
could become part of many movements communication 
strategies. She notes that although the relationship is 
a struggle, it is not a closed or hopeless one. 
It is still of course an open question how 
successfully movements and other speakers of critical 
discourses can ·use N media logics and conventions for 
their own purposes of course. What kind of effects is 
such use likely to have on a movements own discourse or 
identity? Is it possible to translate some ideas through 
news conventions and have them retain their integrity to 
some extent? Does reframing ideas for media mean 
essentially reframing them altogether? 
Besides the reflexive strategies of movement actors 
is the complex and contradictory nature of news itself. 
News organizations are rlven with contradictions 
deriving from their need to respond to economic, 
political and professional forces. In fact as Hallin 
(1992) has suggested, we must see that news itself is 
overdetermined, making any simple processing of other 
discourses unlikely. 
Gamson (1989), for example, has suggested that the 
particular way news represents political issues can be 
attributed to at least three different sets of factors: 
first, the strategic activities of sources; second, the 
activities of professional journalists within the 
routines of news organizations; and third, the cultural 
context in which some ideas and themes have more 
-re~onance" than others, that is to say, the ideological 
content and context of news events. To this list we 
might also add the relative competition for access at 
anyone time between sources (Schlesinger, 1992; Gandy, 
1982); the economic imperatives of news organizations 
(such as their routine use of -information subsidies" 
and audience maximization techniques) which affect, both 
positively and negatively, the chances of movements to 
access news (Hallin, 1992; Gandy, 1982); and the 
relative influences of contextual shifts such as elite 
policy configurations that can make movements more or 
less "newsworthy." 
This overdetermination does not deny the very 
systematic ways that news media can be seen to process 
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reality. Given the highly conventionalized style of news 60 
discourse (in which events are more important than 
processes, institutional elites are the most prominent 
sources, and the "beat" system which encourages the 
definition of news as information which emanates from 
government bureaucracies), it is quite likely that news 
will systematically recombine movement discourses and 
ideas in ways which conform to such conventions. 
However, none of these factors has sufficient 
determining force in all circumstances to make the 
construction of news stories inevitable. As Bruck (1989, 
p. 113) has noted, despite the general sense of 
ideological closure that critical news studies have 
often described, news is still an overdetermined and 
"leaky" ideological system: 
Given the capitalistic, industrial, and 
bureaucratic structure of the news media's 
operation, the finding that the media reproduce the 
dominant ideology does not come as a surprise. 
Rather it means that the news media do perform 
their functional job. What is of interest then 1S 
how the media accomplish their reproductive labor, 
when they fail to do this, what alters this 
operational functioning, what opportunities for 
change exist, how these opportunities are 
differentially distributed, and what conclusions 
can be drawn for alternative or oppositional 
practices and movements. 
Towards a Dialogical Model 
The media-movement relationship lS perhaps best 
characterized as dialogical -- that is, as an 
interactive, reflexive, relationship that takes place 
over time. It is a relationship in which both media 
workers and movement strategists are knowledgeable, 
strategic agents, seeking to learn about and use each 
other's discourse. Such learning, and the incorporation 
of that knowledge into future interactions, can be seen 
as a form of strategic interaction 
Habermas, 1984). 
(cf. Goffman, 1969; 
Giddens (1984) has outlined a general dialogical 
model for social relations that he calls a 
·structurationist· model that is useful here. In a 
structurationist framework the relationship between 
structure and agency in society is seen as dialectical. 
Structures are conceived as being both constraining and 
enabling and agency itself (activity that is perceived 
to be autonomous by actors) may in fact chronically 
reproduce power relations through unintended 
consequences. In a structurationist framework, change is 
produced through the reflexive appropriation of 
knowledge about the routines, rules and structures that 
are constraining actors' understandings and behaviors. 
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However, because the consequences of rules and routines 62 
are not always understood completely (because of both 
resource and competence deficiencies) such change is 
likely to be partial and contradictory. 
A structurationist or dialogical approach to the 
media-movement relationship directs our attention to the 
aspects of that relationship that are highly structured 
-- news organizations do bring highly conventionalized 
categories and expectations to bear on social movement 
communication -- but it also highlights how these 
structures can be used reflexively to produce an 
indeterminate outcome. For example, if movement 
strategists learn about and use the conventions of 
lib'eral journalism in their own communications, the 
outcome of media-movement interactions is likely to be 
different than if they simply present their perspectives 
in their own frames and wait to be processed by news. In 
this context the question for movements becomes, not how 
will we be processed by media, but what can we say by 
using news languages, and how far can we stretch news 
conventions to say what we want. Because media-movements 
relationships play out over time, these incorporations 
of knowledge about previous behaviors and rules, can be 
mobilized In future strategies to produce different 
outcomes. As Giddens has illustrated, it is this kind of 
reflexivity that challenges any deterministic model. 
Understanding the media-movement relationship as a 63 
dialogical one, then, opens up our understanding of 
media and movements from one of "coverage" -- in which 
news representations of social movements are (implicitly 
at least) compared to some ideal representation of 
reality into one in which two sets of actors are 
seen to be working within constraints to create and 
recreate different constructions of reality. Seeing the 
media-movement relationship as two-way does not preclude 
an imbalanced interaction, nor deny that one 
organization holds more power than the other. Dialogic 
interactions corne with no guarantees. Oppositional 
social movements are always likely to be less well 
resourced than either news organizations or the other 
corporate or state sources with which they compete for a 
place in the media agenda. Becoming involved in 
interaction with news media at all, will certainly 
involve expenditures that movements can barely afford. 
And, perhaps most critically, it may also involve 
ideological costs. Framing a critical discourse 
successfully for news consumption may mean re-framing it 
In crucial ways. But to say that a relationship lS 
difficult, complex, subtle, and unbalanced is not to say 
that its outcomes are inevitable. As Hackett (1991, p. 
281) notes in his conclusion to a study of the Canadian 
press and peace movement, "The press is not a level 
playing field, but sometimes it is possible, even 
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playing uphill, to score points, to win a match, and 64 
perhaps occasionally even to redefine the rules of the 
game." 
When we see movements and media engaged in 
strategic interaction, or dialogical struggle, instead 
of inquiring how a movement is covered by the news 
organizations, we can ask: How do movement strategists 
and journalists interact? How have movement 
organizations understood their relationship with news 
media and how have they experienced its constraints? 
What strategies have they developed to control their 
interactions with news media and how have those 
strategies fared over time? In short, what has worked 
and what hasn't and why? 
Assessing Interactions: 
What structures dialog? What constitutes "success?" 
In a dialogic framework, then, news is seen as the 
overdetermined outcome of complex and reflexive 
interactions between sources and journalists in shifting 
political and resource contexts. The question for 
researchers becomes how to investigate and/or assess 
such a relationship. In a dialogic framework, for 
example, we need to ask, what factors structure or 
influence the dialog? What aspects of organizations and 
discourses make it more or less likely that sources will 
be "successful" in controlling a media dialog? Indeed, 
r 
r , what constitutes success? If we want to move beyond 65 
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describing media-movement interactions, and into 
assessing them, these questions are fundamental. 
In this study I identify and investigate three 
general factors that structure media-movement relations: 
resources (such as money, skills, competencies, 
organization, and so on), strategies (for example, 
developing and uSlng news conventions, or building 
relationships with women reporters) and 
ideology/identity factors (that is the ideas, policies 
and self-presentations of the organization). These three 
factors have all been shown to be influential In 
structuring media interactions. 5 Gandy (1982; 1989), for 
example, has noted that source organizations' access to 
journalists is based in their ability to provide 
Hinformation subsidies H for journalists, which itself is 
tied to their overall resource base. In this model news 
access and control over the representation of public 
lssues is tied to the ability of actors to routinely 
provide information that journalist will use in their 
news stories. As Gandy (1989) notes, access to 
journalists (and influence over public debate) is not 
determined only by resources, but those organizations 
that are able to produce cheap, easy, reliable 
information for journalists have a better chance than 
others. 
The question for social movement groups In 
interaction with media becomes whether they too can 
mobilize enough resources to provide llinformation 
subsidies ll to journalists. In this study I investigate 
NOW's resource mobilization asking what resources seem 
to be important in gaining access to media. I also 
assess NOW's ability to mobilize these resources over 
time. I ask what kinds of human, financial, and 
information resources were used in producing NOW's level 
of media access. 
Strategic sophistication, especially In negotiating 
the constraints of news practice and news discourses, lS 
also likely to be a factor that structures news access 
for' sources. As many studies have noted, news itself lS 
the product of conventions and routines both at the 
level of practice (beats, institutional source use, and 
so on (cf. Gans, 1980; Fishman, 1989)) and at the 
discursive level where judgments of what kinds of issues 
and topics are newsworthy and the linguistic framing and 
construction of news stories is also highly 
conventionalized (van Dijk, 1988). How source 
organizations adopt and adapt to these conventions lS 
likely to have a serious effect on their relative 
llsuccess" in influencing news and through news, public 
debates. In this study, then, I investigate NOW's 
development of strategies through which the organization 
sought to control its interactions with news media. I 
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ask what kinds of strategies NOW developed to interact 67 
with and control its interactions with media, and 
whether these strategies were "successful" or not 1n 
allowing the group to control its identity and form its 
agenda. 
Ideology and identity factors have also been shown 
to be important factors in predicting media 
interactions. Gitlin (1980), for example, focuses on 
ideology as a structuring factor in media interactions 
when he suggests that news will always incorporate 
"reformist" groups and marginalize "radical" groups. But 
this framework is very problematic. First, because it is 
difficult to tell at anyone time what a movement 
group's ideology or identity is (the leaders of a group 
may hold a very different perception of its identity 
from its members, for example), and the relative 
autonomy or independence of movement groups' identity as 
a predictor is hard to justify. As Van Zoonen (1992) 
notes, a group's "public identity" is in fact often 
created in interaction with (or in anticipation of) news 
media itself. 
Still, it 1S likely that a group's identity will 
structure its interaction with news media, in some ways. 
Even if identity/ideology does not directly predict 
access or representation, it my be that a group's 
political identity or ideological position will 
structure both its media strategies in some ways, and 
its reception by journalists. Different political 
groups, for example, do take different strategic 
approaches to media and over time a group may change 
both its overall political identity and its media 
strategies as a consequence of that overall shift. In 
this study I deal with the problem of identity in a 
number of ways. First, I track how shifts in NOW's 
political identity (its aims, goals, agenda, leadership, 
and so on) affected its interactions with media. Second, 
the study compares NOW's media strategies to other 
groups In the women's movement, in order to 
contextualize its strategic choices within a movement 
wide framework. Third, in the assessment phase of the 
study, I track how these shifts in NOW's identity over 
time were represented in media content. This approach lS 
essentially comparative and contextual; it involves 
comparing NOW's "internal" identity with its "public" 
(media) identity, in relation to its shifting media 
strategies. Of course none of these "identities" is more 
"true" than any other-- the internal recorded "identity" 
of NOW was as likely to be strategically produced as its 
"public" identity, even if for different purposes. And 
none of the various components of this identity 
structure (NOW identity, media identity for NOW, and 
media strategies) are static; all are shifting over 
time, In ways that make comparisons difficult. But it lS 
only the kind of approach that looks at both discourses 
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and the strategic interactions between them that can 69 
begin to make sense of the structuring roles of 
identity/ideology, strategy and resources in explaining 
media access. In fact in this study I do not ultimately 
argue for the independent determining force of anyone 
of the factors, but rather for a dialogic news model 
that would be able to account for all of them. 6 
Assessing Success in a Dialogic Framework: 
Access, voice and Control 
In a general sense we can define success In this 
study as the relative ability of movements to use the 
rules of news as resources rather than experience them 
as ~onstraints. But this is somewhat vague. What 
empirical outcomes more specifically would constitute 
the success of particular media strategies? Should NOW 
be represented in the same way that they would represent 
themselves? And what should that representation cost the 
movement organization? Is news access successful if it 
takes all of an organization's time and resources? 
In this study I use a four tiered system of 
assessment of NOW's Usuccess U that involves three 
different kinds of success access, voice, placement 
and control. Access simply refers to the appearance and 
placement of stories about NOW. An appearance is the 
minimal requirement for voice in the public sphere. 
Voice refers to whether NOW is allowed to the extent to 
which NOW is allowed to speak and under what 
circumstances. Voice is essential to the movement's 
ability to define events and lssues in ways that would 
produce influence. Placement refers to the context of 
NOW's stories and the associated value of different news 
sections. Control In this study refers to the amount of 
control NOW strategists exercised over the presentation 
of their issue agenda and their organizational 
identity.7 
These four dimensions of success, I would argue, 
can be assessed in most communicative interactions. In 
any conversation or debate for example, we seek first of 
all access or standing as a participant, then we seek a 
chance to contribute in our own vo~ce , and we are 
usually also concerned with the context of our 
contribution (i.e. is it strategically placed so as to 
gain other peoples attention). We would also prefer that 
the debate or conversation be structured in ways that 
legitimate our positions and interests. 
These dimensions of success are also analytically 
separable, and can be understood, hierarchically. We can 
say for example that access is basic to all other 
levels, that voice is an additional level of successful 
interaction, and that legitimate representation or 
control of one's identity makes a voice more credible 
and more likely to be listened to. Control, over one's 
identity and one's agenda -- communicative autonomy --
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1S 1n this framework the ultimate ·success· of strategic 71 
interaction. 
RESEARCH QUESTIONS: 
My aim in this study, then, 1S to both describe and 
assess NOW's relationship with news media within a 
dialogic framework. I have suggested that NOW's access 
to, and success in controlling, such a dialog is likely 
to be affected by shifts in resources, strategies and 
identity. Accordingly the study pursues answers to three 
main research questions: 
(1) What did gaining routine access to news media 
cost NOW? (i.e. How did NOW's resources structure the 
dialog? What resources were important in making news 
access possible in the first place? How were resources 
associated with ·success· in the interaction? Were 
resources a determining factor in creating a successful 
news dialog (as defined by access, voice and control)? 
If so, are the resources that structured NOW's access to 
media likely to be available to all social movement 
groups? 
(2) What role(s) did NOW's communicative and media 
strategies play in structuring the dialog? (i.e. What 
strategies did NOW leaders develop to access and control 
media dialogs? How important was reflexive strategizing 
l.e. knowledge of the "rules" of news -- to NOW's 72 
access and success? How did knowledge of the "rules" 
structure the dialog? Are these reflexive strategies 
likely to be available to all social movement groups? 
(3) What role(s) did NOW's ideology/identity play 
In the in news access or news representation? (i.e. How 
did NOW's ideology and identity structure the dialog? 
How was the organization's identity re-presented by 
news? What can we tell from this "processing" pattern? 
Was NOW's identity (either internal or strategically 
produced public identity) a determinant in news access 
and control? How much does NOW's ideology explain the 
interaction?) 
NOTES 
1 Some new movement groups have organized boycotts of 
products, which is a strategy that in some ways mirrors 
a strike in that people withdraw their support -- but it 
is at the level of consumption, not production. 
2 Most empirical studies of social movements indicate 
that NSM members are quite self aware and reflexive 
about their communicative roles, so that theories that 
characterize the NSM as "carriers" or "functions" in 
society are to some extent denying this reflexivity. 
Unfortunately much of the NSM theory is written in this 
functionalist way. 
3 Zhongdang Pan made this connection for me between 
movement and policy building literatures, personal 
communication 1993. 
4 Gitlin's (1980) study does present SDS leaders as 
quite reflexive and subtle in their political analyses, 
and perhaps over time their media strategies and media 
representation would have developed differently. 
However, his conclusion in which he asserts that news 
media will always trivialize "real" opposition is quite 
clearly deterministic. 
5 These factors are drawn from a review of news source 
studies by the author that suggests that resources, 
strategies and ideologies are the key structuring 
factors in explaining access to news, Barker-Plummer, B. 
(1993). From Gates to Dialog: Towards a Communication 
Model of the News-Source Relationship. Paper presented 
to the Political Communication Division, rCA, Washington 
DC. 
6 Chapter three, methods, describes these analyses in 
more detail. 
7 These measures are described in more detail in chapter 
three, methods. 
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Chapter 3 
Research Design and Methods: 
Parallel Institutional and Content Analyses 
The NOW-news relationship lS conceptualized as a 
dialogic relationship, that is as an interactive, 
reflexive, and complexly overdetermined relationship 
that takes place on mUltiple levels -- between 
journalists and activists, news and movement 
organizations, and feminist and news discourses. 
Investigating and assessing such a complex interaction 
involves choosing a particular entry-point from which to 
understand and assess the interaction. In this study I 
"cut into" the NOW-news interaction in a particular way: 
I investigate and assess the interaction from the point 
of view of NOW, as a news source and as a new social 
movement group. The study describes the development of 
NOW's media strategies over time and then assesses the 
success of these strategies through an analysis of their 
influence on news content. Studying the interaction from 
NOW's perspective (rather than that of journalists) not 
only expands our understanding of new social movement 
communications, but also adds to our understanding of 
newsmaking from the perspective of sources more 
generally. 
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Study Design: 
Parallel Institutional and Content Analyses 
The study involved both an institutional analysis of 
NOW (1966-1980) and a content analysis of the New York 
Times (1966-1980). The institutional analysis draws on 
NOW's records to characterize NOW's development of media 
strategies over time and to describe the role of 
resources, strategies and organizational identity In 
structuring NOW's media representation. The content 
analysis describes patterns in NOW's representation in, 
the Times and uses these patterns to assesses the 
relative llsuccess" of NOW's media strategies. (Both of 
these analyses are described in more detail below.) 
These two parts of the study were designed and 
executed in tandem, so that they would parallel one 
another as much as possible. Questions for the content 
analysis were derived from the institutional analysis, 
and both NOW's and the Times' discourses were analyzed In 
standardized ways (e.g. agendas and identity factors) In 
order to be able to compare NOW and the Times' 
representations of NOW and its issues and identity. For 
example, the content analysis tracks the gender of 
reporters who wrote NOW stories, because interaction 
with, and support of, women reporters was a central NOW 
strategy. And both the institutional and content analyses 
track how each discourse (NOW and news media) represent 
and rank women's issues. 
75 
Overall, the framework for assesslng NOW's "success" 76 
used in this study (and described in more detail below) 
has logical links to the organization's own intentions 
and activities. Because these are quite different kinds 
of organizations and discourses, these links are not 
always perfectly symmetrical. In some instances the 
content analysis has had to operationalize NOW's media 
goals in ways that are assessable in news content 
analysis. For example, it is relatively straightforward 
to track NOW's strategic interaction with women 
journalists by also tracking whether most stories are 
written by women reporters. But success in NOW's more 
general goal of becoming a serious public voice for 
women's lssues, is not so readily assessed. In this study 
it is operationalized as a mix of access, voice (being 
quoted) and identity control over time In news content 
(see below for more description of the assessment 
framework) . 
Generally, though, the institutional and content 
analyses were designed to work together logically. NOW 
sought to access news in order to spread the word about 
feminism, to build an agenda for women's issues, and to 
build a legitimate public identity for itself as a 
serlOUS spokesperson for women's issues in America. The 
study "tests" these goals in the news content. It tracks 
NOW's basic access to news across time, asks whether NOW 
was able to produce "voice" in media, and assesses 
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whether the organization was able to control either its 77 
identity (in terms of legitimacy) or the representation 
of its issues and concerns (in terms of agenda 
comparisons) . 
The institutional and content analysis are thus 
linked through a strategic conceptual framework which 
relates NOW's media goals to their outcomes in news 
content over time. By linking the institutional and 
content analyses levels and methods, this study crosses 
some traditional boundaries in media studies, which tends 
to produce either content analyses or institutional 
analyses. But I argue that it is only by linking these 
levels of analysis that we can begin to untangle the 
independent role(s) that news practices and conventions 
play in processing social change. Having access to both 
an institutional analysis (what NOW was saying about 
itself and its issues and how it was communicating these 
concerns) and to news content (what the Times was saylng 
and doing) makes it possible to suggest which shifts In 
NOW's public agenda and identity were the results of 
NOW's own shifts in agendas, identity or strategy, and 
which were the results of the Times' nprocessingn of NOW. 
As Bruck (1992, p. 142) notes, news discourses must 
be seen in relation to other discourses for both 
strategic and epistemological reasons. We have to be able 
to show both the discourses that news workers draw from, 
and the resulting outcome of news-source interactions, 
before any inferences about news processing (or source 78 
success) is possible: 
In news analysis, we need to make the analytical 
separation between the discourses the media produce 
and the discourses they use as material to build 
on, to process and deliver. We need to be 
interested in the structures of transformation. 
The study also crosses some traditional boundaries 
In methodological terms. For example, it uses both 
quantitative techniques (e.g. quantitative content 
analyses and agenda-setting models to compare NOW and 
the'Times agendas) and also more qualitative, 
interpretive methods (to describe and assess NOW's 
identity control strategies and their outcomes in news, 
for example) . 
This kind of methodological breadth is necessary In 
case study methodologies where the universe of relevant 
data is not imposed by the researcher, but is defined by 
the wide ranging activities of the research subject. This 
complexity (of mUltiple forms of data) is compounded in 
this study, however, by the different levels of media 
analysis involved, as well as by the overall conceptual 
framework of the study which seeks to untangle the 
role(s) of various factors -- resources, strategies and 
ideology -- which have generally been studied through 79 
different research traditions. 
Bringing these different levels, data forms and 
structural factors together in one study means also 
bringing together their different historical and logical 
"baggage" of definitions and measurement traditions. For 
example, questions of the structuring role(s) of 
resources in media access are addressed in a political-
economic approach (using historical/critical, sometimes 
quantitative institutional analysis methods) and 
questions about ideology and representation are asked in 
a qualitative text-based analysis. Questions of "success" 
or "control" are addressed using available social science 
techniques such as ranked agenda comparlsons, and 
quantitative content analysis techniques. 
Overall, the case study is conceptually rather than 
methodologically driven. Rather than framing all 
questions in terms of one method, choices about how to 
measure various aspects of NOW's experience, were driven 
by both the research questions themselves (which were 
drawn from various research traditions) and the forms of 
data available to answer those questions. In the rest of 
this chapter I describe how these various questions, 
methods and levels of analyses come together to produce a 
comprehensive analysis of the media interactions of one 
new social movement organization. 
I. THE INSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS 
Institutional analysis, as Gerbner (1973, p. 559) 
has described it, is a method of analysis that gets at 
the process of decision-making, the structuration of 
power roles, and the development of strategic actions and 
routines on the part of organizations in their production 
of knowledge or goods. In this part of the study I 
engaged in an historical institutional analysis of NOW In 
order to understand how a new social movement 
organization managed, day-to-day, the communication and 
media strategies that are so central to the symbolic 
challenge of the NSMs overall. What were the day-to day-
practices involved in the strategic articulation and mass 
communication of challenging ideas and identities? How do 
NSMs decide on issues, frames and problems to communicate 
to media? What resources and skills does such symbolic 
work take? How do NSM groups understand their 
communicative work? What role(s) do they see for media In 
the communication of new ideas? And how does their 
interaction with media work out day-to-day? How do NSM 
organizations negotiate their way into mass media 
channels? What are the constraints and possibilities of 
media as a resource for a new social movement 
organization? 
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1.1 General Research Questions: 81 
The Role(s) of Resources, Strategies and Identity 
Many different factors might be involved in, and 
influence, a movement organization's interaction with 
media. In this study I organize the discussion around 
three general factors that structure media-movement 
relations: resources (such as money, skills, 
competencies, organization, and so on), strategies (for 
example, making use of journalistic conventions, or 
building relationships with women reporters~ and 
ideology/identity factors (that is the ideas, goals and 
self-presentations of the organization). These three 
factors are drawn from three different research 
traditions, but all of them have been shown to structure 
media interactions in important ways.1 
Resources are likely to be critical In structuring a 
movement organization's media efforts. Gandy (1982), for 
example, has suggested that news access is "bought" day-
to-day by corporations and bureaucratic government 
organizations through the production of information for 
journalists, which he calls "subsidizing" the news. 
Similarly, Ericson et al (1989), have noted that the 
journalist-source relationship is maintained day-to-day 
through the production, release, or holding back, of 
information and access to information by institutional 
sources. 
The production of effective information subsidies is 82 
clearly resource intensive. The question becomes whether 
movement organizations can become producers of such 
subsidies. Can social movement organizations mobilize the 
resources necessary to gain media access? What kind of 
resources are necessary to "subsidize" journalists? And 
are these likely to be available to most emergent 
political groups? In this study I look closely at 
questions of resources and organization. I ask how NOW's 
overall mobilization -- of staff, money and organization 
-- was associated with its development of media 
strategies, and ultimately with its voice in the public 
sphere. 
The ability to develop successful strategies to 
negotiate media routines is also likely to be important 
in explaining movement success in media interactions. As 
mUltiple studies (cf. Gans, 1980; Tuchman, 1978; Fishman, 
1980) have shown, news is the outcome of some very 
conventional and routinized practices on the part of 
journalists who tend to follow the same round of sources 
and institutions -- "beats" -- In the production of 
news, and to be guided by similar judgment patterns for 
"newsworthiness" in deciding how to respond to or frame 
stories (cf. Gans, 1980). 
In any source study it lS a fundamental question, 
then, how sources negotiate these conventions of news 
practice and news discourse. For example, will source 
organizations become the uobjects U of these practices -- 83 
i.e. be ucoveredu -- or can they develop strategies to 
negotiate, counteract or subvert these routines? Some 
critics have suggested that news, because of its own 
ideological basis in elite/ruling class interests, will 
always frame or define challengers in marginalizing ways 
(cf. Goldman and Rajagopal, 1991; Gitlin, 1980; Hall et 
al. 1978). However, more recent work (cf. Ryan, 1991; 
Hackett, 1991; Andersen, 1992) has begun to illustrate 
how some movement groups (e.g. labor union groups and 
peace movement groups) have managed to negotiate news 
framing practices successfully and thereby ure-frame" 
themselves. 
The question of whether movement groups will be 
framed by media, then, or whether they will succeed in 
framing themselves is a critical question that can only 
be answered by investigating media strategies as well as 
media outcomes. In this study I track NOW's understanding 
of news media practices and conventions and its 
development of media strategies to counteract and 
negotiate this terrain. I ask how did NOW come to 
understand news practices and conventions? What kinds of 
strategies and techniques did NOW develop to interact 
with and control the effects of these journalistic 
conventions? 
A group's ideology or identity is also likely to 
influence its relationship with news media. Some critical 
researchers have in fact suggested that ideology (of both 84 
news and sources) is the determining factor in 
interaction with news. Gitlin (1980), for example, has 
suggested that news will always marginalize some kinds of 
identities -- "radicals"-- and will incorporate others 
which he calls "reformists." 
This view of ideology/identity as a predictor of 
media success/failure is problematic, however. Movement 
identities are not stable, taken for granted entities 
that can be determined and used as predictors. They are 
strategically produced social constructions, which may, 
in turn, be constructed in ways specifically to appeal 
to, or negotiate, media constraints. A group may well 
project an identity for itself or frame issues in ways 
that will appeal to media while still considering its 
long-term goals and identity as "radical." Ryan (1991), 
for example, notes how a labor movement group reframed 
its public identity from one of "special interests" to 
one of seeking a decent wage and human "dignity" while 
the group's policies and goals stayed the same. Movements 
and movement groups have no "authentic" identity, only 
the ones they create for themselves or which are created 
in interaction with other organizations and discourses. 
Still, it is likely that a movement group's more 
general identity construction strategies (its political 
identity) at anyone time will also influence its media 
strategies. So, in this study I investigate the role(s) 
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of NOW's identity in structuring its interaction with 8S 
media in two ways: first, by tracking the relationship 
between NOW's more general political identity (i.e. its 
shifting construction of itself and its goals, alms and 
policies) and its media strategies,2 and second, by 
comparing NOW media strategies to the media strategies of 
other women's movement groups with different overall 
identities. This approach carves out a place for 
llidentityll in structuring media interactions, not as an 
independent and well defined predictor of media success 
(or failure) by itself, but as a factor that indicates 
NOW leaders' and members' perceptions of the organization 
and its goals at any particular time, and so is likely to 
also structure their development of strategies to 
communicate with news media. 
To summarize, the institutional analysis of NOW 
asks: 
(i) What resources and skills did NOW's media work 
involve? What kinds of resources did NOW leaders mobilize 
to produce access to news media? And are these resources 
likely to be available to all emergent groups? Overall, 
what are the costs of access to media for movement 
organizations? 
(ii) How did NOW manage to produce access to media 
day-to-day? How did NOW understand news as a resource and 
what strategies did it to negotiate and control its 
interactions with media? Did these routines and 
understandings shift significantly over time? 
(iii) What role did NOW's political identity -- that 
1S its issue focus, goals, and self-perceptions and so on 
at different times -- play in structuring its media 
interactions? How did NOW's media strategies overall 
compare to other movement groups. 
1.2 Data Collection 
The Institutional analysis drew mainly on NOW's 
historical materials which are archived at the 
Schlesinger Library for Women in History, Radcliffe 
College, Cambridge, Massachusetts, and secondarily on 
the Women, Media and Politics collection at the Ellis 
Library, University of Missouri-Columbia. The 
Schlesinger archive requires permission from NOW's Board 
for access and I would like to thank the National 
Organization for Women National Executive Board for its 
permission to access these papers. The Ellis paper are 
the personal papers of Kathy Bonk, NOW's media 
strategist for many years, and are open to the public. 
The archival materials were used to provide 
information on NOW's resources, strategies, policies, and 
political identity creation over time. Documents used in 
the study included financial and budget papers, strategy 
and policy papers, and minutes of Board and Task Force 
meetings. They also included materials on press 
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strategies (such as notes on leaders' preparations for, 87 
and post-mortems of, interviews with journalists and talk 
show hosts), press releases sent at various points in 
time, advance publicity materials and strategy notes for 
NOW demonstrations and public events, memos, notes and 
strategy materials about various NOW campaigns 
(especially concerning the ERA campaign), congressional 
testimony, and various "public" documents such as 
leaflets, posters, brochures and so on. The availability 
of the day-to-day records of the short-lived NOW New York 
Public Information Office (1973-1975) were particularly 
invaluable resources, as were the early "media kits" and 
training manuals produced by the national office for 
volunteer workers in the local and state chapters. 
These papers are of course only the records of NOW's 
day-to-day understandings, statements and practices and 
not direct observations of that process. But they are 
nevertheless a rich resource for understanding the NOW-
news interaction over a long period of time, from the 
perspective of NOW itself. 
1.3 Measurement and Definition Issues 
1.31. Resources. In this study I define resources 
widely to include income, membership, aspects of 
organization, skills, leadership, and communicative 
competence. Some of these resources can be easily 
quantified and measured and others cannot. For example, I 
measure NOW's income and membership quantitatively but 88 
other attributes of the organization which are also 
critically important -- such as education and competence 
of leaders and availability of information and knowledge 
cannot be easily codified. Some resources are thus 
described and assessed descriptively while others are 
measured more objectively (see chapter five). 
One of most important resources for NOW and other 
NSM groups is membership. Most income in NSM groups lS 
derived from membership dues, and large membership 
numbers are also recognized as strategic assets in terms 
of perceived representativeness. 
In this study NOW's membership (and relatedly its 
income) was ascertained from various different sources, 
tracked across time, and then correlated with NOW's media 
access. As the results indicate (see chapter five), there 
seems to be a clear relationship between general 
resources and media access. However, there are some 
important caveats in assessing the accuracy of NOW 
membership numbers. As other observers of social movement 
groups have also noted (cf. Knoke, 1989; Gamson, 1975; 
Zald and McCarthy, 1979) the actual documentable numbers 
of members of a social movement organization at anyone 
time are very difficult to ascertain. First, because SMOs 
do not routinely keep excellent records, second because 
strategic "over-counting" is endemic, and third, because 
the meaning of "membership" itself is problematic. Some 
groups, for example, count all people who have ever paid 89 
membership dues, others routinely purge their rolls and 
drop all non active members every few months or weeks. 
NOW in general has had a policy to count only active, 
paid up members as members, but purging rolls is itself a 
resource intensive activity which may not have high 
priority in an action driven organization, and in any 
case such claims are difficult to verify. The personal 
data/membership forms of all NOW members that would be 
needed to reconstruct or verify membership claims are not 
available in the NOW archive. In fact such materials are 
unlikely to have been kept at all before computing 
technology made it easy to do so. 
Wherever possible in this study I have tried to 
verify membership and income numbers across sources (e.g. 
by comparing numbers from NOW records with other 
historical studies when available). But even so there are 
still some missing years that I cannot account for (which 
do not seem to be available even to the national 
organization), and some sets of conflicting numbers for 
various years. When numbers conflict across sources my 
strategy has been to use NOW's own reported figures. When 
confronted with differing numbers from NOW, I used the 
highest reported figure. In general I have been less 
concerned with the absolute accuracy of the figures than 
with the fact that all reported figures trend in the same 
direction, which is to say generally increasing over the 
time period reported here (1966-1980). Figure 3.1 (next 90 
page) illustrates some of the different reported figures 
from NOW and other studies for membership across time 
from various sources, but indicates that they all follow 
the same general trend. Income figures also follow this 
curve closely because they are derived from membership 
dues for the most part. 
1.32 Strategies. Media strategies In this study are 
defined as those practices, routines and understandings 
which organizations develop in order to control their 
interactions with media. These may take a number of forms 
-- for example, the development of traditional public 
relations skills or attempts to "educate" reporters may 
be media strategies. But conscious and deliberate exit 
from, and avoidance of, media may also be seen as a 
strategic response. To have media strategies, 
organizations must only show some evidence that their 
interactions with media have been considered and planned 
-- that is that they are goal oriented and intended to 
have some effects on media representations. 
This study investigated NOW's media strategies over 
time through an analysis of its historical records. As I 
note In more detail below (section 1.5, Limitations), 
NOW's records are not indexed, so complete confidence In 
finding all relevant material is impossible. However, 
after a search and analysis of all materials in NOW's 
archive (1966-1982) that were marked as being media, 91 
publicity or communications related (both generally and 
within various issue areas), and a search and analysis of 
the day-to-day records of the Public Information Office 
(1973-1975), the public relations task force, and other 
related task forces (e.g. media reform task forces, 
images of women task force, and so on), I have confidence 
that the search accessed most of the available papers 
relating to NOW's interactions with media over time. The 
documents for analysis included press releases for 
various events and activities as well as general 
background press materials on NOW as an organization and 
background materials on various issues and topics; public 
relations and media kits created by NOW leaders for 
training NOW chapters and national staff; letters, 
statements, and other press materials from the documents 
of the PIO (including letters exchanged with reporters, 
editors and TV producers); strategy notes for interviews 
and background notes and materials on reporters and media 
organizations; scrap books of news stories with some 
commentary and analysis; references to media strategies 
and media coverage in National Board minutes, and so on. 
This range of materials from different time periods 
in the organization's history made it possible to 
reconstruct NOW's understandings of, and interactions 
with, media over time. 
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1.33 Ideology/Identity. Organizational identity is a 
complex concept involving aspects of a group's goals, 
ideas, political and cultural issues, historical 
development, perceived roles, and overall philosophy. 
NOW's identity/ideology is tracked In this study through 
analyzing the group's descriptions of itself and its 
goals at various times In NOW's own records. The study 
92 
drew on minutes of Board meetings; public statements of 93 
purpose and priorities (e.g. the 1968 Bill of Rights and 
the 1975 Manifesto of NOW); press materials; convention 
materials; legislative and commission related materials; 
policy statements; records of public speeches and 
internal debates, and so on. These materials made it 
possible to track major shifts in NOW's goals and self-
perceptions over time, as well as to indicate at various 
points what NOW's issue priorities were (i.e. its 
agendas). This historical reconstruction of NOW's 
llinternal identityll and policy agendas at various points 
in time was then compared to its representation (NOW's 
media or llpublic ll identity) in the Times in order to 
assess NOW's relative llcontrol ll over its own legitimacy. 
(See content analysis below) . 
1.4 Limitations of the Data, 
Limits of the Institutional Analysis 
Some of the limitations inherent in this and other 
parts of the study are the result of limitations in the 
institutional data. NOW's records from 1966-1982 are 
available at the Schlesinger Library and can be accessed 
with permission from NOW's National Board. These records 
have been inventoried by a librarian and a master list 
details the contents of hundreds of boxes. However 
entries on this list are not always informative and the 
collection has not been indexed or categorized in any 
systematic way.3 In fact the contents of the boxes are 94 
still in much the same order they were when they arrived 
at the library -- that lS, they are the results of NOW 
office staff emptying file cabinets into them. 
Consequently the boxes contain loose papers, file 
folders, ring binders, and assorted materials that are 
organized sometimes by years, sometimes by theme or 
issue, sometimes by task force, sometimes by project, 
sometimes by leader's name, and so on. 
This lack of sorting/indexing ralses difficulties 
for the researcher, making it impossible to know if one 
has ever collected all relevant materials. 4 In this study 
for resource analysis purposes I searched out all 
materials marked as budget and membership. For policy and 
identity related questions I read and copied all national 
board meetings minutes, policy statements, convention 
materials, and general public statements about NOW at 
various times (from congressional testimonies and media 
Ubackground" packages, and so on). For media strategies 
questions I collected all media and press related 
materials that were marked as being media or 
communications related within lssue areas (e.g. press 
releases, public relations and media kits, press packages 
sent to reporters on various events and issues), and read 
all materials from the Public Information Office papers, 
and from task forces on public relations and so on. 
Overall I spent around two months in the Schlesinger 
archive and a week in the Ellis library archive gathering 9S 
materials. But I cannot be certain that missing data (for 
example, missing membership figures for a few years in 
this period) are not somewhere in the archive, nor that 
important materials about press relations that were filed 
In non obvious ways (e.g. within one of the multiple task 
forces that I did not have time to investigate) are not 
excluded. 
This lack of reliable sorting In the archive 
contributed to one particular critical difficulty for 
the study. As I indicate in the next section, a major 
aim of this study was to compare NOW and news discourses 
across time in terms of issues and lssue agendas (i.e. 
ranked priorities of issues). This proved to be 
impossible to do systematically based on the evidence 
available in the archive. From the archive, no clear 
hierarchization (agenda) could be determined reliably 
for NOW issues at regular points in time. Partly this lS 
because the organization itself is resolutely multi-
issue, but partly it is a difficulty raised by the lack 
of confidence a researcher has in finding all relevant 
materials in the archive. For example, even if a 
reliable llunitll of analysis could be determined in order 
to construct NOW agendas year-by-year or month-by-month, 
the researcher could not be sure that a reliable or 
representative sample of materials containing this unit 
could be found. 5 Consequently in this study the agenda-
comparison aspects of the study are cut back and I rely 96 
on historical policy statements from NOW about its 
agenda and three public llagendas ll (1968 Bill of Rights, 
Manifesto and 1989 Bill of Rights) which NOW put out at 
different points in its history as clear statements of 
priorities (see section 2.46 for more explanation). 
II. THE CONTENT ANALYSIS: ASSESSING NOW's "SUCCESS" 
In order to assess NOW's relative success 1n 
interaction with media the study also drew on an 
original content analysis of 377 stories about NOW or 
quoting NOW in the New York Times, 1966-1980. The 
content analysis was linked from the outset to the 
instit'utional analysis and so it sought to track 
elements of NOW's media construction that were 
especially relevant to the institutional analysis. 
Because NOW's practices and discourse are 
structured in some different ways than news discourse, 
this paralleling is not always as elegant as it might 
be. 6 For example, it is possible to track NOW's 
strategic goals in terms of simple access - 1.e. did 
they make it into the news at all -- but it 1S more 
difficult to operationalize and assess some of their 
other strategic goals in interactions with media. The 
1ssue of identity control is one of these areas. NOW 
sought to llcontrolll its image in media, but there 1S 
little indication in the institutional materials that 
the group had any systematic definition of what this 97 
would entail, and so a direct assessment of whether they 
·succeeded· in this goal needs to first provide an 
operationalizations'of what such ·control· would entail. 
In this study I deal with this difficulty of direct 
comparisons between NOW and news by introducing a 
general, multi-dimensional framework for the analysis of 
NOW's ·success· in interaction with news which has 
meaningful links, if not perfect symmetry, with many of 
NOW's aims and strategies (outlined in section 2.2 
below) . 
Overall, the content analysis seeks to map the 
outcomes of NOW media strategies, including its efforts 
to access media, to gain voice, to be represented 
legitimately and to build a women's issue news agenda. 
2.1 The New York Times as a Case Study Organization 
This study only assessed NOW's ·success· In one 
news outlet and so is consequently limited in its 
generalizability. As one newspaper the Times may make 
decisions differently from other papers, and certainly 
there would be different patterns of access of the study 
also included television news. 7 
However, if one has to choose one newspaper as a 
starting point for this kind of analysis, then the New 
York Times is a good choice for a number of reasons. 
First, the New York Times plays a central role in 
American political life where it is often presented (and 98 
accepted by professional journalists throughout the 
country) as the pre-eminent journal of record in the 
American media sector. As such, the Times coverage of new 
movements and ideas is often the harbinger and active 
trend-setter for other mainstream media responses. 
Secondly, the Times is the newspaper, with the Washington 
Post, that lS read most frequently by policy makers and 
government leaders, the audience that NOW was often 
trying to reach. Finally, and most compelling, the Times 
was considered to be one of the most valued outlets by 
NOW leaders themselves. Success in accessing and 
controlling one's agenda in the Times was seen as success 
by NOW leaders. 
2.2 Measures of Success: Access, voice and Control 
The issue of ·success· in source-news interactions, 
as in any kind of communicative interaction, is highly 
problematic. In this study I assess the relative 
·success" of NOW as a source around four different 
dimensions: access, vo~ce, placement, and control 
(identity and agenda) . 
Access, simply refers to patterns In NOW's 
appearance in the news columns, and is the minimal 
requirement for voice in the public sphere. 
Voice refers to whether NOW is allowed to speak for 
itself and in what circumstances. This ability to be 
quoted in the news has often been seen as associated with 99 
communicative power (cf. Sigal, 1973; Brown et al., 1987; 
Barker-Plummer, 1989). Brown et al. (1987), for example, 
have calculated the percentages of various types of 
quoted news sources and have argued that the over-
representation of elite, official, male sources indicates 
the limits of diversity in political debate in the United 
States. However, the relationship between being cited and 
controlling the representation of one's organizational 
identity or issues is surely one that is quite 
problematic, which is why this study also includes 
placement and control measures. 
Placement refers to the context of NOW's stories and 
the associated value of different news sections. 
Placement in news has long been seen to indicate relative 
importance -- front page issues are more important than 
other kinds, so placement patterns can be read as a 
measure of relative legitimacy assigned different kinds 
of stories by editors. 
The fourth "level" of success for a source used 
here is control. Control refers to the ability of a 
participant in communication to be taken seriously as a 
legitimate speaker and to be able to introduce and 
define issues. Control is thus a measure of one's 
influence over the debate. 
In this study I operationalize control in two ways. 
One aspect of control assessed here involves NOW's 
ability to control the representation of its own issue 100 
agenda -- that is the range and ranking of its issues --
in news. This kind of influence lS usually associated 
with the agenda-setting tradition. It is an assessment 
of relative influence over what other people will 
consider important and has been utilized in studies of 
media effects (cf. Weaver et al., 1988) and in a study 
of the influences of political candidates and parties on 
election news agendas (cf. Semetko et aI, 1991). Hall et 
al. (1978) have also suggested that it is this ability 
to control the agenda -- to be the Hprimary definers H 
of public agendas which lS the source of state and 
officials' symbolic success In using news media. 
Agen?a control is assessed here by comparing NOW's 
agenda at various points with the Times re-presentation 
of that agenda and judging how much control NOW 
maintained over its agenda. (See section 2.48 for 
detailed description of this analysis). 
The second aspect of control that is assessed here 
identity control -- assesses how much control NOW was 
able to exercise over its organizational identity, 
especially in terms of legitimacy. This concept of 
Hsuccess H is one that is tied to the relative legitimacy 
of a speaker in the debate. Such perceived legitimacy lS 
likely to be associated with a source organization's 
ability to frame, define, or control issues. Gitlin 
(1980), for example, seems to be invoking this kind of 
success measure (or in his case, failure) when he notes 101 
that news framed SDS as an illegitimate political voice 
and so harmed the organization's ability to define issues 
or to be taken seriously by publics. Ericson et al.'s 
(1989) idea of ser10US news access as a form of cultural 
capital also involves the idea of successful news access 
as one that allows routine, serious representation that 
results in public legitimacy. 
In this study I assess legitimacy and identity 
control through a qualitative analysis of NOW's framing 
in the Times which is compared to, and understood in the 
context of, NOW's legitimation strategies. (See section 
2.47 below for a detailed description of this analysis.) 
Th~se two dimensions of control are likely to be 
related, but they are not the same thing. A movement 
group's Hsuccess H at the level of control can potentially 
be different in these different dimensions. For example, 
a movement group can be marginalized as an organization 
but still have influence on media agendas. They can place 
their issues on the agenda without being taken seriously 
as the spokesperson for that issue. 
These dimensions of success may be understood, 
hierarchically. We can say for example that access 1S 
basic to all other levels, that voice is an additional 
level of successful interaction, and that legitimate 
representation or control of one's identity makes a 
voice more credible and more likely to be listened to. 
I 
I 
t Control, over one's identity and one's agenda, lS in 102 
this framework the ultimate "success" of strategic 
interaction. 
2.3. Data Collection: The Sample 
The content analysis sample consisted of 377 stories 
from the New York Times, 1966-1980. This sample 
constitutes a census of all stories which are indexed 
under NOW, or which were cross referenced under NOW for 
the period 1966-1980 in that newspaper. This means that 
all stories (excluding letters to the editor) which were 
about NOW or in which NOW was mentioned, cited, or 
featured prominently, should be included. As a census of 
all NOW related stories we can infer from this sample 
that patterns indicated here are indicative of how NOW 
and its agenda are represented by the Times overall in 
the 15 year period. 
This sample also has some serious limitations. As a 
census of all stories about NOW in the New York Times 
1966-1980, it cannot account for stories in which NOW's 
information was used but in which the organization was 
not mentioned or quoted. This is a significant drawback 
because there are many scenarlOS in which journalists may 
have used NOW information without crediting NOW -- for 
example when they cite anonymous sources ("sources 
said"), invoke general sources ("women's groups have 
claimed"), or when they simply draw on this kind of press 
material for background information. This may mean that 103 
the constituted sample underplays NOW's influence on 
women's issue agenda building beyond stories in which lS 
features prominently. 
The size of the news sample also may have been a 
drawback. Though this census sample contains all 
locatable stories about NOW in the Times over the 1966-
1980 period, it still constitutes a modest amount of news 
material with which to analyze placement across multiple 
categories and agenda relations. With a sample this size 
analyses of particular traits over time are especially 
difficult to do because cells become very small. Most of 
the patterns In this study need to be retested on a 
bigger sample of stories about feminism, though how such 
stories would be located is a difficult question. One of 
the positive aspects of this sample, created as it is 
around NOW the organization, is that it does not prejudge 
which issues are feminist issues. A sampling procedure to 
create a larger sample for analysis would have to 
carefully consider how that sample would be constituted 
without prejudging which issues would be defined as 
feminist issues. 
2.4. Coding, Measurement and Analysis: 
Operationalizing "Success" 
Each story was coded by one coder, and 20 percent of 
the stories (randomly selected, proportionally by years) 
were then recoded by a second coder. Coder reliability 104 
figures across these two coders are cited for each 
measure individually below. The average coder reliability 
figure for all measures reported here was .84. 
Each of the four conceptual Hlevels H of success 
access, voice, placement and control -- were 
operationalized and measured in the following ways. 
2.41 Basic access 
Measurement. Basic access was measured in two ways. 
First through a simple count of the number of stories. 
Second, a count of paragraphs was also undertaken. The 
paragraph count gives a more nuanced account as it 
includes information about how much coverage NOW produced 
over time, as well as how many individuals stories. 8 
Analysis. Access measures (both stories and graphs) 
were plotted over time, to ascertain trends in NOW's 
access over time (see chapter seven). Access measures 
were also correlated with resource measures in order to 
investigate links between resources and access (see 
chapter five) .9 
2.42 Access Strategies 
Measurement. Stories were also coded for access 
strategies -- that is each story was coded to determine 
what event, strategy or activity by either NOW or a 
journalist had occurred to produce the story, and these 
patterns were then tracked over time and compared to 105 
NOW's activities. For example, the analysis asked, was 
the story the result of a public demonstration, protest 
or publicity gesture, or the result of journalist 
enterprise, such as an interview? Was the story 
initiated by NOW filing a law suit or was it coverage of 
a NOW conference? 
The overall aim of such an analysis was to 
determine, if possible, how much of the news about NOW 
was produced through NOW's own action. In contrast how 
much was generated from journalist "enterprise," as well 
as to determine, if possible, which of NOW's 
communicative strategies were most likely to gain news 
coverage. 10 
Access strategy categories were: 
(a) Public Events (which included marches, strikes, 
demonstrations, boycotts, anniversary or special 
occasion public events. When these were also accompanied 
by news conferences, the public event was coded as the 
source of the story) 
(b) NOW Meeting/Routine Event This category 
included stories about NOW conferences, conventions or 
chapter meetings. 
(c) Court-Related (Legal). This category included 
stories that were predominantly generated because NOW 
interacted with the court system. 
(d) Legislature or Commission Context. This 106 
category included NOW's interactions with legislatures 
and commissions, both state and national. 
(e) Journalist Enterprise. Any story In which it 
was not clear what the event, strategy or hook was, or 
that was clearly an interview or special feature, was 
coded as journalist enterprise. It is likely that some 
of the stories in the "journalist enterprise" category 
were also instigated by subsidies sent out by NOW, but 
unless a study or news conference was explicitly 
mentioned, the benefit of the doubt was given to 
journalist-enterprise. 
(f) NOW Overt News Subsidy. This category include 
stories that seem to have been generated because of a 
NOW report, award or other "overt" subsidy. Note that 
this category does not account for NOW subsidies of news 
that do not mention or cite the organization, because 
this sample is compiled by collecting together all 
stories indexed and cross referenced under NOW. 
(g) Other. This category contained stories 
generated in unusual contexts. This category made up 
about 5 percent of stories. 
Often more than one origin for the story could be 
detected. For example, if a protest march was being 
reported and a news conference had also been convened by 
NOW to discuss the event. In these cases, policy was to 
code the "main" event that was taking place -- i.e. in 
the case of a news conference accompanylng an event, the 107 
event was coded. 
Coder agreement between two coders for this item was 
75%. Coder reliability was .65. 11 Most of the 
disagreement encountered here was not in finding 
events/strategies that resulted in the story, but in 
agreement between coders as to which event or strategy 
was the most important -- i.e. choosing which event or 
strategy to code as the causal factor. Code sheets 
indicate that both coders were able to identify the same 
~ of initiation or access strategies in the texts but 
they disagreed some of the time as to which news 
initiation strategy was the main event, and so which to 
code. 
Analysis. Access Strategies were tracked over time 
to see which strategies had produced most coverage 
(chapter seven, 1.3), and then cross tabulated with (a) 
gender (b) placement and (c) voice in order to determine 
whether patterns in access strategies were related to 
other strategic factors. For example, the access 
strategy/gender cross tab sought to determine if NOW's 
strategic interaction with women reporters interacted 
with particular story initiation contexts (chapter seven, 
1.2) . 
2.43 Reporter Gender 
Measures. Because one of NOW's main strategies in 
interaction with news was to interact with and support 
women reporters, and because the topic of the news 
stories was feminist lssues, the gender of writers was 
coded from bylines when it could be determined. About 2/3 
of all stories could be identified this way. (140 of 377 
stories did not have bylines.) .Coder agreement on the 
gender of writers as indicated by bylines was 100% across 
a three-part option (male-female-unknown). Coder 
reliability was 1.0. 
Analysis. The gender of writers was then tracked 
across time to determine patterns in coverage overall and 
was crDSS tabulated with (a) placement (b) access 
strategy (c) voice and (d) topic to indicate whether 
interactions with women reporters were also associated 
with other "success measures." For example, I wanted to 
know if women reporters' stories were also likely to be 
the stories generated in particular contexts -- were the 
NOW stories written by women reporters likely to be those 
initiated by journalist enterprise, for example? This 
might indicate the existence of a cadre of sympathetic 
reporters and/or of gendered patterns of assignments in 
the newspaper. 
108 
2.44 voice 
Measures. "Voice" was measured simply by coding 
whether or not the story directly quoted NOW. Give that 
all of these stories mentioned NOW, those in which NOW 
was not quoted were coded as NOW being "talked about." 
Unfortunately the voice measure did not include 
coding for the number of times NOW was quoted, nor did 
it indicate whether they were "counter-quoted" by 
another source, though these would also have been good 
measures of voice and should be included in future 
studies. Coder reliability here was .98. 
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Analysis. Voice patterns were tracked across time to 
indicate what proportion of stories NOW was quoted in and 
what proportions they were talked about. Voice was also 
cross tabulated with (a) gender (b) placement and (c) 
access strategy to determine of voice for NOW was linked 
to story contexts, reporters gender or news placement 
(chapter seven, 2.1). 
2.45 Issue/Topic 
Measures. All stories were also coded in terms of 
the topics of the story. They were coded first for 
headline topic -- which is usually a good indication of 
the overall most important topic of the story. They were 
also coded in terms of issues mentioned (1-6 issues ln 
this study). A comparison of frequencies of stories by 
topic indicated that headline and Issue 1 (first issue 
mentioned) breakdowns were very similar. For the most 110 
part the analysis uses headline topics as indications of 
the general topic of the story. Coder reliability was 
.82. 
Analysis. Topics of stories were first plotted 
overall (aggregate frequencies) to indicate general 
levels of attention by the Times to NOW issues (chapter 
seven, section 4.1). 
Second, the story topics were plotted year-by year 
In order to see what aspects of NOW's discourse the Times 
found most important each year, thus constructing a news 
agenda for each year chapter seven, 4.2). 
Stories categorized by topics was also cross 
tabulated with (a) placement (b) access strategy (c) 
gender and (d) voice in order to detect patterns in the 
Times handling of NOW stories depending on their topic 
(chapter seven, sections 3 and 4). This cross tab data 
would indicate of NOW stories were placed in different 
sections of the paper based on the topic of the story, 
and whether story topics were also related to reporters' 
gender, access strategy and so on. These measures would 
help explain the influence of NOW's identity/ideology on 
its representation. 
2.46 Placement 
Measures. The stories were also coded on their 
placement within the newspaper. Placement in newspapers 
is allocated in terms of topics (TV stories In the TV 111 
section for example) but, placement is also an indication 
news sorting of events in terms of what is considered 
most important (and I argue here most "public" as opposed 
to "private" concerns.) 
Categories in this coding were: Front Page, News 
Sections, Women's/Lifestyle Page, Regional Pages, and 
Other (e.g. TV pages, business pages, etc. Coder 
reliability was .74. 
Analysis. First, stories' placement was tracked over 
time in order to ascertain if NOW "succeeded" in getting 
its ideas into the news sections or the front page, which 
is where they wanted to be placed. Placement was then 
cross tabulated with (a) topic (b) gender (c) access 
strategies and (d) voice in order to ascertain whether 
placement was linked to topic of the story, the gender of 
the reporter or the access strategy which initiated the 
story. 
2.47 Control Measures I: Agendas 
Besides access, voice and placement the study also 
tried to assess NOW's relative control in interaction 
with media along two dimensions -- agenda control and 
identity control. Agenda control measures compare NOW's 
agenda to the Times' representation of that agenda. 
Agenda control is seen to have occurred (i.e. NOW has 
been successful) if the Times representation of NOW in 
terms of its range and ranking of issues resembles NOW's 112 
own agendas at various times. 
Agenda Measures. This use of agenda comparlsons lS 
somewhat different from most studies of agenda-setting 
which focus on the relationship between media and 
audiences. However the agenda-setting methodology has 
recently been extended to embrace a larger concern with 
the formation of media agendas themselves which is called 
-agenda building" (cf. Semetko et aI, 1991). It is in 
this second context that I use the methodology in this 
study to compare NOW and news agendas -- to assess NOW's 
ability to control its own agenda in interaction with 
news media. 
Th~ move from media-to-audience agenda setting to 
organization-to-media agenda setting brings with it some 
problems for the agenda setting method of categorizing, 
ranking and correlating agendas. As Semetko et al. (1991) 
also note, the organizations and discourses that 
influence news agendas are often already formed and 
encoded in ways that are not easily compatible with news 
categories and forms. This makes the comparison between 
agendas at the institutional level a more complex process 
than that between news and audience agendas, where 
audience priorities are constructed through surveys that 
use the same terminology and categories as news itself. 
For example, Semetko et al. (1991) try to assess the 
influence of presidential candidates and parties In 
Britain and the US in "setting" the news agenda during 113 
elections, but they note with some frustration that the 
effort of making these discourses comparable is itself 
part of the problem. 12 
This difficulty in comparing two different forms of 
discourses was also apparent in this analysis. First 
there were problems with constructing reliable agendas 
for NOW at regular intervals. Not only is NOW's political 
identity at anyone time usually resolutely multi-issue 
(see chapter four) but NOW's records are not organized in 
a systematic enough way to create reliable agendas for 
NOW for every year. Consequently the agenda control 
measures in the study are limited to three different NOW 
"agendas" -- the 1969 NOW Bill of Rights, the 1975 
Manifesto and the 1989 Bill of Rights for the 21st 
Century -- which are clear statements of priorities by 
the organization. These agendas are then correlated with 
the Times agendas for the same years, and then for the 
next year. 
Some adjustments had to be made to the news analysis 
also. For the most part the Times "agendas" were created 
conventionally, (i.e. by ranking issues in terms of the 
frequency of stories in particular categories) but some 
standardizing had to be done to make it possible to 
compare NOW and news agendas. For example, a key category 
of news stories had to be dropped during the ranked 
correlations because it had no logical equivalent in NOW 
discourse. The largest category of news stories In the 114 
Times about NOW is the category of NOW/feminism which 
contains stories about NOW events and strategies rather 
than focusing on any particular issue. There is no 
equivalent category in NOW agendas (this is an artifact 
of news coverage) so that this category (and "other") had 
to be dropped in order to rank and correlate NOW and news 
stories. (Semetko et al (1991) also note that in their 
analysis of political parties and news agendas a large 
category of event/strategy oriented stories also had to 
be dropped from the analysis.) 
The agenda correlations here also involved longer 
than customary time lags between agenda comparisons. The 
time lags used here -- in which NOW agendas are seen to 
influence the Times' representation of these agendas 
are yearly. NOW and the Times' agendas (for NOW) are 
correlated first In the same year, and then one and two 
years later. 
This time lag is longer by far than agenda-setting 
usually allows lags usually range from a few weeks to 
a few months. But these time lags are reasonable in this 
particular context. Most agenda setting work is conducted 
during elections, whereas NOW's relationship with news lS 
analyzed here as an ongoing interaction across 15 years. 
During elections news handlers are sending out materials 
daily and hourly, and new issues are put on the agenda 
every day. It makes sense to assess relationships between 
news and audiences, and news and politicians, within the 115 
short term in this framework. However NOW's interactions 
with news were much less frequent than this. They took 
place a few times a month usually and more often in times 
of crisis (this is an estimate from the number of 
available press releases and documented interactions with 
reporters) and new priorities were raised in the 
organization monthly and yearly (at conventions and board 
meetings), not daily. The NOW-news interaction was 
consequently one that was much slower and relationships 
between changes in one discourse and changes in the other 
are consequently likely to be spaced father apart. It is 
this slowness that makes an over time analysis essential, 
and which 'makes year lags as used here reasonable 
responses to the limits of the data and the logic of the 
interaction. These changes in the agenda-setting 
techniques are important ones, however, and they place 
limits on how far results from this study can be 
understood in the larger agenda-setting context (see 
section 2.5, Limitations for more discussion of this 
problem) . 
The starting points for the time-lags involved here 
were chosen based on the availability of NOW agendas in 
these years -- 1968 and 1975. NOW's pUblication of 
agendas in these years coincided with key decision points 
in the organization. The Bill of Rights in 1968 was the 
founding document of NOW after the first two years as it 
became institutionalized and set public goals for itself.116 
The Manifesto in 1975 was a public signal of significant 
change in NOW's direction as the new leaders took over 
the organization. 
Analysis. The limited agenda comparisons done for 
the study, then, were (i) correlation of NOW's 1968, and 
1975 agendas with the Times' agendas for the same years 
(1968 and 1975), (ii) correlation of NOW's 1968 agenda 
with the Times 1970 agenda (1969 had too few stories) 
and (iii) NOW's 1975 agenda with the Times' 1976 and 1977 
agendas. 
2.47 Control Measures II: Identity Control 
AS'well as strategically accessing news media, and 
using that access to introduce new issues into public 
debate, NOW leaders wanted to create and maintain a 
public image for the organization itself as the serious 
"voice" for American women. Organizational legitimacy was 
seen to be essential in making other kinds of political 
activity possible. In this section of the analysis I 
assess the relative "success" of NOW's strategic control 
of its identity control and its attempts to build a 
legitimate identity for itself in the public sphere. 
The study tracks NOW's representation in the Times 
and assesses that representation in the context of the 
organization's own shifting identities and strategies. 
NOW's "public" identity was thus compared to its 
Hinternal H organizational identity, and its relative 117 
Hsuccess H is assessed in terms of that comparison. 
Measurement. NOW's identity was tracked in the 
Times through a systematic qualitative/interpretive 
analysis of the language, descriptions, and frames used 
to construct the organization. Frames here refer to the 
ways in which information is organized and presented, ln 
this case from information about NOW framed by 
reporters. Goffman (1986 [1974]) has describes a frame 
as a cognitive organizing device that "allows its user 
to locate, perceive, identify and, label a seemingly 
infinite number of concrete occurrences defined in its 
terms." Underlying the concept of framing is the 
understanding that the way lssues or groups are 
constructed can have serious consequences for how they 
will be perceived by individuals and policy makers 
(Kahnman and Tversky, 1984; Iyengar, 1991; Stallings, 
1990; Gamson and Modigliani, 1989). 
In the context of media studies, researchers have 
noted that one of the most important roles of news is in 
the ways that it frames new or emergent issues, events 
and organizations for audiences (cf. Gitlin 1980; Gamson, 
1992; Ryan, 1991). Framing an organization in different 
ways in news may lead to its being perceived as more or 
less legitimate or credible by news readers. Ryan (1991, 
p.207), for example, identifies a number of ways in which 
media frames can legitimizes or delegitimize groups. She 
notes that groups can be de-legitimized by being named inl18 
ways that they did not choose for themselves (such as 
"leftist" rather than democratic) i by having their 
identity set off by quotes or qualifiers (such as 
"alleged" or "calling themselves") i by having their 
concerns trivialized (i.e. focusing on dress or 
mannerlsms rather than content) i or by being "balanced" 
by sources that are of quite different stature. Gitlin 
(1980. p. 27) offers a similar series of news framing 
"mechanisms" of delegitimation when he notes that 
coverage of SDS featured trivialization (making light of 
movement language, style, age and goals), polarization 
(emphasizing counter demonstrations and balancing the 
grou~ with the ultra-right as equivalent llextremists"), 
emphasis on internal dissent, marginalization (showing 
demonstrators to be deviant or unrepresentative), and so 
on. 
In this analysis I draw on Ryan (1991) and Gitlin's 
(1980) methodological insights in tracking the linguistic 
cues and frames for NOW that would indicate legitimacy 
(or not) in a particular story (e.g. polarization or 
being described in quotation marks), but I am also 
concerned with more macro patterns of shifts in news 
representations of NOW over time and in different 
contexts. Neither Gitlin (1980) nor Ryan (1991) followed 
media-movement relationships over long periods, and so 
consequently processes of struggle over legitimation that 
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may have taken place had the groups continued to interactl19 
with media, or the researchers continued to observe, are 
missed. Gitlin (1980), for example, studied SDS's 
representation closely only over one year (1965-1966) 
He argues that studying early framing is the best way to 
see the emergence of media frames before they "harden" 
into place as cornmon sense. But what if they do not 
harden at all but change In some other way? NOW's 
representation over time suggests that in fact early 
marginalization can move into later, if limited, 
legitimation. Because NOW is one of the few movement 
groups to continue to exist over time, we have a unique 
ability to see in its experiences with news media whether 
a marginalizing framing can in be turned around 
whether persistent efforts at reframing can be 
successful. 
Analysis. NOW's "identity" as represented in the 
Times is compared to and assessed in the context of its 
own internal identity constructions and legitimation 
strategies. The organization's self-descriptions in its 
policy documents and public statements which was document 
in the institutional analysis is now compared its 
representation in the Times. For example, NOW 
leadership's general shift in 1975 in which they 
exercised less control over NOW's public image in 1975 
and allowed more internal dissent to be publicly talked 
about is tracked to media content at that time, and the 
overall legitimation (or not) patterns in news 120 
representations are compared to NOW's identity strategies 
at that time. 
2.5 Limitations of the Content Analysis 
Some of the limitations of the content analysis 
derive from the news sample, others from limitations in 
the operationalizations and measurements. 
The sample drawn here constitutes a census of all 
stories about NOW in the New York Times 1966-1980 which 
means that it cannot account for stories in which NOW's 
information was used but in which the organization was 
not mentioned or quoted. As noted above this is a 
significant drawback because there are many scenarios in 
which journalists may have used NOW information without 
crediting NOW. The size of the news sample is also 
problematic, making it difficult to analyze trends over 
time adequately. 
Limitations of the content analysis are also tied to 
problems of operationalization and measurement. Assessing 
"success" in interaction is problematic in any context, 
and this study is no exception. The framework of access, 
voice, placement and control offered here, and the 
measurements used to assess these concepts, are only 
exploratory and sketchy beginnings to what will be a long 
development process. I have drawn here also on some 
available measurement techniques (such as agenda setting 
methods of rank order correlations) which seemed to be 121 
the best available for my purposes but which are 
stretched to their logical limits in this context. 
Changing the usual time lags in agenda setting, for 
example, even when it seems justified by the slow pace of 
NOW-news interaction, may significantly distance this 
analysis from others in that research tradition. Combined 
with the difficulties involved in standardizing movement 
and news discourses for comparisons overall, it may be 
that agenda setting techniques are not the most 
appropriate for this kind of analysis. Clearly more work 
needs to be done in operationalizing both agenda and 
identity control. 
Chapter Summary 
The parallel institutional and content analyses 
research design here allows us to both track and assess 
the media strategies of a new social movement 
organization. The two-part logic of the study's design is 
essentially if we are to understand the role(s) of news 
in processing social movement discourses -- it is only by 
comparing news constructions to others that we can 
untangle roles for sources and roles for news. 
Because this is a case study which seeks to 
understand the relative role played by several different 
kinds of factors (resources, strategies and ideology) it 
involved multiple methodologies. The study involves 
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historical, quantitative content analysis and 
interpretive text analysis to get at the complex multi-
layered relationship that NOW built with news. Overall 
the study is conceptually driven, and it draws 
eclectically on methods and measurement techniques that 
seem to show promise in the various contexts addressed. 
NOTES 
1 These three factors are drawn from a reVlew of the 
three major approaches to news studies -- political 
economic, sociological and ideological/hegemonic 
(Barker-Plummer, 1993). 
2 For example, in 1975 NOW's identity underwent a shift 
and so did its relationship to media. The Majority 
Caucus took over with a wider feminist agenda than 
leaders had had before, and their attitude towards media 
coverage of NOW was much less controlling than the 
previous leadership because they were concerned to 
present a diverse and welcoming identity for the 
organization rather than a carefully controlled and pre-
censored one. Thus a shift in political identity 
generally also made for a shift in media strategies, and 
indeed shift in news coverage -- during this period (as 
I describe in chapter eight) news coverage of NOW became 
much more diverse, complex and critical. 
3 The master list lists items in the following ways "a 
manila folder marked ERA 1976" which is less than 
useful. 
4 Finding relevant materials is somewhat haphazard 
researchers have to simply order up boxes that, from 
their contents list, look like they might be useful. 
5 The "unit" of analysis in news agendas is usually the 
story. A possible "unit" in NOW papers might be a 
mention of an issue on the agenda for the national 
convention agenda, or national board meetings, but even 
these materials are not reliably available. 
6 This difficulty in comparing two different discourses 
is not unique to NOW. Recent studies that have tried to 
track the influence of institutions on media agendas in 
other contexts -- for example presidential candidates 
and political parties on news election agendas (cf. 
Semetko et al., 1991) have also noted the difficulty in 
paralleling these discourses adequately for comparison. 
See discussion later in section 2.46 which describes the 
agenda setting measures. 
7 Extensions to the study will include Times coverage up 
to 1995, and TV coverage 1966-1995. 
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8 Paragraphs in the Times and other newspapers are on 
average about 3-5 sentences. This is a more convenient 
measurement than column inches for coders, and overall 
gives a reliable measure for comparative purposes. 
9 Log measures of graphs, income and membership were 
also calculated so that income. membership and access 
could be charted together (chapter seven, 1.2) 
10 Sigal (1973) is the source of this distinction 
between journalist enterprise and other kinds of 
stories, but it is vulnerable to criticism too because 
interview or features may also be instigated by 
information subsidies of some sort -- e.g., press kits 
that indicate leaders to interview, or suggestions by 
media strategists that prompt "features" and so on. 
11 Coder agreement as a simple percentage was 75%. When 
calculated as a reliability figure, which takes into 
account patterns of expected (random) agreement, the 
figure moves down to .65. 
12 In the end the Semetko et al. (1991) study compares 
issue ranking in candidate speeches in media to issue 
ranking in news reports about the election overall. This 
is problematic in terms of the relative lack of 
independence of these sources -- both are mediated --
but it is one way to produce standardized formats to 
compare. 
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Chapter 4 
A Brief Political Profile of the National Organization 
for Women: Militant Pragmatists 
The National Organization for Women -- so called 
so that men could also be members -- was formed in 1966 
by a group of women who were attending the Third 
National Conference of the State Commissions on the 
Status of Women. They had been dissatisfied with the way 
the conference was going for a few days. Most of their 
critical reports on women's status were being ignored 
and they felt that the conference was being "managed" to 
make the Administration look good while avoiding any 
definitive policy statements. Finally, after having 
their attempt to introduce a motion on enforcement of 
existing sex discrimination laws (such as Title VII of 
the 1964 Civil Rights Act), denied, the group got 
together and formed the National Organization for Women. 
According to NOW's first president, Betty Friedan, 
(1976), they sat down together at a banquet table, wrote 
out NOW's name and mission on a cocktail napkin, each 
chipped in $5 for a startup kitty and NOW was born 
(Friedan, 1976; Carden, 1974; Carabillo et al., 1993) 1 
From these early days of a handful of elite members 
and a few hundred dollars, NOW grew into the biggest and 
most important mass-based feminist organization in the 
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United States, and perhaps In the world. It now has a 125 
paylng membership of 250,000 (and many non paying 
supporters), hundreds of chapters allover the United 
States, and a budget around ten million dollars. It has 
become the best known of all feminist organizations in 
the national policy arena, and its targeting by right 
wing politicians and movements as "the enemy" in many 
different campaigns suggests that it is also recognized 
by its enemies as a core organization of US political 
feminism. 
NOW in Movement Context 
NOW was formed In the midst of a burgeoning 
"movem~nt" of women In the United States. This movement 
or llsecond wave" of feminist activity In the United 
States (the first had taken place around suffrage 
earlier in the century) comprised a loosely related set 
of individuals, texts and organizations, all focused in 
one way or another on challenging gender inequities and 
extending women's rights and roles in society. The 
movement ranged from small local groups of a few women 
engaged in consciousness raising to a national, mass 
based organization like NOW. The many different groups 
involved in the second wave -- from women's bookstores 
and clinics to Washington based research organizations 
-- shared few specific strategies or members but they 
did share a central focus on issues of gender inequality 
and a sense of being part of a larger ffmovement ff of 126 
feminism (Echols, 1989; Freeman, 1975; Koedt et aI, 
1973; Carden, 1974; Hole and Levine, 1971.) 
Freeman (1975, p. 50), an activist and movement 
historian, has suggested that we can best understand the 
complexity of the second wave women's movement if we 
think of it as breaking down very generally into a 
"younger" and an "older" branch. In the "older" branch 
Freeman places national organizations, such as (NOW), 
National Women's Political Caucus (NWPC) , Women's Equity 
Action League (WEAL), and so on, which she sees as being 
concerned with political action in the public domain. 
In the ffyounger branch ff Freeman places less structured, 
and more openly radical groups such as The Feminists, 
Redstockings, and so on. 
Freeman's older/younger categorization focuses not 
on ideological differences (because all feminisms want 
to fundamentally restructure human relations) but rather 
notes that the ffolder ff and ffyounger" branches of the 
movement had different kinds of organizational forms and 
tended to pursue similar goals through quite different 
strategies. 
Other observers have preferred to see the movement 
breaking down along a radical-liberal dimension (cf. 
Echols, 1989), but as Freeman notes, this left-right 
spectrum has never worked very well for feminisms. These 
distinctions obscure as much as they reveal about 
feminisms, almost all of which challenge In some ways 127 
the public-private underpinnings of both liberal and 
radical political discourses, and almost all of which, 
if instituted. would indeed have radical outcomes 
(Freeman, 1975, p. 49): 
The terms "reformist" and "radical" by which the 
two branches are often designated are convenient 
and fit our preconceived notions about the nature 
of political activity, but they tell us little of 
relevance ... Some groups often called "reformist" 
have a platform that would so completely change our 
society it would be unrecognizable. Other groups 
called "radical" concentrate on the traditional 
female concerns of love, sex, children, and 
interpersonal relationships (although with non-
traditional views). The ideological complexity of 
the movement is too great to be categorized so 
simply .... Structure and style rather than 
ideology more accurately differentiate the two 
branches, and even here there has been much 
borrowing on each side (p. 49). 
Generally speaking, says Freeman, the differences 
between the older and younger branches were in style not 
substance. Both sets of groups were concerned about 
structural inequities in access to employment, education 
and politics, but they chose different strategic paths 128 
to engage with these problems. 
The "older" branch groups focused for the most part 
on legal and governmental strategies (for example 
challenging sex discrimination in the courts or pushing 
for EEO inclusion of gender discrimination). They also 
usually had more links to existing institutions and many 
of their leaders were already involved in "women's" 
politics in other ways before forming these groups. The 
women who formed NOW, for example, had been working on 
women's politics in various government departments, 
unlons, businesses and universities for years before the 
formation of NOW and they had been talking for a long 
time about the need for an organization like NOW that 
could serve as an "independent voice" for women's issues 
in ways that they could not from within their own 
organizations (Friedan, 1976; Carabillo et aI, 1993) 
This kind of connections to existing political forums 
made the "older" group quite different from the 
"younger" groups in terms of age, experience and 
expectations. 
The younger branch groups were first of all mostly 
made up of younger women, and they were more loosely 
organized into a plethora of different, often local, 
groups. Their activities varied from consciousness-
ralSlng to political "zaps" and protests and who 
experimented with alternative forms of association. To 
the younger groups, personal transformation was as 129 
important as public change and they tried to embody 
their politics in practice through problematizing issues 
of hierarchy, specialization, and routinization in their 
organizations. It was the younger groups for the most 
part who later set up many of the alternative feminist 
service organizations (such as clinics, magazines and 
bookstores) . 
IS there "a" NOW? Strategic Identity Creation 
NOW is a particularly difficult organization to 
classify. Even Freeman's classification of NOW as 
belonging to the "older" branch (because of its 
bur~aucratic form and "insider" strategies) only holds 
true in the first few years of its existence and in fact 
may only ever have been true at the national level. At 
the local level NOW chapters did not always organize 
bureaucratically at all -- in fact many chapters bore 
more resemblance to younger movement consciousness 
raising groups than to national NOW with its Board and 
specialized roles. And after 1973-1975, even the 
national organization began to seem "younger." By that 
time most of the younger movement groups had disbanded 
or disappeared and many women flocked to NOW as one of 
the few viable forms of organized feminism. After 1975, 
NOW itself became a central site of struggle over what 
US feminism would be. because it has changed its 
identity so much over the years. 
On a left-right spectrum NOW leaders and members 
have usually been left of center, but they have also 
quite often put gender issues (such as abortion rights) 
before traditional political distinctions and supported 
candidates from both Republican and Democratic parties 
who worked for these lssues. 
In terms of class issues, NOW has also shifted over 
time. NOW was founded by an upper middle class elite 
group, and it has never been an organization to whom 
class analysis was central, but it has developed over 
time a strong position on the rights and problems of 
poor women. NOW was one of the few national women's 
organizations to speak out, for example, on forced 
sterilization and more recently on welfare cuts and 
their devastating effects on poor women with children. 
In fact, searching for nann identity for NOW may 
itself be part of the problem. NOW's npublic identityn 
has always been seen by its leaders as flexible. In the 
early years (1966-1973), for example, much of NOW's non-
radical positioning had less to do with its members 
philosophies than with the short term political goals of 
its national leaders who were concerned that they be 
taken seriously by news and other political leaders (and 
so were concerned not to seem too radical) and who were 
constrained by the very real problem of maintaining the 
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support of the organizations (for example the 
traditional women's organizations and labor unions) that 
were still underwriting NOW financially.2 
Over time NOW has encompassed both a radical 
commitment to long term social change, and a strategic 
pragmatism In the short term. This pragmatism is what 
makes it possible for NOW to take strategic action in 
the short term -- including framing itself as mainstream 
if necessary -- while maintaining a long term 
transformative vision. As Carden (1974) notes, this 
blend of radical intent and pragmatic strategies lS 
often misunderstood as a lack of vision, when in fact it 
is a kind of "double vision" in which NOW members 
maintain their commitment to long term radical change 
but are good enough readers of the contemporary 
situation to realize that short term actions are more 
likely to succeed (Carden, 1974, p. 105): 
NOW's approach to social problems is pragmatic. 
Ideally many NOW members would like to transform or 
even eliminate societal role expectations for women 
and men but they do not believe they can achieve 
this goal directly: instead, they work for change 
by exerting pressure on the existing social 
structure. This pragmatic approach (which is shared 
by other Women's Rights groups) is commonly 
misinterpreted. Many people believe that NOW and 
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similar groups want to modify the present society, 132 
not to restructure it (p. 105). 
This kind of strategic pragmatism makes NOW hard to 
pin down on dualistic scales -- such as the radical or 
reformist scale -- because such scales assume an 
essential or "authentic" identity which is simply not 
the case for most movements or movement organizations. 
NOW's identity shifted over time because of leadership 
and membership shifts, historical changes and, perhaps 
most importantly changing strategies of self-
presentation. Van Zoonen (1992, p. 6) notes that this 
kind of shifting is typical of social movement 
organizations. It is our frameworks that are wrong In 
trying to see movements as consistent, goal oriented 
identities when they are in fact (strategic) social 
constructions: 
the collective identity of movements is never 
stable; it is a social construction, arising from 
symbolic negotiation within movements, as well as 
from interaction with their political and social 
environment. 
If we have to apply a label to NOW's organizational 
philosophy, it is perhaps best characterized as being a 
kind of militant pragmatism that allows its members and 
leaders to see themselves as revolutionaries -- and 133 
indeed to want radical societal changes in terms of 
gender identities -- but also be able to present 
themselves in strategically appropriate ways in the 
short term and to be able to engage in interaction with 
the existing (sexist) political system over specific 
issues. 
A long-time NOW member and chronicler of the 
organization has called this position a upassion for the 
possible u and it 1S changes in what NOW's leaders and 
members consider to be upossibleu 1n specific historical 
circumstances which caused shifts 1n NOW's identity and 
policy over time, rather than any change in the 
orgariization's commitment to, or desire for, radical 
social change. 
NOW's Policy Agendas: 
Core Issues and Agenda Expansion Over Time 
Over time, changing memberships and political 
contexts affected NOW's political agenda, but there have 
always been certain core areas that NOW has remained 
focused on throughout its history. For example, equal 
rights for women in all areas of social life and 
especially under the law has been a guiding principle 
for NOW since its founding. The NOW Statement of Purpose 
written in 1967 notes that NOW's central aim is to bring 
women into Utruly equal partnershipu with men. 
This concern for equality took a number of 
directions over the years, the most obvious being 
ongoing organizational support for, and mobilization 
around, the ratification of the Equal Rights Amendment. 
NOW declared its support of the ERA in 1967 (and in so 
doing lost the support of its organized labor members) 
and the ERA remained a core NOW issue ever since. In the 
late 1970s , in the days leading up to the 1982 
(extended) ratification deadline it was also an issue 
that brought in thousands of new members and at one 
point around a million dollars a month in contributions 
to support NOW's ERA work. 
The defeat over the ERA, which failed to be 
rati'fied by its 1982 deadline, was a serious blow to the 
organization. NOW had invested huge amounts of money, 
skills and energy into the ratification battle and its 
failure caused serious loss of morale in the movement. 
Sex Discrimination 
This core concern for equality was also manifested 
In NOW's other key legal area; sex discrimination. NOW 
and other feminists had been instrumental in getting 
"sex" added as a category to the Civil Rights Act of 
1964, and NOW worked to have it included in all civil 
rights legislation thereafter. Indeed NOW was one of the 
key political players in the "making" of sex 
discrimination as a legal category and as a political 
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issue at all. NOW members pressured and protested the 135 
EEOC to review sex discrimination in employment 
complaints when the Commission was reluctant to consider 
sex as a viable category at all. Over the years NOW has 
been a legal and moral resource (and litigant) for women 
suffering sex discrimination in employment allover the 
United States. The organization was instrumental, for 
example, in influencing the EEOC to file (and win) some 
of its biggest sex discrimination suits (such as the 
AT&T and US Steel settlements of the 1970s) in which 
women and minority employees were awarded millions of 
dollars back pay due to discrimination in hiring and 
promotions . 
. NOW's sex discrimination concerns also extended 
beyond employment to cover inequalities and sex 
discrimination in education (in schooling and teaching), 
in access to credit and insurance, and in sports and 
housing. NOW's pressure was important in the passing of 
the Equal Credit Act and its work on desegregating 
school sports, especially Little League, made them 
infamous in the early 1970s. NOW research and reports, 
along with the AAUW and EEOC on university hiring 
practices were also influential In promoting reform In 
university promotions and tenuring practices resulting 
in the tenuring of more women. 
Abortion Rights 
Two other essential lssue areas that have remained 
among NOW's core concerns, though they have both evolved 
over time, are abortion rights and child care. NOW 
declared itself unambiguously in favor of reproductive 
freedom in 1967, (and again lost some of its board 
members). NOW's framing of abortion rights as "the 
rights of women to control their reproductive lives" was 
the first time that a feminist framework had been 
provided for access to abortion (Hole and Levine, 1971, 
p. 89): 
NOW's position made it the first women's right 
organization to put the civil libertarian argument 
for abortion into clear feminist terms -- the right 
of a woman to control her body. 
The long term dominance of this frame for abortion 
(which held until recent right wing counter-frames about 
the "rights" of fetuses) lS an indication of how social 
movement communications can successfully influence 
public understandings. 
Child Care 
Child care was also a new and controversial issue 
when NOW first espoused it In 1966. When NOW first 
articulated the importance of accessible and affordable 
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child care centers as the right of working parents, 137 
Richard Nixon was declaring such centers to be communist 
plots. The development of affordable (preferably state 
funded) day care remains a key NOW concern, but 25 years 
later it has also made it ways into both the Democratic 
and Republican party platforms. 
NOW's core concerns were codified In the 1968 
"National Organization for Women Bill of Rights" which 
demanded: 
I. Equal Rights Constitutional Amendment 
II. Enforce Law Banning Sex Discrimination In 
Employment 
. III. Maternity Leave Rights in Employment and In 
Social Security Benefits. 
IV. Tax Deduction for Horne and Child Care Expenses 
for Working Parents 
V. Child Day Care Centers 
VI. Equal and Unsegregated Education 
VII. Equal Job Training Opportunities and 
Allowances for Women in Poverty 
VIII. The Right of Women to Control their 
Reproductive Lives 
As lS clear from both its title and language, the 
1968 Bill of Rights was strategically articulated by its 
producers to link to the US Bill of Rights. This use of 
constitutional language (of individual rights and 
equality) is something that NOW continued to do over 
time, though as we shall see, by 1989 the language of 
"rights" had been extended much further to include the 
"right" to a toxin free environment and a peaceful world 
order. 3 
Sexual Orientation 
One issue area that later became central to NOW but 
lS conspicuously absent in NOW's first policy statements 
is that of sexual identity or sexual orientation. Though 
NOW leaders have often perceived themselves and the 
organization as being in the vanguard of the movement, 
and"of "leading public opinion," they were slow to take 
on board issues of sexuality and lesbianism though these 
were important movement topics. Friedan, NOW's president 
from 1966-1970, is widely seen as the driving force 
behind the organization's avoidance of questions of 
sexual identity, despite the fact that it was a central 
part of the movement discourse more generally. Friedan 
(1976, p. 141) herself admits to wanting to "avoid" the 
lssue, not because of personal feelings, but because of 
its controversial nature: 
I didn't want that issue [lesbianism] even to 
surface and divide the organization, as it surely 
would have in 1970, and almost did, later. 
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Like many other internal conflicts In NOW, this one 
has some roots in NOW's ongoing concern with its 
"public" identity. National NOW leaders, (as I explain 
further in chapter six), were continuously concerned 
with how NOW was perceived by journalists and other 
traditional political institutions and this focus on 
external audiences often had containing consequences 
within the organization. 
NOW's position on lesbianism and sexual orientation 
has changed dramatically since Friedan's early 
statements. A 1971 national conference resolution 
brought lesbian rights onto NOW's agenda and a 1975 
resolution made the issue a priority for NOW. But for 
many feminists the legacy of NOW's initial rejection of 
lesbianism, and a lingering historical memory of an 
alleged "purge" of lesbian members, remains part of the 
organization's identity that NOW leadership has to 
respond to 20 years later. Patricia Ireland notes: 
The perception [that NOW lS unfriendly to lesbians] 
is clearly outdated, and it's not to deny history. 
But I think the history was greatly exaggerated by 
the pain that it caused. 4 
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and "Cultural" Feminisms 
Throughout its history, NOW has retained its 
concern with discrimination in education, employment, 
economics, housing and sports. But from these initial 
topics has grown an expansive set of concerns that now 
include issues of racism, poverty, gay civil rights, 
welfare reform, media reform, violence, health and 
family relations. In fact by the 1990s, NOW was such a 
multi-issue organization that Patricia Ireland, NOW's 
president quipped that NOW 1S uyour genuine full-service 
feminist organization. u5 
Some of this expansion 1n feminist concerns was the 
result of leadership and membership changes. By the mid 
1970s many of the less centralized Uyounger" feminist 
groups had disappeared from public view. They had either 
institutionalized into service organizations (such as 
feminist women's clinics and rape counseling centers) or 
disbanded as members moved on to other projects. In any 
case by 1975, many of the UyoungerU feminists who were 
still interested in working in organized political 
feminism had joined NOW. 
At the 1975 NOW National Conference, for example --
tellingly entitled UOut of the Mainstream and into the 
Revolution u -- almost the entire standing NOW Board was 
replaced by a Umajority caucus" of younger, more 
militant, leaders, and NOW headed into a period in which 
radical, long term goals were emphasized and the 
-mainstream- rejected: 6 
The Majority Caucus believes that NOW should not 
identify as a mainstream organization ... Because 
struggling solely for an equal place in the 
American mainstream ... means accepting whatever 
currently prevails in the mainstream as desirable, 
including an overvaluation of traditionally male 
jobs, activities and roles ... [and it] prevents our 
uSlng tactics that people in the mainstream don't 
like, such as street demonstrations, abrasive court 
actions and uncompromising pursuit of the issues. 7 
These new members and leaders brought with them a 
vision of feminism more expansive than NOW's early 
leaders, and they were much more likely to be associated 
with what Echols (1989) has called -cultural feminism-
-- an articulation of feminism that focused on re-
valorizing women's -traditional" roles as much as (or 
rather than) integrating women into the traditionally 
masculine spheres. 8 
In NOW policy terms this changeover meant an 
expansion of NOW's concerns from the traditionally 
-political- to a wide range of issues, as well as a new 
focus on reaching out to women in -traditional- roles, 
such as homemakers and care professionals. Eleanor 
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Smeal, one of NOW's most dynamic leaders in this period, 142 
defined herself as a "housewife" and urged NOW as a 
whole to develop strategies to reach out to women In 
traditional roles. 9 
New NOW task forces and committees began to be 
formed that covered a variety of feminist concerns as 
women began bringing feminist frameworks to bear on 
religion, media, child rearing and all aspects of life. 
The 1975-1977 NOW conference program, for example, 
offers insight into how broad a range of concerns were 
covered by the mid 1970s. The 1977 conference offered 
132 workshops on more than 50 topics, which as well as 
the traditional workshops on ERA strategies, EEO 
compliance, child care and education, also included; 
lesbian custody strategies, feminist therapy, sexual 
harassment strategies, strategies for setting up and 
running battered women's centers, single parenting 
workshops, assertiveness training, and displaced 
homemaker rights among many others. 
At the 1975 conference, not only were there a 
number of new topic areas introduced (such as women's 
history and household violence ), but new connections 
were made between topics (such as a workshop on racism 
and rape, and one on classism, racism, and sexism) . 
"Old" topics were also reframed in more radical ways, 
such as the workshop on reproduction, which in 1975 
focused on techniques for self examination and self-
abortion rather than on abortion legislation or medical 143 
reform. 10 
Some shifts in NOW's public identity and agenda 
over time were the results of changes in the political 
contexts and In its strategic choices. But much of the 
permeability of NOW agendas also came from the fact that 
NOW is a mass based organization, with hundreds of 
thousands of members all working on different projects. 
There are currently more than 700 NOW chapters around 
the country involved in a multitude of tasks from 
protests, law suits and lobbying to running clinics and 
child care centers. It lS this grass roots base that has 
often been the impetus In changing NOW's direction and 
keeping the national organization from getting too much 
of an uinside the beltwayu orientation. Having a 
dispersed base means that NOW's national leadership is 
directly accountable to the membership of the 
organization. ll It is also NOW's existence as a mass 
based organization dispersed across the country that has 
made it possible for NOW to function simultaneously on 
so many different fronts. 
Over the last 30 years NOW chapters and national 
leadership have taken on the government, the phone 
companies and the ad agencies. They have succeeded In 
changing national divorce and credit laws, as well as 
local newspaper advertising policies. They have 
influenced school reading lists and national prison 
policies (in having gynecologists made available to 144 
women prisoners). NOW members have organized millions 
around the ERA and they have set up set up domestic 
violence centers that cater for a few families at a 
time. They have worked to end the involuntary 
sterilization of poor women and to end promotion 
discrimination in board rooms. They have influenced 
divorce law, credit law, abortion law, government 
contracting, school sports, local television hiring, 
Little League and rape laws. Over 30 years the 
organization has influenced the lives of thousands of 
women in hundreds of ways.12 
NOW and the Future 
NOW's current political agenda reflects both the 
organization's core issues and their expansion into new 
areas. The (1989) UNOW Expanded Bill of Rights for the 
21st Century," outlines NOW's priorities for the next 
century and it includes their ongoing concern with 
equality as well as their more general framework of 
interconnected inequalities. The NOW Expanded Bill of 
Rights demands: 
1. the right to freedom from sex discriminationi 
2. the right to freedom from race discriminationi 
3. the right of all women to freedom from 
government interference in abortion, birth 
control and pregnancy and the right of 
indigent women to public funds for abortion, 
birth control and pregnancy serVlceSi 
4. the right to freedom from discrimination on 
the basis of sexual orientationi 
5. the right to freedom from discrimination based 
on religion, age, ongolng health condition, or 
a differently abled situation; 
6. the right to a decent standard of living, 
including adequate food, housing, health care 
and education; 
7. the right to clean alr, clean water, safe toxic 
waste disposal and environmental protection; 
and 
8. the right to be free from violence, including 
freedom from the threat of nuclear war. 
As the 1989 Bill of Rights illustrates, NOW's 
vision of feminism has expanded over time to include 
many more aspects of life and policy. The organization 
has made connections across issues and groups to include 
question of environmental degradation and poverty, race 
and health into its analyses. Women's -rights- in the 
21st century, according to NOW, should include not only 
freedom from sex and race discrimination, but also 
freedom from a polluted environment and the right to 
live in a peaceful context. This is a long way from the 
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original NOW 1968 statement of purpose that wanted to 146 
bring women into the mainstream, and even more expansive 
than the 1975 "majority" caucus who wanted to bring NOW 
out of the mainstream. The 1989 Bill of Rights for the 
21st Century has expanded NOW's feminist concerns to 
cover global ecological issues, education, war and 
peace, and the fundamental right to a "decent standard 
of living." The rhetoric of "rights" and "freedom" that 
NOW began with is still evident here, but it is a vision 
of HrightsH far beyond the traditionally Hpublic H or the 
traditionally Hpolitical. H In fact should NOW be able to 
produce any of these HrightsH it will indeed produce 
radical change. 
As an organization NOW continues to be the central 
feminist organization in the US, and perhaps in the 
world. But by the 19908 NOW had also been joined by many 
other more specialized women's issue organizations in 
Washington, some of which are NOW offshoots. It is 
consequently involved day to day in coalition politics 
as much as single-handed projects. Beginning in 1985, 
for example, a Council of Presidents from the various 
women's groups formed. The Council in 1991 contained 40 
groups representing 10 million members and drafted a 
"women's agenda." Together they adopted a set of policy 
priorities for legislative work. Boles (1991, p. 45) 
notes that this Council has tremendous potential: 
Although not yet a formal coalition organization, 147 
several indicators of incipient 
institutionalization are present; regular meetings, 
organized media campaigns, annual conventions, paid 
consultants, and conferences with the president of 
the United States and congressional leaders. 
Significantly this new coalition agrees not only on 
legislative priorities but also on the essential, 
noncompromisable components of an acceptable bill 
in each policy area. 
NOW's central role in this new political alliance 
structure is not uncontested. The organization's 
tendency not to compromise on core issues has sometimes 
made them unpopular, and their sense of their own 
historicity has garnered for them a reputation among 
some other groups for arrogance and insensitivity. 
Nowadays NOW far from being seen as HreformistH is often 
seen by its Washington colleagues as too militant and 
unbending. As an anonymous critic notes in a recent 
Times article: 
They're positioned to be so outside that 
they're left with nothing but their anger. It's 
exhausting. I'm not that guilty. You're not that 
guilty.13 
Other observers are willing to grant that NOW still 148 
has a unique vanguardist role to play. The head of the 
AAUW, for example, is glad to note that NOW still take 
on the issues that are "harder to hear:" 
This is how we learn as a society. You need both 
leaders and followers. NOW selects the issues that 
are harder to hear. They push the edge out and then 
an AAUW comes along and sounds reasonable. 14 
In any case, despite several dozen news articles 
that have predicted NOW's demise over the last 10 years, 
the organization is still working on various fronts for 
women's rights. And few people would disagree with Toni 
Carabillo that NOW is still not only a core organization 
of the US women's movement. but a symbol of its fates 
more generally. As she notes, NOW as an organization has 
never been alone in the movement but its fortunes have 
always been reflective of the movement as a whole. "The 
fact is," says Carabillo (1993, p. viii) "if the 
National Organization for Women were to collapse and 
disappear, it would be taken as a signal of the end of 
this era of feminism. 
NOTES 
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but they converge on the facts. 
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political and social life in America. See NOW Statement 
of Purpose, 1966. 
7 NOW (1975) .HOut of the Mainstream into the 
Revolution, H bookleL produced by the Majority Caucus 
for 1975 National Conference. NOW Collection, 
Schlesinger Library. 
8 Echols (1989) argues that Hcultural feminism H became 
dominant in the younger movement by the mid 1970s, and 
that it was largely responsible for the de 
politicization of the HyoungerH (radical) branch of 
feminism which became much more Hlifestyle H oriented and 
much less interested in interacting with traditional 
Hpolitics. H 
9 Smeal also had graduate training as a political 
scientist, so her choice to frame herself as a housewife 
was in fact a strategic choice. 
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Forums and Workshops program. NOW Collection, 
Schlesinger Library. 
11 Besides a national office, and local chapters, NOW at 
anyone time also has a number of active Htask forces H 
which combine national and local energies in specific 
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board, task forces, and chapters, was added to in the 
ERA mobilization effort of the 1970s and early 1980s 
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level organizations. Policy within NOW is set each year 
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chapter members. 
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library. See also Maren Lockwood Carden. 1974. The New 
Feminist Movement. New York: Russell Sage Foundation. 
13 New York Times Magazine March 1, 1992, p. 54. 
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Chapter Five 
The Structuring Role of Resources: 
The Political Economy of NOW's News Access 
For modern feminists In America, the fight for 
political clout will need to be fought on the media 
battleground, but not without adequate money, 
resources and creative analysis -- Kathy Bonk, 
feminist media strategist. 
For NOW, or any other social movement group to 
affect public consciousness or identities through mass 
communication, it must first be able to produce access 
to news media. As one of the major sources of political 
information for citizens, the commercial news media 
still constitute a significant part of the public 
sphere. However imperfect and distorted that sphere may 
be, it is in commercial media arenas that much of the 
civil debate about public policy and the legitimacy of 
cultural practices is conducted in the United States and 
western Europe (Garnham, 1986; Fraser, 1992; McLaughlin, 
1993). If we are to understand the NSM's mass 
communication possibilities, that is their ability to 
influence ideologies, issues and identity formation 
processes at the societal level -- what Melucci (1989) 
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has called their symbolic challenge -- then we must 151 
understand their access to existing mass communication 
channels because that is how most people will hear about 
movements and their ideas. 
So, how is such access produced? What resources and 
strategies are important to engaging in (and perhaps 
controlling) media dialogs? What are the "costs" of 
access to media for social movements in terms of 
material, strategic and organizational resources? And, 
are such resources likely to be available to all 
emerglng social movement groups? 
In this chapter I investigate the role(s) of 
resources in structuring NOW's access to news media. 
Draw·ing on the organization's own records, on patterns 
of news coverage, and on other historical accounts of 
the movement, I argue that three major types of 
resources were essential in NOW's media access, and may 
be important to all groups seeking such access. First, 
the professional communicative competence and 
institutional connections of NOW's leaders and 
strategists was critically important. To a large extent 
NOW's initial access to news (and so to the public 
sphere) was realized as a result of the elite, 
professional, educated (and connected) nature of its 
leaders. Second, NOW's ability to generate and maintain 
effective organizational forms in this case a dual 
structure of a centralized, hierarchical national 
organization and decentralized, distributed chapters -- 152 
was also important in its ability to maintain relations 
with media. The centralized national form allowed NOW to 
act quickly and respond to reporters and editors 
concerns, and its localized distribution across the 
country in hundreds of different chapters allowed it to 
ground its claims to represent all American women. 
Third, NOW's ability to attract financial resources 
to produce an ongoing budget for staff, technology, 
information gathering, and salaries was paramount to 
keeping the organization involved in media dialog. News 
source-work is highly resource-intensive and before 
issues of representation and control can even be 
considered, movement organizations must mobilize enough 
resources to fund information collection, communication 
and other organizational tasks. The chapter illustrates 
how each of these factors structured NOW's ability to 
dialog with news media day to day. 
I. "Human Resources:" The Class and Professional 
Backgrounds of NOW's Leaders 
NOW's first "resource" in its interactions with 
news was the group of women and men who joined together 
to form NOW, and the skills, competence, political 
connections, and even personal self-esteem, that they 
brought with them. 
Offe (1985), Eder (1985), and other new social 153 
movement (NSM) observers, have stressed the importance 
of the class base of the NSMs in understanding their 
characters and effectivity. The NSMs, according to Offe, 
are typically made up of educators, social workers, 
communications specialists and other fractions of the 
Unew middle class. u Indeed it is this anomalous class 
base of the NSMs that disturbs many of their critics, 
because it defies clear connections between the NSMs 
class base and their goals (Larana, Johnson and 
Gusfield, 1994). 
NOW's leadership In the early days (and still 
today) conformed closely to the typical NSM class base. 
NOW's first Executive and National Boards were drawn 
from among exactly that new class fraction that Offe 
suggests is typical -- educators, communications 
specialists, government administrators, social workers, 
and other professionals. The first NOW executive board, 
for example, was made up of seven university professors 
or administrators, five state and national labor unions 
officials, and four business executives. They were all 
highly educated and skilled in organization. Many were 
already part of an elite political network of 
administrators concerned with Uwomen's issues u at the 
state and national level. Four of the group had served, 
or were serving on. state commlSSlons on the Status of 
Women. Seven of the original group held Ph.D.'s, one was 
an MD, and three were from religious vocations. One of 154 
the members was an ex-EEO commissioner, another was 
still working for the EEOC at the time of her election. 1 
In later years the organization continued to be led by 
highly educated, and competent women, who were social 
scientists, lawyers, writers, and professional 
organizers. 2 
The professional and class background of NOW's 
early leaders was important in a number of ways. First, 
their associations with other established organizations 
meant that NOW leaders had access to organizational 
resources. Although Friedan (1979, p. 76), describes the 
beginning of NOW as one in which II Nobody ever gave us 
any money to start the movement ... II the women and men 
who founded NOW were all connected In some way to other 
institutions and as such they had access to 
organizational resources not directly attributable to 
NOW. Resources such as telephones, support staff, 
mailing privileges, computer technologies, and so on, 
were available to the early board members through their 
professional lives. In fact in the first two years of 
NOW's existence much of its business was conducted out 
of the offices of the UAW in Chicago where Board Member 
Caroline Davis had her organizational base. 3 
Besides unions, government departments, 
corporations, and universities also contributed, 
intentionally or not, to the early mobilization of NOW ISS 
(Friedan, 1976, p. 85): 
A lot of employers less sympathetic to women's 
cause than the leadership of U.A.W. would be 
surprised to know that their Xerox machines, 
mimeograph machines, and WATTS lines were doing 
NOW's work, as a result of that women's 
underground, in every office. It was the only way 
the work could get done; our treasury in those days 
seldom had more than several hundred dollars. 
This dependence on other organizations in the 
beginning is a fundamental reason that NOW was able to 
mobilize at all, and it was these borrowed resources 
that made it possible specifically for the organization 
to produce communications about its identity and 
purpose. NOW's first press release announcing its 
formation was produced by Muriel Fox from her public 
relations firm, and much of the organizational work for 
NOW's first conference was supported by the UAW. In 
short this link to other organizations -- and access to 
their resources was crucial to NOW's ability both to 
form and to represent itself as an organization. 4 
Second, the educational, professional and class 
background of NOW's leaders gave them distinct 
communicative skills and competencies which they drew on 
In their interactions with news media. All of the 
original board were college graduates, many had graduate 
degrees and some were in fact professional 
communications specialists. Muriel Fox, for example, at 
the time she was NOW's PR director was also a 
professional public relations specialist running her own 
company and Friedan was a professional writer. 
As observers of media sources have noted, source 
work involves a high degree of communicative competence. 
Tasks include the collection and processing of 
information, the strategic framing of events and issues 
in creative ways, and writing up events and information 
into compelling "stories" or press releases for 
journalists (Ryan, 1991; Ericson et aI, 1989). NOW 
leaders were able to draw on their personal "resources" 
of education and communicative skills to do this work. 
A short transcript of NOW leaders in conversation 
with a reporter (1971) shows this kind of communicative 
competence at work with NOW leaders effectively re-
framing a reporter's question: 
Reporter: Do you feel that you are emasculating men 
in any way? 
Hernandez: On the contrary, we feel that we are 
going to be humanizing men. 
Heide: I think something should be said about the 
very term "emasculating" because implicit in the 
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word is a notion that for a man to be emasculated 157 
is to leave him in the position that women have 
always been in and that's very unacceptable. I'm 
speaking of this in the social sense of the term, 
the status. It's acceptable for women to be in that 
status, but not for men. I think that's very 
significant. S 
Such competence -- what Gandy (1989, p. 109) has 
called "communications competence" or the "the ability 
to understand the world so as to act to change it" --
is not a naturally occurring resource, but one that is 
socially and politically produced through access to 
education and training. It is therefore available to 
some social agents and not others. As movement activists 
with many years of higher education and professional 
training , NOW leaders had high levels of communicative 
competence. 
As well as this specific communicative competence, 
NOW leaders also manifested a strong sense of personal 
efficacy and self esteem which made them consider social 
change to be possible. This sense of efficacy, or 
control in the world has been seen as a key structuring 
factor in activism of many kinds (cf. McAdam, 1986; 
Klandermanns, 1984; Gandy, 1991). However, as Bernstein 
(1971, p. 193) notes, it may also be education and class 
dependent.: "The class system has not only deeply marked 
the distribution of knowledge in society. It has glven 158 
differential access to the sense that the world is 
permeable." As educated members of the upper middle 
class NOW leaders has ample access to the intellectual 
and educational resources that produce both efficacy and 
communicative competence. 
The professional/managerial backgrounds of the 
original leaders also meant that most of them had 
already had some contact with news media organizations 
and journalists in the past. They had encountered 
individual journalists before and has some understanding 
of journalistic norms and practices. As I describe in 
the next chapter, compared to the "younger" feminist 
groups they also had a sense of efficacy about media 
access that was unusually high. 
In particular Betty Friedan, NOW's first president 
had extensive experience as a media spokesperson. 
Friedan's book "The Feminine Mystique" had become a best 
seller and she had been invited onto talk shows around 
the country, becoming something of a public figure. In 
choosing Friedan as the organization's figurehead, NOW 
leaders (including Friedan herself) hoped that her 
visibility and her audiences would translate into media 
visibility and members for the group. As an early member 
of NOW commented, Friedan had a ready-made 
llconstituency" which they hoped would then join the 
organization: (Carabillo, 1993, p. 85): 
Friedan was a public figure already and her name 
had national recognition value that would be a 
critical asset in attracting the attention of the 
media. She also came with a built-in constituency 
-- the hundreds of thousands of women who had 
already read her book and who would flock to hear 
her impassioned speeches. 
Other members of NOW had also had extensive 
dealings with journalists In their capacities as PR 
professionals, union leaders or In managerial state 
positions. NOW leaders were used to thinking of news as 
a resource, and they transferred some of their 
expectation about media from their workplaces to NOW 
activities. In fact one observer of NOW in its early 
years noted that NOW had very little of anything except 
media skills (Freeman, 1975, p. 56): 
Instead of organizational experience, what the 
early NOW members had was media experience, and it 
was here that their early efforts were aimed. They 
could create an appearance of activity but did not 
know how to organize the substance of it. As a 
result NOW often gave the impression of being 
larger than it actually was. It was highly 
successful in getting publicity, much less so ln 
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bringing about concrete changes or organizing 
itself. 6 
Overall, then NOW leaders brought professional, 
educational and communicative resource to the dialog 
with news. The NSM theorists suggest this may be typical 
of other ·new· social movement group, but it is an open 
question as to whether such resources are available to 
all social movement organizations, especially those 
mobilizing outside of the ·professional" classes, is an 
open question. 7 
II. Organization as a Resource: 
Bureaucracy, Centralization and Size 
Organization -- the ability to coordinate 
activities, communicate an identity, recruit members and 
achieve goals -- is itself a resource that is critical 
in the effectivity of social movements. The problem for 
social movement activists and theorists has been In 
deciding which organizational forms are best to achieve 
a movement's goals. Gamson (1975, p. 91-92), for 
example, has argued that a certain level of bureaucracy 
is associated with social movement organizations' 
success because it helps them to achieve ·pattern 
maintenance" (that is readiness to act or react) . 
Centralization, he argues, is also a resource because it 
minimizes the chances of conflict and factionalism over 
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organizational control. Overall, a degree of 
bureaucratization is likely to be successful for 
movement organization in Gamson's view because 
-imitating the form of one's antagonist eases the 
development of some sort of working relationship.-
While centralization may make coordinated activity 
easier, however, it also leaves an organization open to 
more centralized damage, and Gerlach and Hines (1970) 
have concluded that some sort of decentralized structure 
makes survival over the long term more likely. These 
researchers and others (e.g. McAdam, 1986) also 
highlight the likelihood of decentralized organizations 
being able to recruit -affinity" groups -- that is 
people who already know each other. Most social 
movements have their roots in such pre-existing networks 
of social or political relationships. Morris (1984), for 
example, has described the fundamental importance of the 
southern church base for the Civil Rights Movement, and 
Evans (1979) has stressed the linkages between the women 
who organized the women's liberation movement alongside 
NOW. Indeed, as I have suggested above, NOW was also 
formed out of a preexisting network of women and men 
actively involved in women's politics. 8 
Decentralized and non-hierarchical groups have also 
been valued for their ability to increase members sense 
of equality and respect, and as such as being -practice" 
for a more egalitarian future. They are thus sometimes 
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seen to have a moral superiority over bureaucratic forms 162 
which are said to "mimic" oppressive power relations. 
The "younger" feminist movement groups, for example, 
often experimented with radically egalitarian forms 
where role specialization and individual leadership was 
avoided (Freeman, 1975; Echols, 1989). Generally these 
egalitarian forms are more successful at achieving their 
moral/ideological goals (that is allowing members to 
practice egalitarian ideals and to create a shared 
identity) than they are at producing action in the 
external environment. Freeman (1975) and Echols (1989), 
for example, note that the egalitarian forms of the 
younger feminist groups often resulted in inexperienced 
workers being assigned tasks (because role 
specialization was unfair) and so tasks would take more 
time. Egalitarian groups, however, maintained a strong 
commitment to radical political analysis and often 
produced some of the movement's most influential 
writings. 
In NOW's case the organization's structure had 
elements of both a centralized, bureaucratic structure 
and a looser affinity group organization. At the 
national level NOW exhibited a high degree of 
centralization and role specialization -- key aspects of 
traditional bureaucratic forms -- but at the local level 
there was a much wider range of organizational forms for 
chapters. Chapters ranged in forms from highly 
formalized local organizations to loose knit or 
radically egalitarian groups.9 
The Executive and National Boards of NOW are the 
governing bodies who act on behalf of NOW, but they are 
constrained by priorities set by the national 
conference which is made up of grassroots members, so 
both parts of the organization have some control over 
its agenda. 10 Besides the national board and the local 
chapters, NOW also comprises a number of Task Forces 
which focus on particular topics. These task forces 
focus on many different issues and keep NOW functioning 
as a multi-issue organization working on many different 
fronts. Over time the number and range of task forces 
has ±ncreased. 11 
Though coordination problems have plagued the 
organization since its inception, generally both of 
these aspects of the organization its centralization 
and its distributed chapters -- have worked as resources 
for NOW ln terms of its media access. The centralized, 
specialized and hierarchical aspects of the national 
organization have made it possible for the national 
leadership to act quickly and authoritatively and the 
distributed nature of the organization across the 
country has helped ground national NOW's claims to 
speak for all women. 
As a centralized organization, with a visible 
formal Board and national office, NOW was able to 
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coordinate its media activities and to send coherent 164 
messages to media. Such coherence in message 
construction is important if movements' are to keep 
control of their own identity in media. Gitlin (1980, p. 
137), for example, has noted how ambiguity about 
leadership roles and suspicion of centralized authority 
made it difficult for SDS leaders to control media 
coverage of the movement. When SDS leaders did take such 
spokesperson roles on, they were often criticized by 
regional members for usurping authority. 
NOW leaders had no such qualms about speaking to 
media; indeed they felt that it was central to their 
role to be a voice for women In the public arena. And 
the structure of the organization -- with designated 
leaders and relatively clear lines of authority and 
accountability -- made it easy for a core group to 
become media spokespersons for the entire organization. 
In the early years of the organization this centralized 
control was quite extreme. As I describe further in 
chapter SlX, NOW's original leaders often misrepresented 
the internal diversity of the organization strategically 
in order to present a united front to media. 
In general, though the clear sense of leadership 
and accountability worked out well for NOW in its 
relations with news media. Reporters had no trouble 
identifying who was in charge of particular topics, and 
national reporters could rely In being able to speak 
directly to NOW's president. 12 NOW's bureaucratic 
organizational form meant that NOW kept Washington 
business hours (9-5) and could be relied upon to be 
available on deadlines. This ability to fit into news' 
"phase structures" has been seen to be important In 
determining which sources journalists will use most 
(Fishman, 1980; Tuchman, 1978). 
An important side effect of this centralization and 
bureaucracy that also worked in NOW's favor was their 
ability to respond quickly to a breaking issues when 
necessary. As Gamson (1990) has noted, response time and 
the ability to act quickly may be even more important In 
news interaction than in interaction with other 
instltutions . NOW's ability to respond quickly was 
tested in 1981, for example, when Sandra Day '0 Connor 
was nominated to the Supreme Court: 
Within two hours after the President announced her 
appointment, local NOW activists were contacted in 
maJor media markets ... and briefed so that they 
could respond to the inordinate media attention 
that was focused on Judge O'Connor being the first 
woman nominated to the Supreme Court. 13 
In general, then, NOW's bureaucratic and 
centralized structure made them available to reporters, 
which made them more attractive sources. It was also an 
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important element in their own development of media 166 
strategies, speaking in one consistent and accountable 
llpublic" voice, making it more likely that reporters 
would listen. 
Besides the professionalized and bureaucratic 
national office, though, NOW had a distributed structure 
of hundreds of local chapters. By 1977 NOW had more than 
700 chapters around the country. This distributed base 
caused NOW coordination problems, but it also carne with 
some benefits in the form of legitimation. 
NOW often had problems of coordination and 
communication between the local and national 
organization. For example, local and national members 
often did not agree on each others' roles. NOW local 
chapters felt at times that they did not know what the 
national office was doing (in particular what it was 
doing with their dues) and that they did not get enough 
llhelpll from the national leadership in their local 
activities. At the national level, leaders expressed 
annoyance that the localities did not take a national 
Vlew and that they seemed to expect national officers to 
work as administrators for the organization rather than 
as leaders with political vision (Carden, 1974). 
In the mid 1970s this discontent carne to a head in 
an extended dues-withholding protest where local 
chapters refused to pass on membership dues to the 
national organization. The withholding was accompanied 
by an electoral push from the grass roots which unseated 167 
almost the entire standing NOW Board over a two year 
period and replaced the leadership with members more 
sensitive to issues of internal democracy and local 
representation. 14 
Despite these difficulties, though, NOW's mass base 
was strategically useful in a number of ways. The 
mushrooming of the organization across the country, (and 
even across the Atlantic when some American women set up 
a Paris chapter), added to NOW's resources not only 
through an increase in membership dues but also in their 
credibility as a representative organization in the eyes 
of policy makers and journalists. In almost every news 
story about NOW analyzed in this case study, for 
example, the organization's Slze and its spread across 
the country are central to its definition. The 
descriptor phrase, "the largest feminist organization in 
the country with (so many) members and (so many) 
chapters" appeared in virtually every story in which NOW 
was cited. 
This kind of legitimacy may be especially important 
to journalists when they are deciding whether or not to 
take a new organization seriously in the face of 
skeptical editors and supervisors. Simpson (1979), a 
reporter who covered the movement, for example, says she 
argued with her editors that the women's movement was an 
important story simply In terms of size if nothing 
else. IS 
It's mass base made NOW a qualitatively different 
kind of organization to reporters. Whereas many of the 
"public interest" groups in Washington are not mass-
based but leadership groups that is they are 
supported by contributions and grants and have a board 
and staff who act on behalf of an abstract "public" but 
who are not responsible to any concrete membership --
NOW's is directly democratic and represents women from 
all across the country. NOW's mass base and its 
geographical dispersion give it more legitimacy as a 
popular organization. 
In terms of political strategy, this 
diversification has also been useful. The ERA 
mobilization in 1970s and the reproductive rights 
mobilization of the 1980s have each been led by NOW, 
among others, because NOW had a reach that goes beyond 
Washington to mobilize women across the country. 
NOW's dual existence as both a centralized national 
organization and in flexible local chapters, also 
increased democracy within the organization by making 
leadership accountable to a mass base. In fact it may be 
this aspect of NOW's structure, through which leadership 
comes "up" from the localities (and so has a less 
"inside the beltway" orientation), that accounts for 
NOW's ability not to get more conservative with age, as 
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oligarchic theorists suggest, but in fact to extend 169 
their range of concerns and become more radical over 
time. 16 
III. Material Resources: 
Membership, Income and Media Access 
Besides the resources provided by NOW leaders' 
competence and education, and its ability to maintain an 
effective organizational form over time, a critical 
resource for NOW was financial. It is only by mobilizing 
at least some cash resources that movement organizations 
can then pay for other resources such as information, 
staff time, technologies, and so on. 
o NOW's main source of lncome was, and is, membership 
dues. Table 5.1 indicates the trends in NOW's membership 
numbers over time. In the first few years NOW's only 
income came from membership dues. Later, In the mid 
1970s and early 1980s, NOW leaders began to use direct 
mail to ask for contributions from members and 
sympathetic bystanders in addition to membership dues 
and over time the percentage of NOW's funds made up from 
charitable contributions has increased. 17 By 1984 such 
contributions made up 30 percent of NOW's income of 
$5,637,000 (64 percent still came from membership dues 
and 6 percent from sales of NOW products) .18 
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In the late 1970s NOW also began to apply for 
foundation support and grants, usually to fund 
particular projects. Some grant money was forthcoming 
for special projects to NOW and its sister organization, 
NOWLDEF (National Organization for Women's Legal Defense 
and Education Fund) .19 But for the most part, feminist 
organizations have been less successful In getting 
foundation support than other civil rights 
organizations. The majority of NOW's income still comes 
from membership dues, making it a genuinely mass based 
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organization that has to be responsive to its membership 171 
base. 
Over time NOW has grown exponentially. Except for a 
period of decline in the mid 1980s, available data on 
the organization's membership and income base, suggests 
a general upward trend over time. From an initial 
reported membership of 300 in 1966, NOW grew to 15,000 
by 1973 and then to around 50, 000 by 1977. In 1979 some 
sources report as many as 100,000 members for NOW. By 
1982 that figure was 225,000. After the ERA defeat In 
1982, numbers dropped off to around 160,000 in 1985, but 
by 1992 NOW was reporting 275,000 members, making it by 
far the largest feminist organization in the world. 
Because income for NOW is largely a result of 
membership dues, this meant that NOW's organizational 
income also grew rapidly over time. As Figures 5.1 and 
5.2 indicate (next page), both NOW's membership and 
income have generally increased over time, with a few 
years of fall back in the mid 1980s. From an income of 
$1500 In 1966, NOW's reported budget was over $1 million 
by 1979. In 1978 the reported lncome for the 
organization was $3.5 million, and in 1982, at the 
height of the ERA fight the organization took in around 
$9 million. In 1989 the organization reported an $11 
million budget. 
However, it is important that we treat these 
numbers cautiously. As other observers of social 
movement groups have also noted (cf. Knoke, 1989; 
Gamson, 1975; Zald and McCarthy, 1979) the actual 
documentable numbers of members of a social movement 
organization at anyone time are very difficult to 
ascertain. First, because SMOs do not routinely keep 
excellent records, second because strategic over 
counting is endemic, and third, because the meaning of 
"membership" itself is problematic. Some groups, for 
example, count all people who have ever paid membership 
dues, others routinely purge their rolls and drop all 
non active members every few months or weeks. NOW in 
general has had a policy to count only active, paid up 
members as members, but purging rolls is itself a 
resource intensive activity which may not have high 
priority in an action driven organization, and such 
claims are difficult to verify.20 
Wherever possible in this study I have tried to 
verify membership and income numbers across sources 
(e.g. by comparing numbers gleaned from NOW records with 
other historical studies). But even so there are still 
some missing years that I cannot account for and which 
do not seem to be available even to the national 
organization. In short, these specific numbers must be 
seen as quite fragile, though the general trends they 
document are well supported across sources. 
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Membership, Income and Media Access 
Given that membership dues provided most of NOW's 
resources, it was also membership dues (and NOW's 
resulting income) that made NOW's news access possible. 
NOW's ability to research and process information for 
journalists, to write up press releases and 
backgrounders, and indeed to make themselves available 
as sources to journalists, was based in its ability to 
mobilize income 
As we might expect, then, NOW's lncreases In 
membership and in income from 1966-1980 were also 
reflected in its access to news media. As Figure 5.3 
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indicates, there is a strong positive relationship 
between NOW's main resources membership and income 
and its amount of coverage in the New York Times .. 
As measured simply by the number of paragraphs devoted 
to NOW itself, or in which NOW was cited as a source, in 
the years 1966-1980, there is a clear relationship 
between NOW's media visibility and its membership 
numbers (r=.772) and income ( r=.752). 
Figure 5.3 
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Table 5.1 summarlzes these relationships between 
NOW's resources and media coverage over time, including 
statistical significance measures. The relationship 
between NOW's membership and their media coverage shows 
a significant correlation (r=.7772, p<.Ol). 
Table 5.1 
NOW Resource and Media Access Correlations 
Year Log of Log of Log of 
Members Income Coverage 
Year 1.000 .9718** .9869** .6915 
Log 1.000 .9917** .7772* 
Membert 
Log 1.000 .7528 
l:ncomet 
* p< .01 **p< .001 
tMembership, Income and Coverage were transformed 
into log values because all of these values were 
exponential over time. Transforming these data into 
log values redistributes values along the curve 
while retaining any relationship between two 
curves. 21 
The relationship indicated In Table 5.1 between 
NOW's resources (membership and income) and its 
coverage, could also, of course, be interpreted to flow 
the other way. The amount of coverage NOW achieved In 
media would also have helped to bring in members (and so 
income). Indeed after the first few years, NOW records 
themselves suggest that a significant percentage of NOW 
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members were attracted to the organization through 176 
hearing about it in the news. 22 What is also clear from 
NOW records, though, and from news content evidence (see 
chapter seven), lS that much of NOW's early coverage was 
self-generated. So that even if news did increase NOW's 
membership, it did so only after the organization's 
initial investment. 23 From the beginning it was NOW's 
efforts at resource mobilization and active source work 
that produced the group's access to news media. In later 
years, some reporters would seek out the group pro-
actively but for the most part the story of NOW's media 
access is one of self- directed activity on the part of 
NOW itself. 
Summary and Discussion: 
Resource Mobilization and Media Access 
Clearly for NOW, access to media was structured by 
its resource mobilization more generally. It was the 
income from membership that allowed the organization to 
spend money on media work. The class and professional 
background of NOW leaders, which translated into 
competence and media contacts, was also instrumental in 
allowing it to interact with media. NOW's organizational 
form, of centralization and also representation across 
the country in chapters, made it possible both to 
control communication to media and to be seen as 
representative by media. 
That there should be a relationship between an 177 
organization's resources and its ability to access media 
1S 1n some sense a rather unsurprising claim. But in 
fact it is one that is often obscured in both 
journalists' professional ideologies, and in studies 
about news-making, because it is a revelation that comes 
from studying sources and not journalists. Journalists 
themselves tend to stress the Hnews value H of sources or 
of events as a way of explaining news content. Or 
occasionally they admit to time pressures and chance. 
Since most of the studies of news focus on journalists 
themselves, they also tend to stress aspects of the 
content of source's messages, or of journalists 
rou~ines or rationalizations. 24 But this general focus 
on journalists and on content has obscured our 
understanding of news as an institution whose 
relationships with other organizations are structured 1n 
a larger framework of resource s and power. Within this 
larger framework access to resources and skills 
structure whether it is possible for a source 
organization to produce HnewsworthyH ideas. 
This obscuring of the economic or material base of 
symbolic struggle is in fact quite common in knowledge 
production. As Bourdieu (1977, p. 183) has pointed out, 
it is in fact exactly this confusion that allows the 
knowledge/power relationship to remain hidden and the 
legitimacy of certain discursive forms (such as news) to 178 
be maintained: 
Symbolic capital, a transformed and thereby 
disguised form of physical "economic" capital, 
produces its proper effect inasmuch, and only 
inasmuch, as it conceals the fact that it 
originates in material forms of capital, which are 
also, In the last analysis, the source of its 
effects. 
This model of media access -- In which NOW actively 
mobilized resources, and then was able to channel these 
resources into media visibility may be both good and 
bad for movement organizations. It lmproves on the 
strong hegemony model for movements in that it suggests 
that, to some extent at least, coverage of a movement 
group may be produced through its own efforts -- that 
lS, coverage may be least partially on resources rather 
than ideology. However, as I have noted here, NOW's 
ability to mobilize resources, may not be true of most 
emergent political movement groups. For less savvy 
social movement organizations, these "costs" of access 
to news, and to VOlce in the public sphere, may be much 
harder to achieve. 
This focus in resources lS critical, then. Without 
such resources no interaction with media is possible at 
all. As Curran and Gurevitch (1991, p. 19) have 
suggested, when it comes to symbolic power resources are 
determining not in the ulast instance u but in the first: 
This ... forces us to think of economic 
determination in a more flexible way. Instead of 
holding onto Marx's notion of determination in the 
last instance, with its implication that everything 
can eventually be related directly to economic 
forces, we can follow Stuart Hall in seeing 
determination as operating in the first instance. 
That is to say we can think of economic dynamics as 
defining the key features of the general 
environment within which communicative activity 
takes place, but not as a complete explanation of 
the nature of that activity. 
The relationship between resources and symbolic 
success is not a straightforward one, however. Resources 
may make interaction possible, but they do not determine 
success in controlling the interaction. While they tell 
us about the general parameters of the relationship they 
do not help us to understand how it is that material 
resources can be translated into news VOlce. How did NOW 
use its resources to produce voice in the public sphere? 
What strategies did the organization develop day-to-day 
to produce news access? In short, how did NOW translate 
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material resources into symbolic power? I address these 180 
more sociological/strategic questions in the next 
chapter. 
NOTES 
1 NOW National Board Meeting Minutes, 1966. NOW 
Collection, Schlesinger Library for Women in History, 
Radcliffe College, Cambridge, Mass. The first Executive 
Board members were: Dr. Kathryn Clarenbach, professor; 
Betty Friedan, writer; Aileen Hernandez, member of EEOC; 
Richard Graham, former head of EEOC; Caroline Davis, 
union leader, AAUW. (Hernandez was elected subject to 
acceptance, as she was still working for EEOC. Davis 
later left over the ERA, which her union could not 
support). The first National Board members were also 
predominantly professionals, and disproportionately from 
university and religious backgrounds: Colleen Boland, 
Inez Casiano, Professor Carl Degler, Sister Mary Austin 
Doherty, Dr. Elizabeth Drews, Muriel Fox, Betty Furness, 
Dorothy Haener, Jane Hart, Dr. Anna Arnold Hedgeman, 
Phineas Indritz, Rev Dean Lewis, Inka 0' Hanrahan, Grace 
Oli~arez, Dr. Patricia Plante, Eve Purvis, Sister Mary 
Joel Read, Charlotte Roe, Dr. Alice Rossi, Dr. Vera 
Schletzer, Edna Schwartz. 
2 Aileen Hernandez (1970-1971) was a professional 
organizer with graduate work in government. Wilma Scott 
Heide (1971-1973) was a behavioral scientist. Karen De 
Crow (1974-1977) was a lawyer, lecturer and writer. 
Eleanor Smeal (1977-1982), though she framed herself as 
a housewife and was concerned with homemakers rights, 
was trained as a political scientist. Molly Yard (1987-
1991) was a professional organizer educated at 
Swarthmore College, and current president, Patricia 
Ireland, is a lawyer. 
3 NOW Executive Board Meeting Minutes, 1967. NOW 
Collection and Friedan (1976). 
4 Social movement theorists have noted how new movements 
and movement groups are created from the ranks of older 
movements. Evans (1980) for example, traces the roots of 
the women's movement to women who worked in the civil 
rights movement and Hackett (1991) suggests that the 
environmental movement has its roots in the student New 
Left. But few observers have noted how this relationship 
is also resource dependent -- new groups are often 
formed using the resources of the old. In this case the 
labor movement had a hand in helping to produce the 
women's movement. 
S NOW ACTS, September 7th, 1971. 
6 Freeman, Jo. (1975), p. 56. 
7 In fact it may be that the focus on communication by 
the NSMs is a side effect of the class and professional 
basis of their members rather than any profound change 
in movement political strategies generally. We need more 
comparative work on groups from other class bases and 
from other (non western, non post-industrial) societies 
before we can call the NSM move a general social 
movement shift towards HidentityH politics and away from 
material concerns. 
8 The debate about the best organizational form for 
social movements, or the best form for particular ends 
is a long and subtle one, and I am selecting from it 
freely here. For more discussion on hierarchy, 
centralization, and bureaucratization in social 
movements see: Gamson, William. (1990. [1975] ) The 
Strategy of Social Protest. Belmont, California: 
Wadsworth., Gerlach, Luther and P. Hines. (1970) 
People, Power and Change. Indianapolis, Ind.: Bobbs-
Merrill, Jo Freeman. (1975). The Politics of Women's 
Liberation. New York: Longman. For a discussion of how 
different theories valorize different social movement 
forms, see Cohen, Jean. (1985). Strategy or Identity: 
New Theoretical Paradigms and Contemporary Social 
Movements. Social Research 52(4): 663-716. 
9 Chapters are made up of 10 people minimum and they 
should, formally at least, subscribe to by-laws and 
procedures set down by the national board. They each 
appoint a liaison to national NOW, and a designated 
treasurer. But beyond this they are relatively flexible 
according to the needs of the women involved. The larger 
metropolitan chapters usually being the most active. The 
New York chapter, Los Angeles, Chicago, Washington and 
pittsburgh, for example, have all been critical centers 
of NOW activity 
10 The Executive Committee consists of a Chairperson, 
president, four regional directors, four vice presidents 
(legal, legislation, public relations and finance), a 
secretary, treasurer and a chairperson of the National 
Advisory Committee. The National Board consists of 25 
elected members; and the 13 national executive officers. 
NOW started off with no paid staff, and has always 
maintained a healthy fear of becoming a staff dominated 
organization. But over time it has come to rely on a few 
key administrative staff, and from the mid 1970s has 
also paid key elected officials. 
11 In 1974 for example there were around thirty 
different national task forces, in 1977 there were more 
than 50 task forces represented at the at the national 
conference. NOW task forces include women and the arts, 
child care, EEO compliance, credit, criminal justice, 
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education, broadcasting/FCC, fund raising, women and 
health, legislation, labor unions, marriage, divorce and 
family relations, minority women and women's rights, 
older women, image of women, public relation, women and 
religion, rape, reproduction and population, sexuality 
and lesbianism, women and sports, among others. 
12 NOW Public Information Office papers, 1975. 
13 NOWLDEF (1983). Media Project Report to the 
Muskiwinni Foundation. NOW Collection, Ellis Library, 
University of Columbia-Missouri. 
14 The local chapters that withheld dues included 
Harrisburg, Los Angeles, and others. They were also, not 
coincidentally, the "home" chapters of board members 
involved in a leadership fight at the same time. NOW 
National Board Meeting minutes, April 5-6, 1975 . 
15 Simpson, Peggy. (1979). "Covering the Women's 
Movement," pp. 19-23, Nieman Reports, Summer. 
16 NOW has expanded its base of concern from limited sex 
discrimination goals to general feminist transformation 
of all aspects of social relations. Today they espouse a 
general feminist vision which includes concern with 
issues of gender, class, war and peace, as well as 
international connections between women. See for 
example, the NOW Expanded Bill of Rights for the 21st 
Century (1989) in which they espouse the right to 
freedom from sex discrimination and race discrimination; 
the right to reproductive freedom; freedom from 
discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation and 
from discrimination on the basis of age or health 
condition; the right to a decent standard of living 
including health, housing and education; the right to a 
clean and safe environment, and the right to live free 
from violence. 
17 Such direct mailing to solicit funds is time 
consuming and expensive, but it has the advantage of 
bringing in one-time support which requires no further 
output (as opposed to memberships which cost the 
organization in support services such as mailing, 
newsletters, and so on). NOW had mixed success with 
direct mail campaigns in the 1970s. An early attempt to 
reach Hhomemakers H through women's magazines garnered a 
net loss. But another, narrower, Hreproduction H attempt 
in 1974 brought in approximately $158,000 in new 
membership dues over a number of Hthrusts. H In general 
the public relations staff became more knowledgeable and 
better at targeting as they learned from mistakes and 
also began to hire consultants. NOW (1974, November). 
PIO Report to the Board. NOW Collection, Schlesinger 
Library. 
18 NOW Budget records and Gelb and Palley (1987) pp. 42-
43. 
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19 Grants were usually more easily granted to NOWLDEF 
because it was a designated tax-deductible (501c(4)) 
educational organization. NOW itself has 501c(3) tax 
status, a non profit but not tax deductible 
organization. NOW retains this status even though it may 
lose them some large donations because it is a 
"political" classification. Groups designated 501c(4) 
such as NOWLDEF are not allowed, for example, to endorse 
presidential candidates. 
20 The personal data/membership forms of all NOW members 
that would be needed to verify membership claims are not 
available in the NOW archive. In fact such materials are 
unlikely to have been kept at all before computing 
technology became routinely used in the mid 1980s. The 
figures used here agree substantially with a recent 
fact-based "chronicle" of the women's movement Carabillo 
et aI, 1993, The Feminist Chronicles and with other 
published sources. 
21 Hartwig, F. and Dearing, B. (1979) Exploratory Data 
Analysis. Sage Quantitative Applications in the Social 
Sciences, Number 16, p.64 
22 A 1974 NOW membership survey, for example, shows 
around 40 percent of members saying they first heard 
about NOW in the news. NOW Collection, Schlesinger 
Libra-ry. 
23 A regression analysis which might ordinarily clear up 
some of the causal questions, is not useful here 
because of the high degree of auto correlation -- all of 
these measures are increasing over time. 
24 Sigal (1973), for example, makes inferences from 
news content about the institutional affiliations of 
news sources, but fails to make a connection to their 
resource base. Gans (1980) describes the news-source 
relationship as a dance but it is not one in which we 
see the source's steps. See Schlesinger (1990) also for 
an analysis of British news studies that have also 
ignored sources. 
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Chapter Six 
NOW Media Strategies: 
The possibilities and Constraints of Media Pragmatism 
I thought all you had to do was carry a placard 
around, and people would listen. I've learned how 
to organize, how to raise funds, how to computerize 
things, how to use the media. We've become experts 
-- Ginny Foat, president, California NOW, 1982. 
Clearly the ability to mobilize resources is 
essential to beginning and continuing a dialogue with 
media. And in particular, communicative competence, 
organizational maintenance, a large membership, and 
money seem to be especially important resources. But how 
are these resources translated into media voice? How did 
NOW translate membership, income and competence into 
news voice? How did NOW leaders understand and manage 
their relationship with media? What were the media 
strategies that they developed and how did these 
strategies contribute to the more general mobilization 
and goals of the organization and to its political 
identity? 
While resource analysis sketches in the basic 
requirements of access it cannot tell us about the day-
to-day management of that access. In this chapter I 
184 
describe how NOW leaders developed strategies to access 185 
news and to control their interactions with media day-
to-day. I argue that overall NOW leaders developed and 
followed a general strategy of media pragmatism in which 
they sought to understand and strategically appropriate 
the conventions of news practices and news discourses 
to reflexively use the llrules" of news as resources 
(Giddens, 1984). They taught themselves and local NOW 
members to llthink like journalists" in order to present 
the organization in ways that journalist would take 
seriously, and they spent considerable organizational 
skill and resources in the "care and feeding" of women 
journalists who were open to news about feminism . 
. However, this strategic appropriation of news 
conventions carne at significant costs to the 
organization. As I illustrate throughout the chapter, 
NOW's media pragmatism, especially in the early years, 
carne at considerable costs in time, skills, and 
ideological containment. Taking media conventions and 
practices seriously (and encoding them into NOW's 
communications) often meant that NOW leaders reframed, 
or contained the organization's internal ideological 
diversity in producing its llpublic identity.ll This 
becomes especially clear when NOW's media pragmatist 
approach is situated in larger movement context where it 
contrasts sharply with a very different approach to 
media taken by the llyounger" feminist groups. In the 
last part of the chapter I compare NOW's media 
pragmatism and its llcostS" to the llmedia subversion" 
strategies of the younger movement groups in order to 
contextualize NOW strategies as reflexive, strategic 
choices with specific consequences. 
NOW'S UNDERSTANDING OF NEWS 
From the beginning NOW leaders saw media, 
especially the national, elite, news media as a powerful 
movement resource. They wanted to use news media to 
mobilize new members and to tell the public about the 
movement: 
Our major goals ln press relations are threefold: 
1. To build NOW and the movement by reaching and 
recruiting prospective adherents. 
2. To win political and community support for our 
goals. 
3. To give the general public an honest picture of 
the Feminist Movement. 1 
If these alms seem at first glance somewhat naive 
seeing the media as a route to an llhonest" picture of 
the movement, for example -- they were not the result of 
inexperience or ignorance, but in fact the outcome of 
successful interactions with news media in the past. 
These early NOW leaders had generally had extensive 
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relations with reporters in the past, as spokespersons 187 
for their professional organizations. The NOW Board 
members who were not lawyers were often communications 
professionals, such as writers, public relations 
specialists or journalists. 2 They knew about media 
practices and used that knowledge to structure their 
communications with journalists. It may have been their 
success at being sources in the past that allowed NOW 
leaders to be optimistic about their chances with NOW 
and news. 
This expertise with press relations was not 
distributed evenly throughout the organization, though, 
and one of the first strategies that NOW national 
leadership embarked on was the training of local 
chapters in media skills. They codified their knowledge 
and experience with media into "Media Kits" which were 
then distributed throughout the organization to local 
chapters. It is clear from the advice in these kits that 
national NOW leaders were quite sophisticated news 
analysts. The kits stressed knowing reporters routines, 
getting to know how local news organizations were 
structured, and learning about the criteria of 
"newsworthiness" -- similar "training" to that which 
journalists themselves might undergo. 3 
NOW Chapters were urged to find out about the 
deadlines of local papers and stations; to know what 
shifts had which reporters and editors working, and to 
send material or call when "sympathetic" reporters were 188 
on the job. The kits also suggested that chapters should 
designate press representatives whose job it would be to 
get to know reporters and to coordinate media relations. 
In fact local activists are enjoined to envision 
themselves as journalists: 
Think of yourself as a kind of editor. If a 
reporter uses something you said that seems silly 
or irrelevant and ignores the important comments, 
it's partly your fault. Why did you say it? Only 
say what you want used. This is especially true for 
television which generally runs only a minute of 
film for any particular story. Make them use what 
you think lS important by refusing to answer 
questions on camera about anything else. 4 
The press kits also focused centrally on lssues of 
"newsworthiness," and though they describe news values 
as highly unpredictable, they are also able to make some 
good generalizations. They suggest, for example, that 
chapters are more likely to be covered if they stage an 
Hevent,H or if they interact with a legitimate 
institution already routinely covered, such as the 
legislature or courts: 
The beginning of a survey of employment practices 189 
mayor may not be news but the conclusion will 
be. A charge that some company discriminates 
against a woman mayor may not be news -- but the 
announcement that an EEOC complaint has been filed 
will be. A speaker at a meeting will not be news -
unless she or he is a well known personality. In 
the final analysis it's a trial and error game. S 
IDENTITY CONTROL AND LEGITIMATION STRATEGIES 
The same media "savvy" that had made it possible 
for NOW to produce the media kits, made NOW leadership 
very sensitive to how journalists would represent their 
organization in the news. From the first days, news 
representation was a consideration for NOW leaders. The 
first NOW Board itself was chosen partly with media In 
mind. NOW strategists considered that having so many 
"professions" represented -- the original Board had 
seven Ph.D.'s, one MD and three religious vocations 
could only encourage journalists to take the 
organization seriously. They aimed to present themselves 
as a serious "civil rights" organization and to avoid 
the marginalizing treatment that seemed to be the fate 
of the student and women's liberation groups. They 
borrowed the rhetoric and moral authority of the Civil 
Rights Movement and called themselves "the "NAACP for 
women: 
There is no civil rights movement to speak for 
women, as there has been for Negroes and other 
victims of discrimination. The National 
Organization for Women must therefore begin to 
speak. 6 
NOW leaders saw themselves as creating a 
revolutionary organization, whose long term goal was to 
radically change society. But they were also centrally 
concerned with action and with devising ways to make 
change in the short term. This required being taken 
seriously by journalists and policy makers and NOW 
leaders were intent to control the organization's 
representation in news media as a part of this more 
general legitimacy battle. 
NOW leaders tried to manage their relationships 
with media by controlling, both who could speak to media 
in NOW's name, as well as what they could talk about. 
They delegated media interactions to a few key leaders 
and they cautioned local chapters to be careful to keep 
upersonal u and organizational statements separate in 
their interviews. In their interactions with journalists 
at the national level they would try to identify and 
avoid topics or frames that journalists might use to 
usensationalizeu the organization. Early casualties of 
this control were the issues of sexuality and 
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lesbianism. The 1968 press guidelines make clear that 191 
such topics are simply better avoided: 
NOW officers and representatives are urged to use 
careful good judgment when working with the news 
media ... NOW spokesmen [sic] are urged to weigh 
seriously any statement which might be 
misunderstood or which might cause embarrassment to 
our organization ( ... ) we do know that questions 
involving the sexual and social relationships 
between men and women are especially sensitive and 
especially susceptible to ridicule by the press. 
Special caution must be observed in statements 
which go beyond official NOW policy in this area. 7 
NOW leaders also tried to control the context of 
their media appearances. One way to do this was by 
insisting that opponents and counter-debaters on talk 
shows were of the same "stature" as NOW sources -- that 
is national and representative of a mas based 
organization. As Karen De Crow, NOW's President from 
1974-1977, expressed it, she did not want to waste her 
time debating false opposites or "nut types:" 
It is my general policy, as national president of a 
national organization, to not appear with local 
nut-types, although I will appear with national 
nut-types, like Phyllis Schlafly ... I don't want to 192 
give equal time ... in such a manner.8 
NOW's attempts to control media interactions, did 
not always corne off, however, despite careful planning. 
At a 1973 conference for example, cameramen turned on 
their cameras only for resolutions on lesbianism, rape 
and prostitution, ignoring a multitude of other 
resolutions. NOW audience members were furious and 
demanded the complete removal of the cameras. Only an 
intervention by the V-P for public relations, Toni 
Carabillo, who appealed to members to have faith in the 
lltruth" stopped the journalists from being thrown out: 
We know what our own momentum lS, and we know what 
we have overcome by way of biased coverage, and we 
know the truth has a way of prevailing9 
The nCostsn of Identity Control Strategies 
This sensitivity to what reporters would find 
llsensational", however, also constrained what it was 
possible for NOW to talk about publicly. Issues of 
llsexual and social relationships," for example were 
surely at the heart of the feminist movement itself. 
NOW spokespersons were also advised to avoid the 
use of other llhot" terms that would encourage media 
workers to classify them in de-legitimizing ways. 
Friedan, for example, suggested that NOW sources simply 193 
avoid traditional political terms such as capitalism or 
socialism altogether: 
In San Francisco I met with some of the younger, 
radical women ... I told my NOW sisters -- and the 
young radicals too -- that we should stay away from 
issues of -capitalism- and -socialism.- 10 
This avoidance of -hot" political terms, was part 
of a quite deliberate attempt on NOW's part in the early 
years to differentiate NOW's identity from that of the 
more radical movement groups. Friedan had corne to see 
the--younger" groups as engaged in what she considered 
-bedroom politics" which she thought de-legitimized the 
movement. She wanted to continue to present the 
organization as one concerned with -civil rights" and 
the more radical feminisms challenged the very ground 
of -civil" life. 11 
Though Friedan left the presidency of the 
organization in 1970, this media strategy of 
differentiating of NOW from the "younger" groups 
continued through the early 1970s. A 1973 letter to the 
Dick Cavett show, from NOW's Public Information Office, 
for example, outlined NOW's self-perceptions, and the 
identity it was trying to project. In this letter, for 
example, NOW national strategists distance themselves 
from other feminists whom they indicate are the "real" 194 
bra burners 
whole: 
a term that harmed the movement as a 
I would like to stress that the movement is hardly 
one with trivial or insignificant aims. I am sure 
you are all aware of the many inequities 
experienced by women in our society -- including 
discrimination in credit, employment, marriage and 
divorce, and in many other areas. You may not be 
aware, however, that the movement has grown from 
one symbolized by the myth of bra-burners to one 
made up of a large number of serious, dedicated 
women and men who are working hard to bring about 
change in our society for the benefit of both 
sexes. 12 
It was not until after 1975, when NOW leadership 
was taken over by a "majority caucus" with wider ranging 
interpretations of feminism that such differentiation 
strategies declined. 13 
Ericson et al. (1989) have argued that this kind of 
control by source organizations is common. Generally 
organizations seek to speak with one voice, and to 
minimize the appearance of any internal dissent or 
illegitimate practices in their interactions with 
journalists. They try to keep the "back" and "front" 
areas of the organization distinct In their media 
interactions. HBackH areas are where the private, 
conflicted, and perhaps illegitimate, business of the 
organization takes place. HFrontH areas are public and 
strategically monitored versions of the organization 
that are made available to reporters. 14 
But social movements may experience such rules 
differently than other kinds of organizations. Movements 
are usually more concerned with internal democracy and 
their identity is usually more shifting and multiple 
than other types of organizations. Both of these factors 
make a movement group's Hpublic identityH more 
problematic to control -- or as early NOW leaders saw it 
to present as non-controversial -- than other kinds of 
organizations. 
And in fact NOW leaders' strategic attempts to 
frame the organization as respectable and non-
controversial did sometimes backfire and disconnect them 
from their membership and the rest of the movement. In 
her resignation from NOW in 1970, for example, Rita Mae 
Brown cited NOW's insensitivity to issues of sexuality 
because they were more concerned with avoiding 
controversy than accurately representing their 
constituency: 
Lesbianism is the one word that can cause the 
Executive Committee a collective heart attack. This 
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issue is dismissed as unimportant, too dangerous to 196 
contemplate, divisive or whatever excuse could be 
dredged up from their repression. The prevailing 
attitude is ... "Suppose they (notice the word, 
they) flock to us in droves? How horrible. After 
all think of our image. "15 
Though NOW's position on lesbianism and sexual 
orientation has changed dramatically since Brown's 
resignation (a 1971 national conference resolution 
brought lesbian rights onto NOW's agenda and a 1975 
resolution made the issue a priority for NOW), over 
time, the organization's attempts to appear serious and 
not -to be marginalized by media also made them 
compromise on other issues, and brought them criticism 
inside the women's movement. thirsty years later, it is 
still this hostility to lesbian concerns and an alleged 
llpurge ll of lesbians from leadership positions because of 
public identify concerns, that haunts NOW today.16 
1975, The Majority Caucus and New Identity 
Strategies 
In fact these attempts by early NOW leaders to 
llsoft-pedal" feminism were also part of the more general 
critique of NOW leadership voiced by a new llMajority 
Caucus" that emerged in NOW in 1974-1975 and took over 
the organization from its original leaders. 
The caucus comprised a group of mostly "younger," 197 
more radical, NOW leaders who built a platform on their 
commitment to a more open and democratic organization. 
For the first time in NOW's history in 1975 the national 
elections were bitterly challenged by a "slate" of 
candidates with a coherent manifesto and platform. Most 
of the caucus members were elected and they formed 
majorities in 1975 on both the NOW National and 
Executive Boards. 
with the coming of new leadership and new attitudes 
to feminism, came some changes in public identity 
strategies too. The new Board's desire for more 
democratic and "upfront" leadership also extended to 
their approach to media. The tendency of earlier 
administration's to "soft pedal" particular issues with 
media was critiqued and the Majority Caucus suggested 
that NOW begin to loosen its identity control concerns 
with media, because avoiding issues publicly could 
translate into forgetting about them internally too: 
Down playing some issues for tactical reasons lS 
always a risky procedure. When we fail to 
articulate some of our goals we tend to drop them 
not only from our immediate demands but from our 
long term vision, It does not take much anxiety and 
circumspection to turn a multi-issued revolutionary 
movement into a one issue reform. 17 
After 1975, NOW's differentiation strategies, in 
which NOW's respectability had been played up at the 
expense of other movement groups, were also toned down. 
In this later period NOW's relationship to the rest of 
the movement was usually presented to media as one of 
"sisterhood" rather than as the respectable arm of the 
movement. 
The new leadership's more democratic urge was 
reflected in a new emphasis on communicating beyond the 
national elite press and professional women to a more 
general audience. As part of anew campaign to public 
redefinition of housework as work and to reach 
homemakers with feminist messages, NOW began to 
interact with a wider range of media outlets including 
appeal to a wider range of women in which women's 
magazines and local newspapers became central targets. 
The "displaced homemaker" campaign was one of the first 
times feminist had reached out to women working at home 
and it signified a quite dramatic shift in NOW's public 
identity as one concerned mainly with women in the 
public workplace. 18 
WOOING WOMEN REPORTERS: 
BUILDING A WOMEN'S ISSUE "BEAT" 
Besides controlling the organization's identity in 
media, NOW strategists also had a more general aim in 
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their media strategies; to build a media agenda about 199 
emerging women's issues. Many of NOW's core issues in 
1968 -- sex discrimination in employment and education, 
child care facilities for working women, reproductive 
freedom, and ERA ratification -- were for the most part 
still non-existent "issues" in the public policy domain. 
Before they could get the public to take this new set of 
"women's issues" seriously, NOW strategists decided they 
would have to get reporters to respond to them. So they 
set out to "educate" and "raise the consciousness" of a 
group of reporters to become interested and expert in a 
new domain they called "women's issues." 
There was a small cadre of these kind of reporters, 
who "from the early days recognized the importance of the 
movement. NOW media strategists identified these key 
reporters and then worked to keep them and others 
informed and educated on the legislative and legal 
progress of women's issues and of the movement's 
activities more generally. They sent these reporters 
information and research, set up one on one interviews 
with movement leaders, provided background analyses on 
policy issues, and even periodically took them to lunch. 
In building relationships with particular 
journalists and providing information for them NOW was 
acting like sophisticated sources from other kinds of 
organizations. But NOW was faced with a more complex 
problem than other mainstream organizations: the women 
reporters they were dealing with were also subject to 200 
sexism and a lack of professional legitimacy in their 
own organizations. Even when NOW had built relationships 
with women reporters in the elite press, and even when 
those reporters wrote stories about the movement and 
about women's politics, the writers could not be sure 
that unsympathetic or sexist editors would not cut the 
story or revoke the reporter's assignment. 
Marilyn Goldstein, who wrote a series on the 
movement in its early days for News day, for example, 
remembers unsympathetic editors, one of whom cut out 
much of her explanatory material on the movement's 
orlglns or reasonlng: 
I wrote a serles on women's rights and he told me 
"Get out there and find an authority who'll say 
this is all a crock of shit. I'm quoting to you. I 
wrote of how the women's movement parallels the 
black movement, and he pulled that all out. So 
when people say "A good series, Marilyn," I say, 
"If you really want to learn about the women's 
rights movement, look in my waste basket.,,19 
Nan Robertson, for example, a long time New York 
Times journalist also recalls how editors failed to take 
feminism seriously. She recounts how two of the 
movement's strongest journalistic allies, Eileen 
Shanahan and Grace Lichtenstein, both of the Times, had 201 
to relegate women's issues to evening work: 
Like Shanahan she [Grace Lichtenstein] had been 
covering the burgeoning women's movement for two 
years. Like Eileen, she had to ask her uninterested 
male editors for permission to cover women's 
politics, and when she got permission, she often 
had to cover them in her spare time when her 
regular reporting was done. 20 
The early attempts by NOW and these reporters to 
build a women's issue beat, was often set back by lack 
of s·upport and resources from media institutions, who 
could not "see" women's politics as news. Grace 
Lichtenstein, for example, a senior Times journalist 
noted that an issue like changing rape laws was not 
something that would get a male editor's attention: 
There have been times when I found editors unaware 
of things happening, like the [changes in] the 
rape laws. Only women think in terms of rape laws; 
the men ... know about capital punishment. 21 
NOW's role here, then, was more important than that 
of the traditional source. In many instances it was the 
only source and had to be doubly reliable and useful to 
reporters. But it also served as a source of moral and 202 
social support for women whose own "news judgment" was 
being questioned. Without the support of organizations 
like NOW, these women would not have been able to (or 
perhaps would not have thought of) writing about the 
movement at all. In fact the interaction between 
feminists and some women journalists was strong enough 
that a number of these women later went on to sue (and 
win against) their employer, The New York Times for 
discrimination in promotion, hiring and pay (Robertson, 
1992) . 
Advocate Journalists or Gendered Journalists? 
These women journalists did not necessarily 
consider themselves feminists. They noticed that they 
could "see" that feminism was newsworthy in a way that 
their male colleagues could not, but they attributed 
this to their news judgments and "professionalism" more 
than to any ideological factors. Peggy Simpson, for 
example, a reporter who covered the movement recalls 
that she was surprised when her editors could not see 
that feminism was news, but she did not attribute her 
own judgment to politics but to her news sense: 
I thought of myself not as a feminist but as a 
reporter covering a good story that for some reason 
almost all of my male colleagues had ignored. 22 
Simpson and other women journalists covering the 
movement for the elite press saw themselves as acting 
like good journalists, and building up expertise the way 
journalists do -- by finding expert sources. But they 
were bringing their professional judgment to bear on 
information and sources that male reporters ignored, 
sources their editors simply didn't see as sources, and 
issues they could not see as lssues. 
Goldenberg (1978), has suggested that we might see 
these kind of reporters who are sympathetic to a 
particular Vlew as "advocate" reporters. In a study of 
"resource-poor" groups access to newspapers in Boston, 
she noted that advocate reporters were essential 
resources for these groups access to newspapers. And, ln 
NOW's case too, it is also true that a small group of 
reporters covered the organization and its issues 
persistently despite set-backs. But to consider these 
women "advocates" may be both too simple, and too media-
centric. Much of their coverage of feminism was 
facilitated not by their own consciousness but by the 
information subsidy work of NOW and other feminist 
groups. Though these women reporters certainly played a 
part in making women's issue noticeable as stories, it 
is also true that without the proactive source 
strategies of organizations like NOW, it is doubtful if 
much of the early coverage of women's issues would have 
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been generated at all. 23 One reporter who covered the 204 
movement, for example, recalls missing such information 
in her early coverage of the ERA and then changing her 
mind on the ERA when it became available to her. Without 
arguments and information from women's groups, she took 
on board, uncritically, the arguments of another 
legitimate source, in this case a state senator, who was 
anti-ERA: 
At that time I had not reported on any major 
elements of the early women's liberation marches 
and had never met anyone who called herself a 
feminist. I did know a lobbyist from the Texas 
. chapter of Business and Professional Women who was 
unsuccessfully trying to get a state Equal Rights 
Amendment passed. She never approached me, during 
my two terms covering the Texas Legislature, and I 
never called her, so a persuasive state senator 
easily convinced me that women would be 1n terrible 
straits if Texas protective labor laws and 
community property laws were altered by the ERA. 24 
The ability of some women reporters to UseeU that 
women's issue were newsworthy, when their male 
colleagues could not, 1S also more complex than any 
simple uadvocate U status can account for. It is more 
likely to be the result of women reporters different 
life experlences and socialization. As women they would 205 
have been exposed to sexual discrimination, sexual 
harassment, problems child care, and so on, that their 
male colleagues would not have experienced. This 
differential socialization does not then mean that all 
women reporters will see the world the same (and all 
differently from their male colleagues), but that 
gendered, racial and sexual identities (among others) 
will play a role in what seems important to a reporter 
even after professional socialization (Van Zoonen, 
1989) .25 
What lS clear here is that these reporters did not 
consider themselves as either -advocates- or feminists 
but as reporters whose life experiences as women 
sensitized them to these new issues. 26 It was this 
sensitivity combined with the information support work 
of NOW and other feminist groups these women were then 
able to produce stories about the movement that would 
the influence public perceptions of what were previously 
considered -private" (or at least non problematic areas 
of life) into -public- issues. Whether or not feminists 
have been able to retain control of the framing of these 
issues, it is still an achievement to have -made" them 
lssues. and this -making" was accomplished to a large 
extent through interaction with, and subsidizing of, 
women journalists. 
THE CENTRALITY OF INFORMATION SUBSIDIES 
PACKETS, BRIEFINGS, AND THE NOW NEWS SERVICE: 
NOW was able to play this supportive role because 
it invested so much time and resources in producing 
information. Indeed, as Melucci suggests is true of 
social movements more generally, in some ways NOW was 
itself a form of media. The organization researched, 
collected and processed information as a central 
organizational activity. Much of this effort went into 
education efforts within the movement. For example, NOW 
information staff produced kits, newsletters and the 
organization's newspaper, Do It NOW (later National NOW 
Times), but a large amount of such effort was focused 
on journalists -- into producing information subsides 
for journalists (Gandy, 1982). 
This subsidy work was especially apparent during 
the years 1973-1975 when NOW maintained a separate 
Public Information Office in New York. During its 
existence, the PIO built up for NOW an extensive network 
of Hcontacts H in news, talk shows, magazines, and 
special interest newsletters. 27 The office put out an 
average of 10 press releases a month in 1975, and 
organized numerous appearances for NOW leaders on radio 
and TV talk shows. They also monitored NOW's 
representation in media and maintained clipping files of 
NOW stories sent in from chapters across the country. In 
a survey of NOW national conference stories in July 
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1974, for example, chapters sent back clips to the PIO 207 
office from 12 different states. 28 
In an ambitious effort to reach out into the 
country beyond the national media, and as part of an 
emerging state-based ERA campaign, the PIO also set up 
one of NOW's first ongoing information subsidies, the 
NOW News Service. The NOW News Service was aimed at 
suburban news services who always needed material and 
who could reach women NOW could not reach in other ways: 
The service would have a double purpose: 
(a) to reach small city and rural areas and supply 
them with news of the ERA and other women's 
lssues. 
(b) to establish a climate for the organization of 
new NOW chapters. 29 
The first NOW News Service packet in 1973 contained 
an ERA feature story, a press release on NOW's August 
26th strike, a feature on NOW's accomplishments, a brief 
history of the feminist movement and a question and 
answer column on ERA. It had a mailing list of about 500 
news outlets. Future packets were similar, often 
including easy to use question and answer formats or 
ready to print editorial length pleces on the ERA or 
other women's policy concerns. 
The NOW News Service succeeded in putting out a 208 
number of these packages and received good responses 
from regional news and women's page editors, such as 
this letter from a Sparks, Nevada editor: 
I'd like to use some of this material and would 
like to see more of it. I was happy to have it you 
.. , keep the news coming. 30 
Though the News serVlce was curtailed for lack of 
resources and staff time after only a few publications, 
it was one of the first efforts by NOW to go beyond 
promoting coverage of particular events or activities, 
and to provide regular and ongoing information packages 
of background information on women's issues to news 
outlets. As such it was a harbinger of future NOW media 
strategies like the gender gap campaign which aimed to 
produce ongoing information about women's politics. 31 
From Identity Control to Symbolic Politics: 
The Making of the "Gender Gap" 
By 1980 media strategies had become an integral 
part of NOW's overall political planning. Whereas in the 
early years, public relations personnel had sought to 
place stories about NOW's events or concerns, by the 
1980s, the media campaigns were integral to the overall 
political strategies. Media plans began to be made with 
political strategy, and NOW's knowledge production 
efforts began to be aimed more and more at reporters. 
Communication itself had largely become the 
organization's goal. 
During the ERA Ratification Campaign, for example, 
especially in its last months, NOW threw enormous 
resources into a last minute Hcountdown H publicity 
campaign where the centrality of good media coverage to 
overall political success was seen as central. The fight 
over the ERA was a symbolic fight in the eyes of NOW 
leaders, and one that could ultimately only be won in 
the public media arena: 
The future of the ERA in part depended upon the 
public's perception of the issue and the media's 
interpretation of the final months of the decade-
long effort to ratify the Amendment ... Press 
Hstrategies H became almost as important as the 
legislative and legal strategies. Legislative 
progress hinged on mobilizing public opinion and 
publicizing the views and votes of individual 
legislators. 32 
Perhaps this move towards symbolic politics 1S most 
apparent in NOW's 1981 HGender GapH Campaign in which 
it becomes clear how the creation and diffusion of Hnew H 
issues is at the heart of social movement communication. 
209 
The ngender gapn was the name that NOW leaders 210 
coined for a for a significant and persistent difference 
they noticed in men's and women's voting patterns in the 
1980 election. The ngapn showed women as less inclined 
to vote for Reagan than men. It was first noted by NOW's 
President Eleanor Smeal who was trained as a political 
scientist. Smeal noted the persistent difference in 1980 
election poll results in a meeting in which the NOW 
leadership were discussing the future of the ERA 
ratification process., and NOW leaders set out to make 
the llgender gapn a household term. They reasoned, that 
if legislators could be convinced that women were a 
significant and distinct voting bloc, perhaps they could 
be persuaded to vote for the ERA. At this point In the 
ratification process, the ERA was being blocked by no 
more than a half dozen senators in a number states. 33 
Beginning with a New York Times article based on 
NOW's information, newspapers an TV stations around the 
country then picked up the idea of the gender gap.34 
Over a period of months, NOW leaders wrote op-ed pieces, 
distributed copies of gender gap stories from one outlet 
to another, and responded critically to reporters' 
questions about the gender gap. NOW hired political 
scientists to cross tabulate poll results by gender, and 
then sent out these ngender gap updates n to thousand of 
reporters. 
The result of this continuous information work, 211 
according to NOW media strategist Kathy Bonk, was a 
months-long surge of coverage of the gender gap and 
women's voting and attitude patterns in news outlets 
throughout the country that brought attention to women 
as voters, and as voters with different agendas than 
men. After NOW stopped sending the updates, however, 
Bonk (1988) recalls that the coverage stopped. She 
suggests that the campaign did influence a few 
specialist reporters, but that, for the most part, once 
the Hupdates H stopped coming, the stories on women's 
politics also dried up: 
A few key political reporters and columnists .... 
did spend time analyzing and monitoring women's 
voting patterns. They became more informed and 
better able to write accurately about the issue. 
Too many headline writers and reporters, however, 
covered the issue as a passing fad. When women's 
groups stopped "selling" the gender gap, reporters 
went on to the next fashionable issue. By 1986, 
gender differences in polling were rarely 
reported. 35 
Bonk assesses the effects of NOW communications in 
terms of the number of news stories it generated, but it 
is less clear, and harder to assess, how such ideas as 
the "gender gap" affect peoples' thinking more 
generally. Melucci has called this more general effect 
of movement communication its "symbolic" effect in which 
public ideas are created or reformulated. The "Gender 
Gap Campaign" seems to be a good candidate for this more 
diffuse communicative effect. The term itself is still 
routinely used to talk about women and men as voters 15 
years later. and its formulation may have changed 
journalists (and others) ways of seeing women more 
generally as an active and cohesive political voting 
bloc. By persuading news organizations to report polls 
broken down by gender, NOW may have ultimately changed 
how reporters and policy makers saw "women" as political 
agents more generally. 
NOW leaders emerged from the ERA and gender gap 
campaigns more convinced than ever of the importance of 
media and information campaigns as part of a social 
movement group's work: 
Good media coverage lS crucial. If the media glve 
the issues adequate play and stress the importance 
of registering and voting, profound social change 
lS possible. Everything depends on making sure that 
women are fully informed on the critical issues and 
are encouraged to get out and vote. 36 
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By the mid 1980s, NOW's media plan involved an 213 
ongolng, continual, strategic interaction with media 
over the construction of women's issues. NOW strategists 
saw their role as one ln which they would produce 
information for media, monitor media content, and use 
that monitoring in the design of new information. And ln 
the mid 1980s, with foundation support, NOW began a 
research project that would help them to connect with 
journalists more effectively. The organization compiled 
a data base of around 3000 media personnel around the 
country, and then undertook a year-long series of 
meetings with media personnel across the country to talk 
about the coverage of women's lssues on an ongoing basis 
and to "establish positive working relationships within 
the industry.,,37 
These meetings with industry professionals were the 
culmination of a media pragmatism that has from the 
beginning tried to form NOW into perfect media sources. 
By the mid 1980s media work was central to NOW's 
political work more generally. 
Media Pragmatism vs. Media Subversion: 
NOW Strategies in Movement Context 
The deliberateness and coherence of this media 
pragmatist orientation becomes clear when we see NOW's 
strategies in the wider movement context. NOW's general 
media pragmatism was quite different from the media 
strategies employed by the "younger" feminist groups. 214 
These groups took a different approach to media -- one 
that can be characterized as media subversion rather 
than media pragmatism. Where NOW sought to use the 
media, the younger groups wanted to subvert its 
processes and convert its workers. They were likely to 
be hostile or difficult in their interactions with 
journalists because they saw news media as a major part 
of the problem, in society, not the solution. As off our 
backs writers put it, in 1970, news was as sexist as 
other American institutions, so unlikely to be a 
resource: 
·A major misconception lS the belief that the media 
will deal with us seriously and present a truthful 
picture of who we are. There lS no reason to assume 
that the mass media are free of the sexism 
pervasive in all other American institutions. The 
mass media are primarily interested In lining their 
own pockets and assuring themselves of the 
continuance of their powerful position in society 
by kow-towing to the interests of the ruling 
class ... In the end the mass media will capitulate 
rather than fight for the truth, for to meet the 
needs of the people and the demands of objective 
journalism would mean the end of the mass media in 
their present form. 38 
In contrast to NOW's strategy of control and 
careful use of media conventions, the younger movement 
groups took an oppositional stance to media. Where NOW 
tried to support women journalists with information, the 
younger groups would either ban journalists from their 
events, or try to subvert media sourcing routines by 
insisting the journalists speak to all members of a 
group. 
For the "younger" movement groups, media access was 
intertwined with more general issues of power and 
representation within their organizations. In their 
attempts to deconstruct patriarchal systems, younger 
movement groups (such as New York Radical Women, 
Redstockings, Women's Liberation) often equated 
bureaucratization or specialization with patriarchal 
forms of organization and refused to have either 
designated leaders, or spokespersons, preferring to have 
a "structureless" organization in which each individual 
would "speak for herself." 39 
Issues of who should or could speak FOR the 
movement has also been concerns for NOW. But in the 
younger movement these issues were part of larger 
debates about the nature of power in which the question 
of and who should be seen [if anybody] as leaders of the 
movement was recurrent. In this context delegating 
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individuals to act as sources for the media became much 216 
more problematic. 
Whereas NOW had built into their organizational 
identity the role of spokesperson, the younger movement 
could not easily compromise on the issue. Central to 
their critique of patriarchal ways of knowing and 
representing others, was their belief in the importance 
of knowledge gained from personal experience. They had 
seen too often in the past how women had been spoken 
"about" and "for" by male voices. In particular they 
valued personal testimony or experiences of oppression 
that had not been able to be spoken before. The same 
search for authoritative sources that women journalists 
had been able to satisfy by talking to NOW, then, led 
journalists into trouble with the younger movement 
groups. As a women's liberation member said to reporter 
Sandie North when she tried to find a movement 
spokesperson: 
Any woman working In the media can write about her 
own oppression as a woman, so why should the press 
need to talk to any of us?40 
By asking reporters to listen to a wide variety of 
women, or indeed to listen to themselves, they were 
expressing a key tenet of their feminism, but it was not 
one that fit easily with news conventions. 
The generally conflictual relations between the 217 
younger groups articulations of feminism and news 
discourse conventions manifested itself most clearly in 
one of the more radical movement's key strategies; they 
would speak only to women reporters. Starting at the 
1968 Miss America protest, when women demonstrators from 
New York Radical Women (NYRW) simply refused to speak to 
male reporters or to answer them explaining, "Why should 
we talk with them? It's impossible for men to 
understand," this policy soon became an informal rule 
among many women's groups. 
As a group who had chosen their name, The National 
Organization "for" Women, deliberately so that men could 
also ·be a part of ending sexism, NOW were unlikely to 
adopt such a policy. But the radical women's groups 
involved hoped that their separatist strategy would make 
it easier to deal with the press, (which would result in 
better coverage), and that it might also force the news 
media to hire more women journalists. They had seen how 
the Civil Rights Movement had forced editors to employ 
more African-American journalists and thought that they 
would do the same in order to cover the women's 
liberation movement. 41 
The younger groups seemed to believe that women 
reporters would somehow, naturally, be more sympathetic 
because they were women. But they failed to take onto 
account that women reporters also followed the 
conventions and "logics" of news. 
The llyoungerll branch's approach to media sometimes 
extended into outright hostility and violence against 
the press where women sabotaged equipment and confounded 
attempts to "cover" movement events because they were 
suspicious of how that coverage would turn out. Male 
reporters were often harassed and sometimes subjected to 
physical abuse, though, ironically, it didn't seem to 
cure them of their sexism: 
"Get the pigs out!" was the rally cry for a 
contingent of women who last fall drove Doug 
Johnson, a WABC-TV correspondent away from a 
Women's Lib meeting. "One of the girls smashed 
my microphone. She was rabid, but she was a lovely 
little thing. ,,42 
This hostility to the press, sometimes deterred 
even sympathetic reporters. Marlene Sanders of ABC-TV 
remembers the radical movement as a very hard story to 
get, noting that covering the younger movement meant 
"fighting everybody, everywhere, all the time .... I am 
in real agreement with the Women's Liberation front and 
they're oppressing me.,,43 
Some of these differences In media interactions and 
expectations between NOW and more radical groups may 
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have been due to the differences in background. Whereas 219 
NOW's early leaders had come from government 
administration, education and public relations, the 
women of the HyoungerH women's movement had gained their 
political experience in protest politics, such as the 
peace movement or student movements, and they had 
learned to be suspicious of the press in those contexts. 
Freeman (1975, p. 111), for example, notes that it was 
this background in student politics which made the 
younger feminists wary of the press: 
Young feminists had been hostile to the press from 
the beginning -- significantly more so than other 
social movements. Some of this fear was traceable 
to inexperience as even those women with a 
political background had not done press work 
before. Much more derived from watching how 
inaccurately the press had reported the social 
movements and student protests in which they had 
previously been active. 
Indeed Betty Friedan once suggested that an 
unspoken alliance between serious journalists and the 
Hserious H women's movement had Hsaved H the movement from 
its own Hexcesses: H 
The women ln the media had already become quite an 220 
effective underground, protecting the movement from 
its own excesses in their coverage. 44 
In any case, NOW's pragmatism and strategic 
attempts to learn about and use news routines, were 
clearly not the only possible ways for feminists to 
interact with news media. 
CONCLUSION: THE CONSTRAINTS AND POSSIBILITIES OF 
MEDIA PRAGMATISM 
Over time NOW developed a more and more 
sophisticated version of media pragmatism. From early 
attempts to control the group's identity through taking 
media conventions into account, to a fully fledged 
research project to determine how best to interact with 
journalists, NOW has seen news as a potential movement 
resource and has set out to use it for mass 
communication purposes. 
This media pragmatism, which was in direct contrast 
to the younger feminist groups' conflictual relationship 
with media, seems to have been "successful" enough, at 
least from the organization's own point of view, because 
they continued to develop and refine it over time. In 
the period described here, NOW leaders continued a 
general strategy of trying to "use" rather than subvert, 
ignore or avoid media interactions. And, day-to-day 
NOW's reflexive appropriation of news conventions seems 221 
to have been a strategy which helped them to create and 
maintain relationships with reporters. As this chapter 
illustrates, NOW and other feminist groups were critical 
producers of information for the women journalists who 
first wrote about and publicized feminist political 
issues. 
NOW's media pragmatist strategizing also came with 
some important constraints, however. Media access work 
diverted time, energy and skills that might have been 
used by NOW in other ways, thereby constraining NOW's 
other political activities. But perhaps more 
importantly, the media orientation of NOW from the 
beginhing may have constrained its own articulations of 
feminism. NOW leaders, especially in the early years, 
were often more concerned with the organization's 
"public identity" than they were with its internal 
democracy. Early NOW leaders generally produced news 
access at the costs of the strategic avoidance of 
certain topics and frames -- some of which (such as 
questions of patriarchy and sexual identity) were 
essential to the movement's philosophy as a whole. Their 
focus on reporters' perceptions meant that they often 
mis-represented the organization -- for example, 
ignoring and erasing the contributions of lesbian 
members in the early years. 
The conventions of news functioned for NOW both as 222 
resources and as constraints. Speaking in llmedia logic ll 
gained the attention of reporters -- and so access to 
the public sphere -- but it also meant restricting 
public communication about NOW's identity and political 
concerns. NOW's decision to encode its concerns in 
media-friendly ways -- llthinking like journalists ll 
may in fact have meant that early NOW leaders thought 
less like feminists. Later in the organization's history 
this constraint of media strategizing became quite clear 
to NOW's leaders. As the new NOW leaders noted in their 
1975 manifesto, keeping quiet strategically on some 
issues in pUblic, means they are often also forgotten In 
private: llWhen we fail to articulate some of our goals, 
we tend to drop them not only from our immediate demands 
but from our long term vision. ll 
News is a kind of resource for movement groups who 
want to use it, then, but like signification, or 
knowledge more generally, it is a resource whose 
strategic use requires that sources articulate their 
experiences within its terms. Speaking in news VOlces 
may constrain what it is possible to say. The question 
for social movement organizations (and source 
organizations more generally) lS what those constraints 
might be at any particular time, and what, if anything, 
can be done to resist them. 
By choosing to interact with news media on its own 223 
terms, and to ·think like journalists," NOW strategists 
were able to produce some access, but it is a critical 
question whether the kind of access NOW was able to 
produce was in fact useful for the organization's 
overall goals, For example, did media pragmatism help 
NOW to mass communicate enough of its feminist concerns 
over time? Or was there always a significant difference 
between NOW's own identity and its public identity? Was 
NOW able to succeed in controlling its legitimacy as a 
speaker in news or did news ·process" NOW in its own way 
despite the organization's efforts? 
NOW leaders in the early years seemed to be willing 
to ·pay· for news access by clamping down on internal 
dissent and by limiting the organization's identity. In 
later years, new leaders decided that it was more 
important to communicate a more inclusive vision of 
feminism and to risk being treated as an illegitimate 
speaker by media. But the relative ·success· of these 
different degrees of media pragmatism may only be seen 
in an analysis of the outcomes of these strategic shifts 
that is In news content. In the next two chapters of 
the study, I look closely at NOW's re-presentation in 
news over time, and ask whether NOW's media pragmatism 
overall, and its various manifestations at different 
times, produced the kind of representations that NOW 
strategists intended. 
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Chapter 7 
News Outcomes 1: 
Patterns in Access, voice and Agenda Control, 1966-1980 
Over time NOW remained committed to a sophisticated 
and reflexive pragmatism in its interactions with news 
media. NOW leaders and strategists saw news as a 
resource and, especially in the early years, they were 
willing to impose some constraints on the organization's 
public communication in order to be taken seriously by 
journalists. Compared to the more radical "younger" 
groups, NOW's strategies were quite clearly media-
friendly, and media conventions and practices were taken 
into account in most NOW communications. NOW leaders 
tried to use the "rules" of news -- that is the routine 
practices and discursive conventions -- in order to 
access news. 
This reflexive media pragmatism had two maln aims 
to use news media to build an agenda for women's 
issues, and to create a legitimate public identity for 
NOW itself. But how effective was NOW in accessing and 
using news? Was NOW able to produce routine news access? 
Did NOW's incorporation of news values into its own 
communications help to transfer its issue agenda to 
news? Did NOW leaders' attempts to control the 
organization's identity in interaction with journalists 
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result in a legitimate public identity? Overall, did NOW 230 
llsucceed" in controlling its interaction with news media 
using media pragmatist strategies, or was the 
organization and its issues "processed"---.by news? 
In the next two chapters I assess NOW's media 
strategies through an analysis of the outcome of these 
strategies in news content. 1 Chapter seven assesses the 
outcomes of NOW strategies in terms of agenda-building 
success -- it asks whether NOW was able to access news 
and transfer to news its agenda of women's issues. using 
quantitative content analysis techniques and rank order 
correlations, it tracks NOW's access, VOlce, placement, 
and agenda control in the Times, asking whether, at 
thes"e various levels of access, NOW "succeeded" (or not) 
In its interactions with news. 
Chapter eight assesses NOW's "success" In terms of 
identity and legitimacy control. It draws on frame 
analysis techniques to track the Times representation of 
NOW and compares that representation to shifts in NOW's 
overall identity and media strategies. Both chapters 
draw on an original content analysis of 377 stories 
about NOW in the New York Times from 1966-1980. 
Overall, I argue that NOW was relatively successful 
in accessing news, and in gaining some "voice" in the 
public sphere, but that at the level of both agenda and 
identity control, NOW was subject to some systematic 
processing by news media which limited this success. 
Even as NOW reflexively appropriated news conventions 231 
and practices to gain access to news, the organization's 
discourse and identity were translated by the Times 
through a public/private framework in which issues that 
were framed ln more traditionally llpolitical" or legal 
terms (such as sex discrimination in employment) were 
placed in serious news categories, but llnew" issues or 
issues that were framed in less conventional ways (such 
as child care or "sexism" frames) tended to be placed in 
lifestyle or "wom~n's pages." 
I argue that this "processing" of NOW by the Times 
is the outcome both of NOW leaders' own strategies (in 
which they took on some news values in their own 
communications and tried to seem legitimate by framing 
new issues in terms of old ones), but also of some deep 
discursive patterns ln news discourse-- namely a public-
private divide -- which NOW encountered (and 
incorporated) unintentionally. News shares this public-
private divide with liberal discourses more generally, 
but it is a discursive categorization that may be 
inimical to feminisms. As feminist theorists have noted 
in recent years, the public-private categories of 
liberal politics , in which some aspects of life are 
designated llpublic" (and open to political debate and 
collective amelioration) and others are marked llprivate" 
or domestic (and no concern of the state's), are also 
gendered. It is the traditional elements of women's 
lives, experlences and problems (for example, child 232 
care, sexual harassment and so on) that are usually 
consigned to the "private" and less legitimate areas of 
the liberal divide, and traditionally "male" experiences 
(such as work, economics, war and so on) that are seen 
as public issues (cf. Butler and Scott, 1992; Fraser, 
1989; 1992; McLaughlin, 1993). Given that one of they 
key struggles of feminist politics overall has been to 
"make public" more of women's experiences (and so open 
them up to debate and political action), this 
conventional public-private processing of NOW's 
discourse by news is especially problematic, and perhaps 
marks some of the limits of both news and liberal 
discourses for carrying feminist politics. 
These discursive constraints of news are not dealt 
with particularly well in NOW's media pragmatism, 
because unlike the "rules" of news that are accessible 
to NOW at the level of practice (e.g. the "beat" system 
and the event-orientation of news), these discursive 
patterns are much less visible day to day. It is these 
constraints, though, that may constitute the unintended 
consequences of engaging with news media for NOW. 
ASSESSING SOURCE JlSUCCESS JI IN NEWS AGENDA-BUILDING: 
ACCESS, VOICE, PLACEMENT AND CONTROL 
The issue of "success" in source-news interactions, 
as in any kind of communicative interaction, is highly 
problematic. Indeed some observers have suggested that 233 
we should abandon the idea of success altogether as 
being too ·instrumental· a concept in 
dialogical/constructivist approaches (Van Zoonen, 1992) 
However, I think it is important to recognize that 
dialogs are not only communicative (i.e. interactive, 
non linear and sometimes oriented towards understanding) 
but also often (and certainly in media-movement 
interactions) highly strategic. 2 As such, we still need 
ways to assess the relative outcomes of different kinds 
of interactive strategies, even when recognizing that 
these will be imperfect measures. 
In this study I use a four-part framework for 
assessing NOW's success that assesses the organization's 
access patterns at four different levels: access, 
vOlce, placement, and control. Access, simply refers to 
NOW's appearance in the news columns, and is the minimal 
requirement for voice in the public sphere and ·success· 
in interaction with news media. Voice refers to whether 
NOW is allowed to speak and in what circumstances, since 
voice is essential to the ability to define events and 
issues in ways that would produce influence. 3 Placement 
refers to where in the paper NOW stories were placed. 
Placement in news has long been seen to indicate 
relative importance -- front page issues are more 
important than other kinds, so placement patterns can be 
read as a measure of relative legitimacy assigned 
different kinds of stories by editors. Control, refers 234 
to NOW's ability to retain control of its own agenda. 4 
Issue control 1S assessed through a comparison of NOW's 
"agendas" to the Times representation of that agenda 
over time. This comparison indicates whether news 
coverage of NOW presented to the public the same set of 
issues that NOW was concerned with internally, and 
whether these issues were presented in the same "order" 
or ranking, where such ranking is read to indicate 
relative importance. 5 
These dimensions of success -- access, voice, 
placement and control are analytically separable, and 
can, to some extent be understood, hierarchically.6 We 
can say for example that access is basic to all other 
levels, that voice is an additional level of successful 
interaction, and that legitimate representation or 
control of one's identity makes a voice more credible 
and more likely to be listened to. Control, over one's 
identity and one's agenda, is in this framework the 
ultimate "success" of strategic interaction. In reality 
of course, anyone story might have overlapping and 
contradictory elements of all of these, and my aim 1S 
not to put these forward as definitive a-priori 
categories of success, but simply to use them to 
organize a discussion of the constraints and 
possibilities of NOW's access to news media. 
I. PATTERNS IN BASIC ACCESS 
1.1 Simple access 
Simple access is the primary level of JJsuccessJJ for 
news sources. No other kinds of voice or control are 
possible without that access. And indeed basic access to 
the news columns was one of NOW's key communicative 
aims. NOW leaders wanted to become a JJvoice JJ for women's 
interests in the public debate over policy and culture 
but they could only do so by first getting the attention 
of reporters. 
NOW was generally able to galn news access. As 
Figure 7.1 illustrates, NOW's access patterns -- simply 
measured in the number of stories in which NOW was 
mentioned or quoted in the New York Times show that 
the organization maintained some access to news at all 
times and in the first 10 years or so of NOW's existence 
that visibility increased dramatically over time. 
After 1975 coverage (in number of stories) 
decreased and seems to have leveled off. This pattern 
indicates that NOW's representation in news may have 
reached a ceiling after the first ten years. During the 
same period NOW's resources in terms of membership and 
income also increased generally over time, showing less 
of a drop-off, however, than NOW's media visibility. 
Figure 7.2 illustrates how NOW's general access pattern 
paralleled its resource pattern in the first ten years 
or so, but then access drops off while income continues 
235 
to increase and membership drops off slightly. (All of 236 
these measurements are log values so that measurements 
on different scales can be compared) . 
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Such trends have to be interpreted with caution, of 
course, because it may be that this period of apparent 
leveling lS merely a dip in a long term trend upwards. 7 
But what is very clear is that NOW was able to access 
news at least minimally at all times and that access was 
higher overall in 1980 than it had been in 1966. The 
organization seems to have ·succeeded," then, at this 
basic level of access. 
1.2 Access and Gender: NOW and Women Reporters 238 
One of NOW's key strategies in news interaction was 
their building of a network of sympathetic women 
reporters. Though NOW leaders manifested much less 
"essentialism" in their political ideology than the 
younger women's groups, they still thought that women 
reporters were more likely to respond to feminist 
information. 8 
And in fact most of NOW's coverage was produced by 
women writers. Whether as a result of NOW's deliberate 
targeting of women reporters, or because of their 
assignment by editors to cover women's politics because 
they were women, most of the coverage of NOW that could 
be identified by the writer's gender, was produced by 
women reporters. 
As Figure 7.1 illustrates, of the stories that 
could be identified by gender, twice as many were 
written by women (42%) as by men (21%). If those stories 
that were unidentifiable -- because they carried no 
byline had similar proportions, then more than two 
thirds of the Times stories about NOW were written by 
women journalists. 
Figure 7.3 
NOW STORIES BY REPORTER'S GENDER 
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Not only did NOW's coverage increase over time (and 
generally in proportion to their resource base at least 
in the first 10 years) but an analysis of the origins of 
news stories about NOW, indicates that the majority of 
stories about NOW can in fact be seen to have been 
initiated by NOW itself. 
Table 7.1 indicates a general breakdown of stories 
about NOW in the Times over the period 1966-1982 ln 
terms of their origins -- that is the events or 
activities produced by NOW or a journalist which 
produced the news story. Again, because this content 
analysis can only code manifest events or strategies 
i.e. those that are mentioned or indicated by the 
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article -- instances in which NOW's strategic 
communication influenced stories in less visible ways 
are not accounted for. 
For this analysis each of the 377 New York Times 
stories was coded to determine what event, strategy or 
activity by either NOW or a journalist had occurred to 
produce the story. For example, the analysis asked, was 
the story the result of a public demonstration, protest 
or publicity gesture, or the result of journalist 
enterprise, such as an interview?9 Was it provoked by 
NOW filing a law suit or was it coverage of a NOW 
conference? The overall aim of such an analysis was to 
determine, if possible, how much of the news about NOW 
was ~roduced through NOW's own resource and skill 
mobilization. In contrast how much was generated from 
journalist Uenterprise,u as well as to determine, if 
possible, which of NOW's communicative strategies were 
most likely to gain news coverage. 10 
As indicated in Table 7.1, most of the stories 
about NOW in the Times can be seen to be the result of 
NOW's own communication and political activities. 
Overall, NOW was responsible for initiating around 77 
percent of its own coverage (see cumulative percentages 
ln Table 7.1). 
One of the largest shares of this was news stories 
produced from NOW's public activities, such as 
demonstrations, protests and marches (19.9 %). NOW's 
240 
overt news subsidy attempts -- where the organization 241 
held a press conference, announced the publication of a 
study, or actually wrote the piece themselves --
generated the second greatest number of stories (17.8%) 
Coverage of NOW's routine meetings such as annual 
conferences generated the next important category of 
source initiated stories (15.9%). Interactions with the 
courts (13.5%), commissions or legislatures (9.5 %) 
together accounted for around 20 percent more. 
Journalist enterprise stories, such as those based 
In interviews or special features on the movement, 
accounted for 18 percent of stories. This group of 
journalist-generated stories may also, of course, have 
been generated behind the scenes by NOW information 
efforts, or these stories may have been instigated as 
responses to NOW's public activities -- all this 
analysis can conclude is that they were stories in which 
NOW events or press conferences did not seem to be the 
critical generators -- and which (by default) may have 
been generated by journalists or editors themselves. As 
an emergent movement with thousands of members (15,000 
by 1973) NOW could be justified by sympathetic reporters 
to their editors as a genuine story. 
We should be wary about seeing these categories as 
too distinct, however. The making of social change and 
the making of news were deeply intertwined for NOW. 
Though its public events such as marches were most 
clearly aimed at media, all of NOW's political actions 242 
included media strategies. NOW strategists filed legal 
cases to publicize particular issues as well as to seek 
redress for a individual's injustice. They sent out 
notices, reminders and background materials for annual 
conferences. They organized conference sessions In ways 
that would attract journalists to the most central 
issues. They sent out copies of, and background 
information about, their legislative testimony. Though 
it is useful to see where news media paid most of its 
attention to NOW, (in this case when they took to the 
streets), then, any clear separation between media/non-
media strategies is impossible to make. 
Table 7.1 
Origins of NOW Stories in The New York Times, 1966-1980 
Origins of Stories 
About NOW 
NOW Public Events ll 
NOW News Subsidy l2 
NOW Meeting/Routine 
Event 
Court Related 
Legislature or 
Commission 
Other/unknown 
Journalist 
Enterprise13 
Totals 
Number 
of 
Stories 
75 
67 
60 
51 
36 
20 
68 
377 
% 
Total 
Stories 
19.9 
17.8 
15.9 
13.5 
9.5 
5.3 
18.0 
100.0 
Cumu-
lative 
% Total 
Stories 
19.9 
37.7 
53.6 
67.1 
76.6 
81. 9 
100.0 
100.0 
What lS clear here is that most of the coverage of 
NOW In the Times carne as a result of NOW's own 
strategic actions. Indeed, other than the stories 
produced through Hjournalist enterprise H (such as 
interviews and special features that are not overtly 
related to specific NOW activities) which account for 
only around 18 percent of stories about NOW, the bulk of 
~mes stories can be said to be HNOW-generated H media 
coverage. In this framework NOW was responsible for 
initiating around 77 percent of its own coverage. 14 
In terms of access, then, NOW's appearance in the 
news seems to have been generated largely by the 
organization's own activities, and especially through 
their strategic interaction with women reporters. 
II. VOICE PATTERNS 
2.1. Voice Over Time 
A second fundamental element of legitimate or 
credible representation is that a source be allowed to 
speak. Voice allows sources at least to attempt to 
control their own representation in media, and to set 
the agenda by framing issues and events in ways that 
they consider to be important. As Ericson et al. (1989) 
note, there is vast difference In being able to speak in 
news, and being spoken about. One implies agency and 
subjectivity, the other is associated with being 
objectified and marginalized. 
Voice is no guarantee of control. Journalists can, 
and do, select freely from source statements, sometimes 
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creating from them meanings not even considered by 
sources. But in general, because news is itself a 
discourse made up from other discourses, what a news 
story can say is constrained in important ways by what 
sources says. 
Voice -- or being quoted as serlOUS speakers for 
American women was fundamentally important to NOW. The 
organization invested significant resources and skills 
in becoming ·experts· in various policy issues, and it 
was one of NOW strategists aims to get reporters to see 
NOW as the expert feminist organization and to become 
the feminist source In elite reporters' phone lists. 15 
Overall NOW succeeded in becoming a voice in news. Over 
the period observed here NOW was much more likely than 
not to be quoted in stories. In the Times coverage of 
NOW, the organization was quoted in 75.3 percent of the 
total stories in which it appeared. It was talked about 
that is mentioned but not quoted in 24.7 percent 
of stories (N=377). As Figure 7.4 indicates, 
proportionally year-by-year NOW was always more likely 
to be quoted than not, with most years being around 70 
percent success rate at being quoted. In general, the 
longer the news story, the more likely NOW was to be 
quoted. 16 
These figures represent only whether or not NOW was 
quoted in a story -- not how many times, or in what 
contexts (i.e. whether the organization was ·counter-
244 
quoted for example). As such they are not prlma facie 245 
evidence for NOW's control or "success" in a news story, 
but certainly without voice such control is highly 
unlikely. 
Figure 7.4 
NOW Voice Over Time 
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2.2 Voice and Access Strategies 
NOW was more likely to be quoted than not when 
covered, but there were patterns in its voice. As Table 
7.2 indicates the organization was proportionally more 
likely to be given voice In public events, news 
conferences and coverage of NOW meetings than in the 
contexts of its interactions with the courts or 
legislatures. In the context of its interactions with 246 
the courts, especially, NOW was about equally likely to 
be spoken about as quoted (51% of Court related stories 
show NOW being talked about.) 
Table 7.2 
NOW voice by Story Origin in The Times, 1966-1980 
NOW NOW NOW Journ. Courts Legis-
Public Info- Meet- Enter- lature 
Event Sub ing prise 
NOW 
Talked 17.3 20.9 13.3 25.0 51. 0 22.2 
About 
NOW 82.7 79.1 86.7 75.0 49.0 77.8 
Quoted 
N 75 67 60 68 51 36 
Totals 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Chi Sq.: 26.308 DF :5 p=.00008 
2.3. Voice and Gender 
NOW leaders' tendency to interact with women rather 
than men reporters, and their relative success at 
gaining access through that route, was no more likely, 
however, to increase the organization's llvoice ll in the 
news. As Table 7. 3 illustrates, there was no real 
difference in NOW's likelihood to be quoted (as opposed 
to talked about) whether the reporter was female or 
male. 
Table 7.3 
NOW voice by Reporter's Gender 
Gender Now Quoted NOW Talked About 
Female 32.5 37.8 
Male 67.5 62.2 
Totals % 100 100 
(N) (45) (191) 
(N= 236 because stories that could not be 
identified by gender were excluded.) 
III. PLACEMENT 
Besides access and VOlce, the placement of a news 
story also carries messages about its general importance 
as a public, political topic. Within journalistic 
practice, importance is assigned to news events and 
issues on a sliding scale of importance; those accounts 
of events that are deemed most important are put nup 
front" and are framed in ways that make it clear to the 
reader/viewer that these have higher status in the 
opinion of news workers. Getting one's story on the 
front page, for example, is better than the second page, 
being in the national news sections is generally deemed 
to better than in the cultural sections, and being In 
the metropolitan section more important than the 
regional sections, and so on. This tendency to value 
what is most visible, and to make most visible that 
which is most valued, is well understood by both 
journalists and readers/viewers, and indeed to be 
transferable from news texts to readers in a process of 
salience transfer, or agenda-setting. 
247 
It seems reasonable, then, that one aspect of 248 
source Hsuccess H that we might note would be the level 
of visibility or prominence that sources' achieve. We 
may say, for example, that sources who consistently make 
it into the front pages are successful sources. NOW was 
like other sources in this respect, Hmaking the papers," 
and especially Hmaking the front page" were important 
markers of its own day- to-day influence. In general NOW 
leaders sought to make it into the Hserious H news 
sections. Their media strategies (as described in 
chapter six) were focused on legitimating women's 
issues, by persuading reporters, editors and policy 
makers that women's lssues (such as child care, sex 
discrimination, and violence, for example ) were in fact 
legitimate political concerns. 
They were especially concerned that women's issues 
not be confined to the Hghetto" of women's pages, and 
they saw coverage in the news sections as ·promotion:" 
the press has been increasingly cooperative and 
responsive to covering NOW activities, and we seem 
to be moving out of the ·women's page ghetto" and 
more into the regular news and feature sections of 
the news media. 18 
3.1 Placement Over Time 
For the most part NOW achieved its news placement 
goals. Overall, in the 15 years of coverage analyzed in 
this study, NOW appeared in the news sections (that is 
in the front sections of the paper, including op-ed, and 
sections not designated for other purposes (e.g. 
business, TV or magazine)) 63 percent of the time, In 
the women's pages 16 percent of the time, in the 
regional sections 17 percent of the time and in other 
sections 4 percent of the time. 
Patterns in that placement year-by-year indicate 
that NOW became more successful after the first few 
years In getting its stories into the news sections. As 
Figure 7.5 illustrates, in the first few years (1966-
1968) most of NOW's stories were placed in the women's 
pages. By 1969, however, that trend had reversed and 
most of NOW's stories from 1969-1980 were placed in the 
news sections. For the 15 year period of this study, NOW 
stories remained predominantly in the news pages. 
The year-by-year percentages also indicate that regional 
pages became an outlet for NOW stories after 1972. 
llRegional" here means regional in terms of he 
neighborhoods around New York (such as the Long Island 
neighborhood section for example.) In the 1970s these 
sections were quite often accessed by local suburban NOW 
chapters -- perhaps following the guidelines from the 
llmedia kits."19 
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3.2 Placement and Gender: 
NOW Stories and Women Journalists 
NOW's strategic focus on the "front" of the paper 
and its focus on women reporters may have worked out to 
be contradictory strategies. Despite the fact that more 
than twice as many stories about NOW were written over 
time by women reporters than by men, male reporters 
stories were more likely than women's to be placed on 
250 
the front page and In the news sections more generally 251 
(Table 7.4 ). 
NOW's focus on women reporter may have been 
successful at getting the organization into the 
newspaper overall, but because of gendered staffing 
practices i.e. women being assigned llfeminine ll topics 
and beats this strategy worked against other kinds of 
legitimacy, such as making the front pages. Ironically, 
a more successful strategy may have been to cultivate 
some male reporters who already had legitimate "news" 
beats. 
Table 7.4 
News Section (Prominence) by Gender of Reporter 
Newspaper Section 
Front page 
News/Editorial 
Women's Page 
Regional 
Totals 
Chi Sq.: 14.495 DF: 3 
Male Female 
Reporter Reporter 
% % 
13.3 
62.7 
8.0 
16.0 
100 
p=.002 
8.1 
49.3 
30.4 
12.2 
100 
N=223 20 
3.3 Placement and Access Strategy 
NOW's access to the news pages rather than the 
women's page was also affected by the access strategy 
and context in which the story was generated. As Table 
7.5 illustrates most of the news in both the front/news 
and women's pages came from public events such as 
protests. However, beyond this association, it lS also 
clear that interaction with already legitimated 252 
institutions such as the legislature or courts 
(themselves more likely to be beats staffed by men) was 
more likely to be defined as "news" material than 
"women's" material. A much higher percentage of news 
about NOW in the front pages than in the women's pages 
carne from these interactions with the courts and 
legislatures. Note for example, that none of the 
stories generated by legislative activities ended up on 
the women's page, and only 3 percent of court related 
stories did. 
Table 7.5 
NOW Strategy/Story Origin by Story Placement 
Story % % % % 
Origin/ Front News Women's Regional 
NOW Page Section Page 
Strategy 
Public 27.3 20.7 29.1 16.7 
Event 
NOW Info 13.6 23.2 10.9 10.0 
Sub 
NOW Routine 9.1 19.7 16.4 11. 7 
Journalist 18.2 11. 8 40.0 21.7 
Enterprise 
Court 18.2 15.3 3.6 20.0 
Legislature 13.6 9.4 0.0 20.1 
Totals 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
N=340 21 chi square: 48.83 DF: 15 p =.00002 
On the other hand, 40 percent of the women's page 253 
was made up of journalist enterprise stories; that is 
interviews and profiles about feminism and NOW which 
almost never made it into the front of the paper. The 
women's pages had more than 40 percent of their coverage 
of NOW in this form, whereas the front pages had 18 
percent and the news sections around 11 percent 
journalist enterprise stories. 
When NOW makes the front page, then, it lS often 
when they interact with one of the major institutions, 
coverage of which also constitute the major "beats" of 
elite journalism. 22 This outcome is again problematic 
regarding NOW's interaction with predominantly women 
reporters. If these access patterns are accurate, then 
NOW is more likely to gain legitimate (upfront) news 
access when it interacts with the major "beats." However 
these beats are likely to be staffed by men. 
Access to the news sections and front pages of the 
Times is complexly overdetermined. Certainly it is 
conditioned by more factors than can be accounted for 
here. But it does seem clear from these patterns in 
NOW's placement, that a role can be carved out in this 
overall process for the interaction of gendered staffing 
patterns and gendered sourcing patterns. NOW leaders' 
strategy of interacting with women reporters, gains 
access, but because assignments themselves are also 
gendered, these women do not have the most legitimate 254 
access themselves. 
3.4 Placement and Topic: 
Public-Private News Spheres? 
A further layer of complexity lS added to this 
interaction between gendered sources and gendered beats, 
when the aspect of gendered topics is also considered. 
Not only were NOW stories placed systematically by the 
Times in terms of the reporter's gender and strategy, 
but NOW news seems also to have been processed 
differently based on its topics. 
As Table 7.6 illustrates, an overall pattern is 
deteetable In which the Times placed those stories 
associated with more traditional political areas (such 
as electoral politics or economics) or those issues 
framed in terms of individual rights (e.g. sex 
discrimination) in the front section of the paper, and 
issues and frames that are less traditionally seen as 
political such as child care, discussions of HsexismH on 
the women's pages. More than 42% of NOW's front page 
stories are about sex discrimination. Additionally, 16% 
of front page stories are about equal rights, making 
more than half of NOW's front page stories from this 
category of topics that are framed in traditional 
Hliberal H ways as matters of individual HrightsH (as 
opposed to systemic and structural patriarchy for 
example). On the other hand, most of the NOW stories 255 
placed on the women's page are about NOW as a women's 
organization or about feminism more generally (42%), or 
about sexism (18%) or family and child care issues 
(13%) . 
These patterns are by no means conclusive. But 
there is some evidence here to suggest that the Times 
placed NOW stories according to what feminists and NSM 
theorists have called a pervasive upublic-private U 
divide that underlies liberal discourse more generally. 
The public-private categorization is one in which 
some lssues are seen as upublic u (and important) and 
others are assigned to the category of uprivate U (less 
impoytant). These categories have been critiqued as 
linked to, and derived from, the differential historical 
experiences and practices of men and women ( cf. Fraser, 
1992 ; Butler and Scott, 1992). Feminist theorists have 
noted that women's traditional experiences (of child 
care and domestic responsibilities) and more recently 
feminist concerns (such as sexual harassment, domestic 
violence and so on) are routinely consigned in liberal 
politics to the uprivate u (i.e. less important, not of 
public concern) half of this dichotomy. 
Table 7.6 256 
Topic of Stories on the Front Page, Women's Page and 
News Pages 
% % % 
Topic Front Women's News/ 
Page Page Ed 
NOW /Feminism 10.5 41. 8 19.8 
Sex Discrimination 42.0 5.5 24.4 
Equal Rights 15.8 12.7 15.7 
Elect. Politics 21.1 3.6 12.2 
Sexism 18.1 15.3 
Abortion/Contracept 5.5 5.1 
Family/Child Care 5.3 12.7 2.5 
Rape/Violence 4.1 
Homosexuality 5.3 1.0 
Totals % 100.0 100.0 100.0 
N 19 55 197 
The editorial process manifested here by the Times, 
In which some topics are consigned to the Hfront H and 
some to the HbackH of the paper, seems to mirror this 
discursive breakdown quite closely, suggesting that news 
media may play a key role in reproducing the public-
private border In public communication processes. As 
such news must be seen as a critical site for the 
negotiation and struggle over making more lssues 
Hpublic H that is at the heart of NSM challenges. 
This public/private (front/back) patterning of news 
can be seen more clearly in Table 7.7. Table 7.7 
indicates the relationship between placement and topic 
if we collapse the range of issues considered in table 
7.6 into Hpublic H and Hprivate" categories. In this 
table stories about sex discrimination, equal rights, 
electoral, and rape stories are considered Hpublic" and 
stories about abortion, sexuality, sexism In images and 257 
relationships, and family/child care and to be 
"private." 23 
As Table 7.7 indicates, the breakdown between 
"public" and "private" (as defined here) is clear across 
news and women's pages. The women's page is the only 
place in the paper which is predominantly made up of 
"private" issues (61 % of women's page stories are from 
the "private" category, as opposed to 11% of front page 
stories, or 35% in news sections more generally.) 
Table 7.7 
llpublic ll vs. llPrivate" Topics by News Section 
Topic Front News/Ed Women's 
Category Page Page 
publici 88.9 64.8 39.4 
trade 
political 
issues* 
private/ 11.1 35.2 60.6 
new 
women's 
issues** 
Totals 100.0 100.0 100.0 
(N) 
N=254 24 Chi Sq. : 13.25 DF :3 p =.004 
* The public category includes the following 
issues: sex discrimination, equality and the 
ERA, rape/violence, and electoral politics. 
**The private category includes the following 
issues: abortion/contraception, sexuality, 
sexism in images and relationships, 
family/child care. 
Given that one of the central goals of NOW (and of 258 
the NSMs more generally) is to nmake public n formerly 
private issues, this overall pattern in the Times -- In 
which more conventional (or conventionally framed) 
topics are treated more seriously as npublic n and as 
news, while newer (gendered) topics such as child care 
are treated as less serlOUS nwomen'sn issues --
indicates that that goal is far from achieved, at least 
in news terms. In fact news seems to be simply 
reproducing the public-private boundaries of liberal 
politics in its placement of NOW news. 
However, some important caveats are In order here. 
This aggregate pattern indicates only an static 
nsnapshot n or aggregate analysis of what may be an 
ongoing struggle over placement. It would take 
systematic, close analysis of issue placement by news 
over time, In the context of issue framing by sources 
over time, to really track whether news media are indeed 
processing feminisms rigidly or whether there has in 
fact been movement from nprivate n (women's pages) to 
npublic n (news sections) over time. In this study the 
numbers of stories overall (N=377 over 15 years and 
mUltiple topics) is too small to track any patterns 
accurately over time in a subset of issues, but a future 
study might take these suggestive patterns as a starting 
point and assess the communicative nsuccess n of feminist 
groups In "making public" formerly private issues, by 259 
tracking news placement of these issue over time. 
The patterns that can be seen here, though, do 
indicate some support for Van Zoonen's (1992, p. 470) 
suggestion, that news is one of the key places where 
such struggles over "old" and "new" politics will play 
out, and that news is likely, in the short term at least 
(Van Zoonen studied Dutch news media's construction of 
feminism from 1968 to 1973) to tend to reproduce exactly 
those categories of public-private that feminism 
challenges: 
The press has a preference for social, economic and 
"legal issues. These themes are part of the "old" 
political paradigm of the welfare state, in which 
politics is thought to be about matters of material 
distribution ... It is a new thing for women to 
claim their share of material resources, but that 
does not undermine the definition of politics per 
se. This only happens when the women's movement 
begins to expand the notion of politics into the 
area of daily and private lives. The press can only 
understand body politics, gender relations, sexual 
violence, etc. as part of a social psychological 
domain, not as politics. 
IV. Agenda Control 
The final measure of "success" for NOW in this 
chapter (issues of legitimacy and identity are dealt 
with in the next chapter) revolves around the 
organization's ability to successfully IItransfer ll its 
set of issues -- its political agenda -- to news media. 
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In this part of the analysis I draw on the methods 
of agenda-setting research to compare NOW's agenda at key 
points (1968 and 1975) with the Times' representation of 
that agenda in the year or two following. I argue that 
NOW's "success" at the level of agenda control can be 
indicated by the closeness of the relationship between 
these two NOW agendas: if the Times representation of NOW 
in terms of its range and ranking of issues resembles 
NOW's own agenda in the period before the Times 
representation, we can say that NOW was able to transfer 
its agenda to a lesser or greater degree. 
This use of agenda comparisons (and rank order 
correlations) lS somewhat unconventional. Traditional 
agenda-setting research has usually compared and 
correlated audience and media "agendas," but more 
recently the methodology has also begun to be used to 
track "agenda-building" processes at the institutional 
level -- to investigate how news agendas themselves are 
set. Semetko et al. (1991), for example, use agenda-
setting's rank order correlation techniques to assess 
the influence of presidential candidates on news 
agendas. This study follows that use of agenda-setting 261 
logic and methods and uses agenda comparisons to assess 
the influence of NOW as a source organization, on the 
Times representation of its own agenda. 
This shift in levels of analysis for agenda-setting 
logics and techniques brings with it some limitations. 
For example, standardizing source and news discourses 
for comparisons is more difficult than standardizing 
audience and news discourses (audience agendas are 
usually constructed through surveys that use the same 
terms and categories of news, whereas source discourses 
are already constituted). And, because source-news 
relations take place (in this case especially) over 
longer periods, and less frequently, than news-audience 
interactions, the time lags are longer than usual in 
this analysis. However, this method may still allow us 
to indicate a level of ·success· -- i.e. agenda control 
beyond those already assessed. (See Chapter 
Three/Methods for more discussion of these measurements 
and limitations) . 
There are two key questions addressed here in 
assessing NOW's agenda control. The first question 
concerns NOW's ability to have its range of issues 
represented. This is a question of whether NOW's overall 
public agenda appeared in the news or whether that 
agenda was selected from or significantly transformed ln 
interaction by the Times. The second question involves 
NOW's ability to transfer to news its sense of 
priorities -- that is the order or ranking of its 
lssues. (It is this second measure has often been 
described as an llagenda-setting ll or agenda building 
process (Weaver et al., 1981; Semetko et al., 1991). 
In this section I assess NOW's relative agenda control 
ln terms of transferring its range of issues first, and 
then its ability to transfer its issue rankings. 
4.1 Agenda Selection: 
Representing NOW's Range of Issues 
The first question in assessing NOW's relative 
agenda control, centers around its ability to transfer 
the entire range of its agenda to news. This means 
assessing whether the Times represented NOW's whole 
agenda or whether it selected in systematic ways from 
that agenda. It also means, however, noting that not all 
of NOW's issues were in fact strategically communicated 
to media. There may have been some issues at some times 
that NOW wanted to keep quiet, (issues of homosexuality 
in the early 1970s, for example), and I have tried to 
indicate in the analysis when silence by the Times is a 
success and when it is a failure of NOW's agenda control 
efforts. 
Table 7.8 indicates an aggregate llagenda ll for NOW 
ln the Times 1966-1980. All 377 stories about NOW or 
cross referenced under NOW in the Times, were coded by 
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headline into these 12 categories (see chapter three, 263 
Methods, for more details). This breakdown, then, 
indicates both the overall range and the overall 
(aggregate, 1966-1980) ranking of NOW issues according 
to the Times. 
Over time, most of the stories about NOW in the 
Times can be categorized as not being specific "issue" 
type stories at all, but stories more generally about 
NOW the organization, its events, strategies or members. 
As Table 7.8 illustrates, around 21 percent of these 
stories were about NOW/feminism events and strategies 
more generally and not about issues at all. This pattern 
is in line with studies of political news more generally 
where significant portions of news can be classified 
as event/strategy type rather than issue stories (cf. 
Semetko et aI, 1991; Iyengar 1989). These stories 
sometimes also mention issues, but the stories 
themselves are not about these lssues per se but about 
NOW or the movement. (We might say that these stories 
were about the "macro-issue," feminism itself, but for 
the most part they fall into what Iyengar (1987) and 
others have noted as event/strategy category rather than 
issue/thematic stories.) 
Of the stories that focused on particular issues, 
sex discrimination was the most significant category. As 
Table 7.8 illustrates around 20 percent of total 
coverage of NOW was taken up by stories about sex 
discrimination. Most of these concerned sex 
discrimination in employment (12.5%) though some were 
also about sex discrimination in credit and lnsurance 
(3.4%), ln education (1.3%), in sports (1.1%) and in 
access to housing or public places (2.7%). 
Equality issues, which includes general civil 
rights stories and stories about the Equal Rights 
Amendment, made up the next category of NOW news overall 
at 12.5% of all stories. This was followed by 
traditional politics at 10.6%. The category "traditional 
politics" refers here to NOW's involvement with 
political candidates, either endorsing or criticizing 
them, or in its efforts to encourage and support 
feminist candidates. Sexism in images, especially on TV 
and in children's books and cards was also an important 
topic in NOW's coverage by the Times and made up around 
9.5% of stories. 
Family issues (marriage, divorce and child care) 
were deemed less important by the Times, making up only 
4.8% of stories. Sexism in relationships (such as sexual 
harassment and general discussions of gender roles and 
femininity) was also given low priority at 2.9% of 
stories. Perhaps most surprisingly in news coverage of 
NOW and feminism was the small number of stories about 
race or sexuality. Only 1.1.% of stories could be 
classified as being mainly about race, and only 0.8 
about homosexuality (three stories overall from a total 
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of 377 were clearly about homosexuality, though it may 265 
have been a secondary issue in other stories.) 
These patterns mirror to some extent NOW's own 
issue concerns but with some significant omissions and 
shifts in salience. On the topic of sex discrimination, 
both NOW and news media made it a central topic of 
concern. As outlined In chapter four, NOW's agenda over 
time always included sex discrimination law and its 
enforcement as core concerns. In fact NOW was 
instrumental in making sex discrimination a political 
issue. NOW first publicized the term (following the 
civil rights term, Hrace discrimination") and throughout 
its history NOW leaders worked to have sex included as a 
category in all civil rights legislation. As the NOW 
Bill of Rights for the 21st Century indicates (Table 
7.9) sex discrimination is scheduled to remain a 
priority lssue for NOW into the 21st century. 
The Times representation of NOW's agenda also 
focused centrally on another set of issues that was 
critical to NOW -- equality, civil rights and the ERA. 
Since its earliest programmatic statement of goals in 
the 1968 Bill of Rights for Women, NOW have been working 
towards passage of the Equal Rights Amendment. As Table 
7.9 notes, the ERA was a key part of NOW's agenda in the 
early days and remained so through internal dissent and 
reorganization in the 1970s. In the 1979-1982 period, 
NOW were instrumental in having the ratification 
deadline extended, and they devoted a minimum of 50 266 
percent of their time and energies to ratification in 
1980 and 1981. 25 The Times' reflection of the ERA as a 
key issue, then, is generally in line with NOW's own 
priorities. 
However, there are also some important differences 
ln NOW's and news' representation of NOW's feminism 
overall. On the issue of electoral politics, for 
example, the Times aggregate agenda gives a significant 
amount of attention to NOW's activities in terms of 
electoral politics. Given that NOW was not even involved 
in electoral politics at all in the early years -- it 
was not until the mid 1970s that the organization formed 
PACs"and became active players in elections at the 
local, state and national levels -- this level of 
attention is disproportionate on news part. 26 That news 
about electoral politics makes up 10 percent of all 
coverage, then, suggests a priority on news' part that 
does not reflect NOW's over time. 
There were also important differences ln NOW and 
the Times relative amount of attention to issues of 
family/child care. In NOW policy statements over time, 
family and child care issues have been centrally 
important to the organization. And indeed three out of 
eight of NOW's originally publicized priorities ln the 
NOW Bill of Rights 1968 were issues of child care 
(maternity leave, child care facilities and child care 
tax deductions). But this kind of overall attention to 267 
family issues is nowhere present in the Times 
representation of NOW's agenda. 
On the lssue of sexism in lmages (in art, media, 
advertising and textbooks) NOW and news are also 
somewhat at odds. News coverage shows this category of 
issues to account for 9.5% of news stories, but sexism 
in images is not an issue that makes it into either 
NOW's Bills of Rights, the 1975 Manifesto or the Bill of 
Rights for the 21st Century (see table 7.9). 
This is not to say, however, that NOW members and 
leaders did not work on the issue of sexism. Many local 
chapters of NOW indeed spent significant amounts of time 
monitoring and coding media to show patterns of sexism 
in TV and advertising and especially in children's 
programming and toys.27 It may be that sexism in images 
and relationships did not make it into the Bills of 
Rights because it was more a chapter-level issue than a 
national organizational priority. 
The areas of greatest discrepancy between NOW's and 
the Times' agendas at least in terms of stated goals, 
occurred in the areas of sexuality/lesbianism, minority 
and race lssues and poverty/poor women. If we compare 
the Times attention to these issues to NOW's public 
agendas there is an important difference. 
Table 7.8 
Topics of NOW Stories in the New York Times, 1966-1980 
Headline Topics No. Percent 
of of 
Stories Stories 
NOW/ feminism generally 79 
Sex discrim In employment, 77 
education, credit, sports, 
etc. 
ERA/equality and general 47 
civil rights 
Electoral politics 40 
(women candidates and 
candidates on women's issues) 
Sexism In Images 
(media, art, texts, etc.) 
Abortion/Contraception 
Family Issues (child care, 
divorce, alimony) 
Rape/violence 
Sexism In relationships 
Religion 
Race/ethnicity 
Sexuality/Lesbian 
Other, various 28 
Totals 
36 
21 
18 
12 
11 
6 
4 
3 
23 
377 
21.0 
20.4 
12.5 
10.6 
9.5 
5.6 
4.8 
3.2 
2.9 
1.6 
1.1 
0.8 
6.1 
100.0 
As Table 7.9 lists, the NOW 1968 Bill of Rights for 
example has as one its concerns Poor women and job 
training, and the 1975 Caucus Manifesto also lists 
minority women and sexuality as key issues. As the NOW 
Bill of Rights for the 21st Century notes, these issues 
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have continued to be important to NOW, and have in fact 269 
climbed up their agenda from the bottom to the top over 
time, but they have remained unimportant in news stories 
about NOW. 
Table 7.9 
NOW Agendas 1968, 1975 and 1989 
1968 NOW Bill of 
Rights 
1. ERA 
2. Sex 
Discrimination 
In employment 
3. Maternity 
Benefits 
4. Child Care 
Tax Deduction 
5. Child Care 
Centers 
6. Equal 
Education 
7. Poor Women, 
Job Training 
8. Reproductive 
Control 
1975 Majority 
Caucus Manifesto 
1. Abortion/ 
Reprod.Choice 
2. Child Care 
3. Economic 
Equality 
4. Electoral 
Politics 
5. ERA 
6. Minority 
Women 
7. Sexuality/ 
Sexual Orient 
8. Worksite 
Organizing 
NOW Bill of 
Rights for the 
21st Century 
1. Sex 
discrimination 
2. Race 
discrimination 
3. Reproduction/ 
Abortion 
4. Sexual 
orientation 
5. Religious/ 
health/age 
discrimination 
6. Right to 
decent living, 
housing, 
education 
7. Clean 
Environment 
8. Freedom from 
violence and war 
This disparity may indicate a significant 
difference of priorities in NOW and the Times, but it is 
also important to note that NOW's stated purpose and 270 
media activities may have not always have coincided 
perfectly. As a mostly voluntary organization, work in 
NOW tended to get done by those with a particular 
interest in that area. With few minority or working 
class members, task forces on minority and poverty 
issues may have been understaffed and underrepresented 
in the organization's day to day work. And in fact 
criticism of the organization over time as being 
unrepresentative racially or in class terms, may belie 
the symbolic importance NOW gave to these issues. 
The question of sexuality is more difficult to 
untangle. The news silence on issues of sexuality in the 
cont'ext of NOW may not in fact be a failure for NOW but 
a Hsuccess H of its early media strategies. Though 
lesbianism and the social construction of sexuality were 
major issue in the movement generally, it was an lssue 
that NOW strategists tried to silence in the early years 
of this time period (1966-1973). Though the organization 
later embraced sexual identity as a core issue (see 1975 
and 1989 agendas) the early and significant efforts to 
minimize sexuality as a public issue may have succeeded 
in dissociating NOW from the issue publicly in this 
period. As Mannheim (1991) has suggested, keeping some 
issues invisible may also be seen as a successful 
outcome of strategic communication. In the early years 
NOW leaders tried to keep issues of sexuality quiet 
because they thought that if the organization became 271 
labeled as a lesbian group it would lack credibility as 
a spokesperson for women more generally. In this case, 
then, media silence may have in fact been a strategic 
"success." 
Overall, then, the Times reflected some of NOW's 
most pressing concerns In sex discrimination and the 
ERA, but there are significant differences in the 
relative priority that NOW and news attributed to other 
issues, especially issues of family/child care, 
sexuality and race. 
4.2 Agenda Rankings Correlations: 
Did NOW Transfer Salience? 
This general indication that NOW was more 
successful at transferring some issues than others lS 
reinforced when NOW and news agendas are ranked and 
compared at key points In time. Table 7. 10 illustrates 
the different rankings of issues in the two discourses 
(NOW and news) at key points in NOW's history, 1968 and 
1975, and then In the Times agenda In the next year or 
so. (There were too few stories in 1969 to make it 
possible to compare NOW 1968 and the Times rankings for 
1969, so 1970 is used instead here). The time lags in 
Table 7.10, of a year or two, are longer than usual, but 
(as I explain in more detail in chapter three), the NOW-
news relationship took place slowly over long periods of 272 
time, so these time lags are logical in that context. 
The measures of NOW's agenda were taken at key 
points in NOW's history from public documents stating 
the organization's priorities. NOW's 1968 issue agenda, 
for example, is constructed from The NOW Bill of Rights, 
1968, which was an important early founding document of 
NOW. The NOW 1975 issue agenda is taken from the NOW 
Manifesto in 1975, which was a public signal of 
significant change in NOW's direction as the new leaders 
took over the organization. The Times agendas were 
created in the conventional way by ranking the number of 
stories under each topic heading for each year, leaving 
out -the category of stories NOW/feminism generally which 
has no logical equivalent in NOW's discourse (see 
chapter three/Methods for more description of this 
process.) 
NOW seems to have been more successful at 
transferring its sense of importance with some lssues 
rather than others, and in some periods rather than 
others. For example (table 7.10) NOW's prioritizing of 
the ERA and employment discrimination highly in 1968, is 
reflected in the Times 1970 agenda, which also ranks 
these issues highly (employment is number one and ERA 
number two in both agendas) . 
r 
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Table 7.10 
Rank Table (Comparing NOW and News Issue Ranks)29 
Issues NOW NYT NOW NYT 
19 68 1970 1975 1976 
ERA/Equal Rights 1 1 5 4.5 
Employment (Sex 2 2 8 1.5 
Disc) 
Family/Child care 3 8.5 2 4.5 
Education (Sex Dis) 4 4 10 8.5 
Economics (gen. ) 5 8.5 3 8.5 
Reproductive Issues 6 8.5 1 1.5 
Rape/Violence 7 8.5 10 4.5 
Homosexuality 9 8.5 7 8.5 
Race 9 8.5 6 8.5 
Traditional/Elect 9 4 4 4.5 
Politics 
Sexism ( Images and 9 4 10 11 
Relationships) 
However, other issues, such as family and children, 
and education are ranked quite differently for the Times 
and NOW. NOW's 1968 agenda, for example ranks 
family/children type lssues as its number three 
priority, whereas family/child care stories in the Times 
rank around eighth in an 11 item agenda. Similarly NOW's 
1975 agenda ranks family/child care lssues as a number 2 
priority, while for the Times it is ranked at 4.5. The 
many ties in this rank order correlation complicate this 
kind of comparison of course, but it is clear that for 
NOW and news family/child care lssues had quite 
different importance both In 1968 and in 1975. 
A similar disparity may be seen in the NOW 1968 and 
Times 1970 lack of agreement over the issue category of 
Reproductive issues. NOW seems to have been unsuccessful 
ln the 1968-1970 periods in convincing the Times of the 274 
importance of abortion and contraception as important 
news issues (it is ranked as 6 in NOW agenda and 8.5 in 
the Times). By the mid 1970s, though there seems to be 
more agreement between the NOW and news rankings on 
reproductive issues. As Table 7.10 indicates they are 
now much more closely ranked at 1 and 1.5. On the issue 
of reproduction, NOW seems to have been more successful 
in transferring salience later in its career. 
This sense of partial "success" for NOW in setting 
the Times' NOW agenda is reinforced by the rank 
correlation between NOW and the Times agendas. Table 
7.11 indicates the correlations (Spearman's Rho) between 
thes~ rankings. As the table indicates, the correlation 
coefficient for NOW's 1968 agenda with the Times 1970 
agenda is .478 . And NOW's 1975 agenda is correlated 
with the Times 1976 agenda (for NOW stories) is .415, 
suggesting that there was agreement in about half of the 
rankings. 
Table 7.11 
Rank Correlations (Spearman's Rho) NOW and New York 
Times Agendas 1968 (1970) and 1975 (1976) 
NYT NYT 
1970 1975 
NOW .478 
1968 
NOW .415 
1975 
This discrepancy in ranking indicates either a 275 
failure in NOW's news management that is issue-specific, 
or it indicates that the Times reacted to and 
"processed" different kinds of issues differently. 
NOW did shift its media strategies over time (as 
chapter six illustrates) and the organization did 
strategically push or minimize some issues at different 
times (e.g. sexual identity was minimized in the early 
1970s) But there is no evidence in NOW's institutional 
records that it failed to communicate about family/child 
care lssues. In fact the institutional analysis suggests 
that this was one of NOW's key areas of concern from the 
beginning. 
"Given the evidence indicated above in terms of 
placement -- i.e. that news processed NOW in terms of a 
public-private divide in its issues -- it lS more likely 
that this partial "success" in terms of rank orders, is 
also an indication of this public-private processing of 
NOW's discourse by news. The issues that NOW was able to 
transfer most effectively (i.e. to have ranked close to 
NOW's own ranking) were those issues that fit more 
easily into the traditionally "public" category (such as 
employment discrimination), and the issues that did not 
transfer their salience (such as family/child care) are 
drawn from the traditionally "private" category of that 
dichotomy. 
r 
Chapter Summary and Conclusions 
NOW was "successful," then, in some important ways 
In producing news access, and through news, a voice in 
the public debate over women's issues. But there were 
also important limitations to this access, which stemmed 
from gendered staffing patterns in news organizations, 
and underlying discursive categories in which news 
mirrors and invokes the public/private divide of liberal 
politics. In this sense new can be seen to "police" the 
public sphere and to be engaged in struggle over what 
will be seen as "public" alongside other social 
institutions. 
To some extent NOW was successful In this struggle. 
Over-time NOW was able to produce access to news. 
Throughout its existence it has some level of news 
presence. And NOW was mostly covered mostly In the news 
sections, which the organization considered to be more 
credible than the women's page. Much of this access was 
the result of the organization's own publicity efforts, 
rather than any "coverage" by enterprising journalists, 
and it cost them significantly In resources, skills and 
time. But it still indicates a level of accessibility 
that is important to note, that with resources, groups 
can produce some access. 
NOW's strategic interaction with mostly women 
reporters was also a generally successful strategy in 
that most of the news about NOW was in fact authored by 
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women. However, this focus on women reporters was not 277 
unproblematic. As indicated in this chapter, women 
reporters, though they wrote most of the stories about 
NOW were less likely proportionally to have those 
stories placed on the front page. This pattern --
probably the result of gendered staffing patterns In the 
newspaper itself -- meant that NOW's access was limited 
in the same way that women reporters' access was. 
Besides basic access, NOW was also able to gain 
some llvoice ll in news stories. Most of the time the 
organization was directly quoted rather than talked 
about, for example. This llvoice ll was most likely to be 
granted in feature type pieces which NOW generated 
itself and least likely in institutional (legal) 
contexts .. 
NOW also maintained some control over its issue 
agenda. On at least a few key issues -- such as the ERA 
and sex discrimination -- NOW and the Times had some 
agreement over importance. However there were also 
conspicuous discrepancies in NOW and the Times sense of 
priorities The Times was relatively silent on issues 
such as family and child care, race, and economics 
(especially problems of poor women). It is possible that 
these issues did not receive the day-to-day attention of 
NOW as stated in its public statements -- though the 
institutional records do not indicate any strategic 
media interaction differences across these particular 
lssues (see chapter SlX for a description of NOW's media 278 
strategies). It is most likely the case that this 
pattern -- like the patterning in placement and identity 
-- indicates that news sees some feminist issues as more 
important than others. 
NOW managed to gain news access, then, but its 
placement and agenda control patterns suggest that not 
all of the issues in NOW's agenda were taken equally 
seriously by news editors. These patterns, I argue, 
reflect news' role in maintaining the liberal 
distinction between "public" and "private" issues which, 
unless challenged, works for the most part against 
feminism, which sets out to blur this distinction. 
This "processing" by news may not necessarily have 
been a matter of deliberate practice by reporters or 
news organizations, but rather the result of embedded 
epistemological assumptions in news about what lS 
important, which are then encoded in editorial 
judgments. One of these assumptions, which news 
discourse shares with liberalism more generally, is a 
set of expectations about what kinds of things will be 
seen as "public" issues (and therefore important) and 
which will be seen as "private" (and therefore less 
important). As feminist theorists have illustrated 
extensively in the last few years, these categories are 
also distinctively "gendered" -- it is women's lives and 
experiences that are usually consigned to the "private" 
and less legitimate areas of politics (cf. Butler and 279 
Scott, 1992; Fraser, 1989; 1992; McLaughlin, 1993). News 
reproduces this male/public and female/private dichotomy 
by placing stories seen to be about "private" issues in 
the women's section of the paper and by ranking them 
overall as less important. It is instructive in this 
context to note that the Times (nor other papers) does 
not have a "men's" section. Rather men are assumed to be 
the readers of the news sections. 
Given that one of the central aims of feminist 
politics (and indeed of the NSMs more generally) has 
been to extend the realm of issues that will be 
considered "public," this pattern -- in which news media 
may"be seen to be "policing" the public-private border 
has important consequences for new social movement, 
and especially feminist groups, communication 
strategies. NOW's partial "success" as indicated in this 
chapter at the levels of access, voice and agenda 
control, suggests that feminist communications 
strategists may need to develop new ways of negotiating 
news beyond the level of reflexive appropriation of news 
practices and conventions. Strategists may need to 
engage with news at a deeper discursive level where news 
discourse categories (such as that of public-private) 
pose a greater threat to feminist mass communication 
efforts. 
NOW "succeeded" then to some extent ln its efforts 280 
to access news and use it to build a women's issue 
agenda, but that access may have come with some serious 
and unintended consequences for NOW at the discursive 
level. NOW sought access to news to become a public 
voice for feminism, but news discourse in its processing 
of NOW issues, transformed NOW's agenda in significant 
way. NOW may have learned to "speak" news, but to some 
extent news also spoke NOW. 
NOTES 
1 In this study I have been concerned mostly with NOW's 
media strategies, so I am using media content as the 
"outcome" against which to assess these strategies. 
Clearly this is only one way to assess new social 
movement communications. Assessing movement influences 
on legislative agendas, on public opinion polls, or on 
journalists attitudes would all also be reasonable ways 
of assessing movement communicative "success." All I 
argue here is that influencing media content is one 
important step in this larger process of public agenda-
building. See chapter two for more discussion of media-
movement interactions as part of a larger process of 
agenda building. 
2 See Jurgen Habermas (1984) A Theory of Communicative 
Action. Volume 1. Boston: Beacon Press for a discussion 
of the differences between strategic and communicative 
styles. In this study I include only measures of 
strategic communication. For example, I have not 
included the communicative category of "understanding" 
as a category of success, since such a relationship 
would require that the participants sought 
understanding. Although NOW feminists did want 
journalists to understand their positions, and worked 
towards educating them, it is for instrumental purposes, 
i.e. so that journalists will spread the word. 
Understanding was not really a clear goal for the 
journalists either, who in fact shied away from being 
seen to sympathize with or understand the movement as a 
professional liability (see Tuchman, 1978, and chapter 
six of this study). Indeed journalistic ideologies of 
detachment and objectivity seem to be predisposed to 
strategic use of other discourses rather than efforts to 
understand them. 
3 Voice is measured by NOW being quoted or having 
material attributed to them. See methods for more 
explanation of measurements and operationalizations. 
4 Other source studies have variously defined 
successful news access (when they have defined it at 
all) as: (a) simply being mentioned (cf. Sigal, 1973; 
Brown et al, 1987; Barker-Plummer, 1989), (b) having 
uvoice u -- defined as routine access and being quoted 
(cf. Ericson et al, 1989), (c) being a uprimary def iner u 
of issues and events (Hall et al. 1978), and (d) as 
being able to usubsidize u news stories through having 
one's (interested) information used (Gandy, 1982). 
Gitlin (1980) does not define what he would consider 
Usuccess.U See chapter three, methods, for more 
discussion about these measures. 
5 More qualitative aspects of NOW's representation, such 
as legitimacy, are assessed in chapter eight within the 
assessment of NOW's identity control. 
6 These dimensions of success -- access, voice, 
placement and control -- are commonly at work in most 
communicative interactions. In any conversation or 
debate for example, we seek first of all access or 
standing as a member, then we seek a chance to 
contribute in our own voice , and we are usually also 
con'cerned with the context or placement) of our 
contribution in terms of its legitimacy (is our topic 
first or second, for example). Finally we would usually 
prefer that the debate or conversation be structured in 
ways that legitimate our positions and interests -- i.e. 
that we can control the context, pace and direction of 
the conversation. 
7 In fact data for the period 1980-1995 indicates that 
this is so, but nevertheless for the period under 
observation the trend levels off. 
8 This is clear in NOW media strategy notes, where they 
often note that certain women reporters are more aware 
than others -- that their uconsciousnessu is raised. NOW 
collection, Schlesinger Library. 
9 Sigal (1973) is the source of this distinction between 
journalist enterprise and other kinds of stories, but it 
is vulnerable to criticism too because interview or 
features may also be instigated by information subsidies 
of some sort -- e.g., press kits that indicate leaders 
to interview, or suggestions by media strategists that 
prompt ufeatures u and so on) . 
10 Sometimes more than one origin for the story could be 
detected. For example, if a protest march was being 
reported and a news conference had also been convened by 
NOW to discuss the event. In these cases, policy was to 
code the umain u event that was taking place -- i.e. in 
the case of a news conference accompanying an event, the 
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event was coded. Consequently the category "overt 
information subsidies" which is made up of news 
conferences, announcements , and so on, is restricted to 
those news conferences and announcements that were 
themselves the main event. See chapter three for a 
discussion of coding and coder agreements for each 
question. 
11Includes marches, strikes, demonstrations, boycotts, 
anniversary or special occasion public events. When 
these were also accompanied by news conferences, the 
public event was coded as the source of the story. News 
conferences that were themselves the main event were 
coded as "overt information subsidies." 
12 This category includes only overt or manifest 
subsidies such a news conferences, special reports or 
studies published by NOW, that were not accompanied by 
another event such as a protest, or legal filing. 
13 This category includes any story in which it was not 
clear what the event, strategy or hook was, or that was 
clearly an interview or special feature, was coded as 
journalist enterprise. It is likely that some of the 
stories in the "journalist enterprise" category were 
also instigated by subsidies sent out by NOW, but unless 
a study or news conference was explicitly mentioned, the 
benefit of the doubt was 
given to journalist-enterprise. Even coding only overt 
subsidies, though, shows them to be a significant source 
of stories. 
14 If we separate out legal and legislative strategies 
from "publicity" strategies as some others have tried to 
do, then the figure becomes closer to 50 percent of news 
being generated by NOW, still a substantial amount (see 
table 7.1). See for example, Sean Cassidy (1992) The 
Environment and the Media: Two Strategies for 
Challenging Hegemony. In Janet Wasko and Vincent Mosco 
(Eds.) Democratic Communications in the Information Age, 
pp. 159-1974. Norwood, New Jersey: Ablex. Cassidy 
distinguishes between legal and publicity strategies in 
the environmental movement, and attempts to compare them 
for results (with Greenpeace said to be following a 
publicity/direct action strategy and Friends of the 
Earth a legal strategy). This distinction, though is 
problematic with NOW, who followed both legal and 
pUblicity strategies, and to whom legal action was 
itself sometimes a publicity strategy. I suspect that a 
closer analysis of any organization's strategies, from 
the perspective of the group itself, would produce this 
overlap between what are analytical not empirical 
categories of strategies. 
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15 Records from the PIO for example, note that NOW media 
strategists spent considerable effort courting 
journalists and editors and making them aware of NOW's 
expertise as a source in many policy issue areas, trying 
as Dian Terry, NOW PI officer 1973-74, put it, to get 
them to put NOW in their Rolodexes. NOW collection, 
Schlesinger Library. 
16 Pearson correlation between voice/NOW quoted and size 
of story in graphs is .9613, p<.OOl. 
17 N=357 because "other" categories have been dropped. 
18 NOW (1974, July), Quarterly Status Report, NOW Public 
Information Office. NOW Collection, Schlesinger Library. 
Tuchman (1978, p. 146) states that the women's page was 
a "movement resource" because journalists thought so. 
But it is not at all clear that feminist activists 
agreed with this assessment. Tuchman and I treat some of 
the same issues in the coverage of feminism, but from 
different standpoints. She focuses generally on how 
journalists make news, and briefly on how they made new 
about feminism. I am concerned with how feminist 
strategists made news about the movement. This leads to 
some different perspectives. 
19 Of course some of this placement is simply the 
logical outcome of there being more news pages than 
women's pages -- in any edition of the paper of course 
there is one women's page and one front page but 
multiple news pages. However, given that there was only 
one women's page, it is highly over-represented if NOW 
stories were being randomly distributed. A one-to-one 
comparison between the front page and the women's page, 
for example, was as follows: front page, 22 stories 
(5.8%), and women's page 59 stories (15.6%), or almost 
three times as many. 
20 N=223 because 140 stories do not have bylines. A 
further 14 cases were dropped from the analysis from an 
"other" category -- i.e. various other sections of the 
paper (business, TV, etc.) which were too small to be 
significant. 
21 N=340 because "other" categories have been dropped. 
22 This relationship between strategy contexts and 
placement is well in line with more general news studies 
that suggests that much news is made up of reporters 
routine coverage of state institutions (cf. Sigal, 1973; 
Gans, 1980; Fishman, 1980, etc.) 
23 These categorizations are of course arguable. The 
assignment of rape to the public category, for example, 
and abortion to private, can be debated. In either case 
the number of stories in these categories mean that it 
makes little difference to the overall patterns whether 
they are included or not. 
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24 N=254 because non-issue categories (such as stories 
about NOW and feminism generally) have been omitted as 
have NotherN news sections. 
25 At the 1981 conference Eleanor Smeal, president of 
NOW, publicly committed at least half the organization's 
resources and staff time to the ERA Countdown Campaign. 
26 Prior to the mid 1970s, in fact, NOW's tax status had 
restricted their activities in the traditional political 
arena. Whether NOW should be involved in traditional 
politics was one of the key issues in the 1975 
organizational battle for control. The sitting NOW 
leadership in 1975 thought that NOW's involvement in 
electoral politics would eat up too much of the 
organization's time and energies. 
27 Task Force on Image of Women papers. NOW Collection, 
Schlesinger Library. 
28 This category includes a number of topics with very 
few stories such as drugs, prostitution, and police 
surveillance. 
29 Note that NotherN categories and NOW/feminism 
categories have been dropped from the news agendas. 
There is no equivalent in NOW agendas for the 20 percent 
of news stories about NOW events/strategies. Note also 
that in order to compare NOW and news agendas NOW's 1968 
age'nda has been compressed -- the three agenda items 
about maternity leave and child care have been 
compressed into one child care item. (See chapter 
three/Methods for a discussion of the problems and 
limits of these methods) . 
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Chapter 8 
Legitimation Patterns: 
The Times' Processing of NOW's Identity, 1966-1980 
Strategically accessing news media, and uS1ng that 
access to introduce new 1ssues and frames into public 
debate, is at the heart of the "symbolic challenge" of 
NOW and other NSM groups. The relative success of this 
agenda-building, however, is likely to be influenced by 
a movement organization's identity as well as its issues 
or agenda. In particular a movement organization's 
perceived legitimacy as a political actor will influence 
whe'ther its ideas will be communicated through news. As 
studies of journalists have noted, the perceived 
legitimacy of sources, as well as their reliability, is 
a strong determinant of how seriously (and routinely) 
journalists approach them or use their information (cf. 
Gans, 1980; Fishman, 1980). 
Legitimacy is not only an attribute that 1S 
important in determining access to news media for source 
organizations. It is also a quality that can be produced 
and reproduced 1n interaction with news media. Serious 
and routine access to news media itself may produce (and 
reproduce) public legitimacy for source organizations. 
It is this quality of routine news access that Ericson 
et al. (1989) have called "voice" and which they see as 
285 
a fundamental form of Hcultural capital H ln mass 
mediated societies. Movement organizations l then l may 
use news to become legitimate public speakers. 
In fact creating and maintaining such a legitimate 
identity in and through news was a key goal in NOW/s 
media strategies. NOW leaders wanted to create and 
maintain a public image for the organization as the 
serious Hvoice H for American women and they tried to do 
so by controlling who could speak to journalists l what 
they could talk about I and how the organization would be 
rhetorically Hplaced H in regard to (and differentiated 
from) other movement groups.1 
In this chapter I track the outcome of NOW/s 
legitimation strategies through a qualitative analysis 
of its representation over time in the New York Times I 
1966-1980. I argue that l overall l NOW underwent a 
general legitimation process over the time period 
covered in this study (1966-1980) I and so was to a 
certain extent HsuccessfulH in its attempts to become a 
legitimate public voice for women/s issues. From a 
generally marginalizing representation in the early 
days I NOW I moved to a generally serious representation 
by 1980. This overall legitimation process was limited l 
however I and complicated l by another pattern of 
processing in which NOW/s identity was processed 
through the discursive categories of news discourse. As 
with its agenda building efforts l NOW/s organizational 
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legitimacy in news was related to the issue and movement 287 
context in which it was assessed. When NOW focused on 
more institutionalized or Htraditional H political issues 
its legitimacy carne under less scrutiny than when the 
organization took up a Hnew" women's issue. When NOW is 
compared to more radical groups it lS also treated as a 
more legitimate organization, than it is when judged 
alone. This process is further complicated by the fact 
that the group of ·institutionalizedH issues itself 
changes over time due to NOW and others communication 
work. 2 
The chapter is organized around four overlapping 
·stages· in NOW's organizational re-presentation by 
news: First, an early period (1966-1970) of 
marginalization in which NOW was represented as odd, 
peculiar and generally illegitimate. Second, a period of 
complex and contradictory representation overall (1970-
1974), in which NOW was presented sometimes as a 
legitimate speaker, and other times as a bizarre group 
making strange claims. The complexity in re-presentation 
during this period was the result of both issue 
contexts (i.e. depending on what it is NOW is talking 
about) and different movement context (i.e. depending on 
who NOW is being compared to). Third, is a 2 year period 
(1974-1976) in which NOW itself was undergoing an 
internal identity crisis. During this period news 
coverage was complex, contradictory and critical, 
drawing some of that critique from the challenges being 288 
mounted inside NOW for national leadership. Fourth, 
(1976-1980), is a period in which NOW began to be 
accepted as serious (if sometimes incompetent) political 
player that was likely to be around for a long time. 
This period is characterized by stories that historicize 
NOW, talking about its long history as a spokesperson 
for women and noting that it was now an -insider- group 
in women's politics. However, even with this general 
legitimation there were important limitations invoked in 
terms of what were NOW's -real" issues and which were 
unreasonable demands in the eyes of journalists. 
Overall, I suggest that, like agenda building, 
legitimation work by movement organizations takes place 
in a larger cultural context than just that of 
strategists and journalists. NOW's legitimation (or not) 
at particular times was influenced by the organization's 
own strategies, but it was also the outcome of a larger 
social debate over what would be considered -politics-
in which NOW and the Times were only two of many 
players. 
ASSESSING LEGITIMACY AND IDENTITY CONTROL 
Legitimacy is a complex concept, Which Includes 
elements of credibility (is the group to be believed) ; 
expertise (is the group experienced or educated enough 
on a particular topic?); representativeness (who does it 
stand for?), viability (will it be around for long?), 289 
authority (does it have any power?), and so on (cf. 
Shoemaker, 1982; Ericson et al, 1989). 
These various dimensions of legitimacy are 
themselves referenced and presented by news media in a 
variety of overt and implicit ways. Ryan (1991, p.207), 
identifies a number of ways in which the media 
legitimizes or delegitimizes groups through its 
descriptions of them. For example, she notes that groups 
can be de-legitimized by being named in ways that they 
did not choose for themselves (such as HleftistH rather 
than democratic); by having their identity set off by 
quotes or qualifiers (such as Halleged H or Hcalling 
themselves H); by having their concerns trivialized (i.e. 
focusing on dress or mannerisms rather than content); or 
by being Hbalanced H by sources that are of quite 
different stature. 
Gitlin (1980. p. 27) offers a similar serles of 
news Hmechanisms H of delegitimation when he notes that 
coverage of SDS featured trivialization (making light 
of movement language, style, age and goals) , 
polarization (emphasizing counter demonstrations and 
balancing the group with the ultra-right as equivalent 
Hextremists H), emphasis on internal dissent, 
marginalization (showing demonstrators to be deviant or 
unrepresentative), and so on. 
In this chapter I assess NOW's legitimacy over time 290 
by looking at the ways in which NOW the organization was 
described terms of its goals, its constituents, and its 
leaders at different stages in its history with news, 
and in the contexts of its own shifting media 
strategies. I draw on Ryan (1991) and Gitlin's (1980) 
methodological insights in tracking the linguistic cues 
and frames for NOW that would indicate legitimacy (or 
not) in a particular story (e.g. polarization or being 
described in quotation marks), but I am also concerned 
with more macro patterns of shifts in news 
representations of NOW over time and in different 
contexts. 
'Neither Gitlin (1980) nor Ryan (1991) followed 
media-movement relationships over long periods, and so 
consequently processes of struggle over legitimation 
that may have taken place had the groups continued to 
interact with media, or the researchers continued to 
observe, are missed. Gitlin (1980), for example, studied 
SDS's representation closely only over one year (1965-
1966) . He argues that studying early framing is the 
best way to see the emergence of media frames before 
they "harden" into place as cornmon sense. But what if 
they do not harden at all but change in some other way? 
NOW's representation over time suggests that in fact 
early marginalization can move into later, if limited, 
legitimation. Because NOW is one of the few movement 
groups to continue to exist over time, we have a unique 291 
ability to see in its experiences with news media 
whether a marginalizing representation can in fact be 
turned around and recreated. I argue here that NOW's 
persistence and longevity made it possible for the group 
to create and maintain over time a limited amount of 
legitimacy as a public voice for feminism. 
I. EARLY PATTERNS OF MARGINALIZATION, 1966-1970 
In the first few years of its existence NOW was 
presented by the Times as a somewhat dubious 
organization. Between 1966-1970, despite quite 
sophisticated attempts by its leaders and media 
strategists to have NOW taken seriously as a civil 
rights organization parallel to the NAACP, NOW was 
mostly presented in this period as a marginal and 
strange group whose statements could not be taken at 
face value. 
This deviant framing was achieved by journalists, 
through the liberal use of linguistic udistancing u cues 
such as qualifiers for NOW claims (e.g. uwho call 
themselves,u uwhich it termed U ), quotation marks around 
such claims (e.g. seeking uequality for all women"), 
and talking about the organization rather than allowing 
it to speak for itself. Much of this skepticism seems to 
have been aimed at NOW's self-representation as a civil 
rights organization. Reporters in the early years were 
not convinced that women needed a civil rights 
organization, and they resisted the overarching 
framework of Hsex discrimination H as a description for 
women's experiences. 
NOW was also routinely trivialized in this period 
by reporters focusing on NOW leaders' clothes, 
mannerlsms and relative HfemininityH rather than the 
content of their statements. Such issues were often 
brought into the story through the use of Heverybody 
knows H kinds of statements in which journalists appeared 
simply to be referencing some of the stereotypes Hout 
there H but in fact were recirculating them. Linguistic 
cues to sexist assumptions about women were also 
abundant in this period as NOW are seen to be 
Hcomplaining H about inequality rather than Hdemanding H 
change, for example. News stories in this period also 
questioned both the competence of NOW's leaders and the 
breadth and representativeness of its membership. 
1.1 "So-called," "Self-styled" and other Dubious 
Descriptors 
Early NOW coverage was characterized by these 
distancing mechanisms. For example, a 1967 story in 
which the Times reports on a NOW picket outside its own 
building (against gender- segregated want-ads) indicates 
how the liberal use of qualifiers (Hwhat it considers,H 
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"such things as" ) can leave a reader skeptical about a 293 
group's motives: 
Eight women and three men picketed the New York 
Times midtown classified advertisement office 
yesterday charging that the newspaper discriminated 
against women by labeling help wanted ads male and 
female. The pickets were members of an organization 
called National Organization for Women which 
was formed last November to fight what it considers 
discrimination against women in jobs and 
legislation ... There are about 300 members, mostly 
women, in the New York state chapter, Mrs. Jean 
Faust, the chapter president said. The group has 
also campaigned for such things as Constitutional 
amendments that would outlaw sex discrimination and 
for the right of women to terminate unwanted 
pregnancies (New York Times, December 14, 1967, 
p. 56). 
In this anonymous, nine-paragraph story NOW is 
given voice only once, and that is to claim a membership 
of 300. This claim is not questioned directly, but it 
stands in direct contrast to the reporter's note that 
"eight women and three men" were actually there. The 
story also resolutely avoids NOW's own frames for 
abortion rights at this time (such as "reproductive 
freedom" or llreproductive control") and chooses an 
inflammatory one, "the right to end unwanted 
pregnancies." Four of the story's nine graphs are 
dedicated to giving the Times management voice through 
a long quote defending its policy. 
A second example of this kind of hostile framing, 
ln which NOW's claims are presented as somewhat dubious, 
occurred in 1968 when a writer on the women's page 
framed NOW as llself-styled militants": 
The National Organization for Women (NOW), which 
consists of 2,000 self-styled militants fighting 
for lltrue equality for all women" had every 
intention of endorsing one or more male would-be 
candidates yesterday. But it couldn't because only 
two of the SlX men canvassed bothered to respond to 
its questionnaires (New York Times, May 7, 1968, 
p. 40.) 
In this early story, the number of members 
attributed to the group by NOW itself is allowed to 
stand but NOW's goals of lltrue equality for all women" 
is given the added journalistic insurance of quotation 
marks. The story makes it clear that not only is the 
organization considered a non-player by the presidential 
candidates, but the writer herself also find them 
dubious enough to be llself-styled." In fact every 
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llself-styled ll in that they describe themselves in 
strategic ways. But with organizations that journalists 
take seriously, the presented identity is taken at face 
value. 
The general dubiousness with which the Times 
approached NOW's goals sometimes opened up into direct 
criticism of NOW leaders. In the same 1968 story, for 
example, NOW leader Betty Friedan is made to look quite 
ignorant: 
Mrs. Friedan said NOW was protesting llextreme 
employment discrimination against women workers.ll 
She cited layoffs of women not based on seniority. 
She accused the union, the name of which she did 
not know, of llplaying footsie with management.ll(New 
York Times, May 7, 1968, p. 40). 
The point here is again one of journalistic 
selectivity. It is quite likely that Friedan did not 
recall a particular union, and may have been entirely 
ignorant on the matter. But it is highly irregular for 
writers in political stories to make direct references 
like this to their source's ignorance. Indeed, it lS an 
indication of how little the writer valued NOW or 
Friedan as repeat sources that she would select this 
piece of information for the story. 
1.2 Civil Rights vs. Being "Put Upon": 
Resistance to the "Sex Discrimination" Frame 
At this point In its early history NOW leaders were 
trying to present NOW as a civil rights organization. 
Friedan had said she wanted NOW to be seen as the "NAACP 
for women" and the language of rights, discrimination 
and seXlsm were all strategically produced by NOW 
leaders to parallel NOW and the women's movement with 
the NAACP and the Civil Rights Movement. However the 
frame of "sex discrimination" did not automatically go 
over well with journalists. Journalists were more likely 
to report seriously on NOW's more specific goals -- i.e. 
paid- maternity leave and child care expenses -- but to 
balk at simply reporting the concept of sex 
discrimination outright. In most cases in the early days 
the idea of sex discrimination would be reported in 
quotation marks ("sex discrimination") or it would be 
attributed to NOW as a dubious concept (e.g. "what it 
terms sex discrimination"). 
This general skepticism about the overall 
serlousness of the movements, and indeed the need for a 
movement at all, came up frequently. News stories of the 
late 1960s emphasized the relative wealth and affluence 
of America and seemed to be puzzled that these women 
were feeling so "put upon." This article by Martha 
Weinman Lear In the Times magazine, for example, asks 
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over and over whether women really need such a 
Jlmovement:" 
... when pink refrigerators abound, when women (51 
percent of the population) hold unparalleled 
consumer power, when women control most of the 
corporate stocks, when women have ready access to 
higher education and to the professions, when 
millions of women are gainfully employed, when all 
the nation is telling American women, all the time 
that they are the most privileged female population 
on earth, the insistence on a civil rights movement 
does seem a trifle stubborn. (New York Times 
Magazine, March 10, 1968, p. 25.) 
In this long and complex article, NOW and other 
feminists are allowed to express their positions, but 
still, the whole article is permeated by a general 
cynicism about the real need for a feminist 
organization. 3 As a large-type header (perhaps added by 
a less sympathetic editor) notes "women still feel put 
upon." 
In any language of politics being "put upon" is 
hardly the same as having one's civil rights 
systematically denied. Yet throughout this period NOW is 
described as "complaining," about inequality, being on a 
"crusade" rather than mobilizing, being "stubborn" 
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rather than principled, and being Hplaintive" In its 298 
demands for change. These terms not only trivialize the 
groups' political identity In a general way, but they 
also reference a system of gendered linguistic divisions 
in which men Hdemand" and women Hcomplain," men are 
principled and women (and children) are Hstubborn." 
These descriptors are part of a general ridiculing of 
NOW and other feminists in this period in which the fact 
that they are women, making demands about women's lives 
is an essential aspect of their marginalization. 4 
Some of this early resistance by reporters to the 
term Hsex discrimination" may simply have been the 
result of corning into contact with unfamiliar 
terminology. HS ex discrimination" and sexism, were both 
very new terms in the late 1960s. But more likely the 
Times writers like the EEO itself, resisted the overall 
systematic and radical consequences that such a frame 
brought with it. 
When they did include NOW's frame of 
Hdiscrimination" in this period, it was almost always 
in quotes, as if it was not quite a believable 
description of women's experlence. In a description of 
feminist positions for example, a Times story frames the 
feminists' terms as highly dubious: 
Those here for example, are picketing such 
establishments as the Federal Equal Employment 
Opportunities Commission ("unfair"), The New York 299 
Times ("discriminatory" want ad pages) and the 
Association of the Bar of New York (site of a 
hearing of the Governor's Committee on abortion 
Law) ."(New York Times July 24, 1968, p. 19) 
In later years (after 1970), and in the contexts of 
the larger women's movement, NOW's frame of "sex 
discrimination" came to be used without quotations and 
in fact the issues of sex discrimination in employment 
and education came to be seen as the "real" issues of 
feminism as opposed to the sexual or personal politics 
of the "younger" movement. 
In general, though, in the first few years, even 
relatively neutral descriptions of NOW would use 
quotation marks around NOW's identity as if to make 
quite clear that this was not a judgment on the writer's 
part. 
1.3 Femininity and Legitimacy: Trivia1ization 
Mechanisms 
This general framing as somewhat dubious was 
accompanied by a tendency to focus on the dress or 
appearance of NOW leaders in particular on their 
relative degree of "femininity." This focus on 
femininity and fashion was sometimes used to maintain 
legitimacy -- i.e. the fact that some NOW leaders were 
also attractive was used as a way of enhancing the 300 
group's legitimacy by journalists. More often appearance 
made its way into stories in ways that diminished 
legitimacy -- as for example when journalists 
recirculated stereotypes such as "everybody knows the 
stereotype that feminists are ugly." In either case the 
focus on appearance -- whether to enhance or debunk NOW 
speakers -- was a trivializing mechanism. 
In fact the very first story about NOW In the New 
York Times appeared on the Women's Page, days after the 
press conference on which it was reporting, and was 
placed between a recipe for Thanksgiving turkey and a 
story about Pierre Henri, hairdresser, returning to Saks 
Fifth Avenue. This first coverage of NOW, reporting on 
its founding, was a highly contradictory effort to both 
take NOW seriously and to fulfill the functions of a 
fashion and gossip story. 
The story associates NOW and the women's movement 
with previous revolutionary movements (citing Marx's 
Communist Manifesto), outlines the organization's recent 
political activities of sending letters to the President 
and the EEOC, and yet also finds time to make note of 
Betty Friedan's "neat black suit" and her "ruby and 
sapphire parlor": 
Although no one in the dim ruby and sapphire 
Victorian parlor actually got up and cried "Women 
of the World, unite! You have nothing to lose but 301 
your chains," that was the prevailing sentiment 
yesterday morning at the crowded press conference 
held by the newly formed National Organization for 
Women ... The Board of Directors urged President 
Johnson Hto give top priority among legislative 
proposals for the next Congress to legislation that 
would give effective enforcement powers to the 
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ... Speaking 
in a gravely alto from the depths of the large fur 
collar that trimmed her neat black suit, the 
ebullient author [Friedan] suggested that women 
today were Hin relatively little position to 
-influence or control major decisions. But she 
added, leaning forward in the lilac velvet 
Victorian chair and punching the air as if it was 
something palpable, Hwhat women do have 1S the 
vote." (New York Times, November 22, 1966, p. 44.) 
Some of this focus on clothes and manners was the 
result of news genre conflicts. In the early days most 
of NOW's stories were placed on the lifestyle/women's 
page where fashion, food, manners, and so on were the 
usual topics and so coverage of NOW was subject to the 
same kind of writing and processing as these articles. 
But NOW also had a hand in this outcome. This first 
story about NOW was the result of a carefully 
orchestrated press conference in which NOW strategists 302 
showcased many of their most IIrespectableli leaders (such 
as vicars, nuns, professors and government officials) 
But they decided to hold the conference in Friedan's 
parlor because they believed that holding the conference 
in the home of a celebrity would be sufficiently 
different to get journalists attention. It did indeed, 
but it got the attention of the women's page editors and 
was IIprocessed li as a celebrity woman story and placed on 
the women's page. 
Another story from 1968, which also ran on the 
women's page, illustrates this confusion of politics and 
fashion also. It spends 18 paragraphs reporting on a 
talk.by Florynce Kennedy on movement picketing 
strategies, but winds up by describing her clothes: 
Miss Kennedy a civil rights lawyer and a counsel 
for H. Rap Brown the militant black power advocate 
socked it to a meeting held Thursday night to 
discuss strategy for picketing the Colgate-
Palmolive Company '" Miss Kennedy who was dressed 
in a sleeveless gray wool overblouse and a white 
pleated skirt also wore a button that said 
IIJeanette Rankin brigade. II (New York Times, August 
24, 1968, p. 33) 
NOW and other movement groups developed their own 303 
ways of dealing with this focus on appearance. The more 
radical groups and individuals confronted the issue 
directly. They articulated the cultural relationship 
between femininity and legitimacy as part of a larger 
sexist system and they tried to subvert expectations 
about female sexuality by appearing unkempt and by 
dressing in non-traditional ways (Echols, 1989). NOW, on 
the other hand, followed its usual strategy of trying to 
both use and transform cultural constraints. They 
selected someone from within their midst who was 
"photogenic" as a spokesperson, and then had that person 
talk about the politics of femininity. Ti-Grace 
Atkinson, for example, who was briefly the leader of New 
York NOW, was reportedly pushed forward by Betty Friedan 
because of her "refined" looks and her "untypical" 
feminist appearance was thought to have disarmed 
reporters. 
In other stories, the physical appearance and 
sexuality of feminists was ushered in by a back door as 
writers used general statements of the "everybody knows" 
type to bring NOW leaders' lifestyles into focus. One 
writer noted in a 1968 story, for example, that 
stereotypes of feminists as "castrating crows in 
bloomers" were widespread and then goes on to determine 
whether this is the case in her story (New York Times 
Magazine, March 10, 1968, p. 57). Whether it is true or 
not, she has inferred that the reader ought to be 
considering the possibility. Another "everybody knows" 
article in 1970 illustrates the convenience of these 
unnamed sources for bringing stereotypes into the story: 
From its beginnings, the movement was widely 
regarded as somebody's idea of a bad joke. "A 
Lesbian plot" muttered some. "A group of frustrated 
old maids who need a good man," said others. (New 
York Times 1970, August 30, 1970, IV, p. 4) 
Just who these "people" are of course lS never 
discussed, and indeed this maintenance and circulation 
of stereotypes -- of what "everybody knows" -- is one of 
the (de) legitimation tools that journalists employ while 
at the same time seeming to be simply populist and to 
know the mind of the "average" person. The point here lS 
one of selectivity. It is not the case that journalists 
repeat all stereotypes that they have ever heard off, 
only those that further the frame of their story. 
Overall, then, in the first few years of NOW's 
interaction with news media, many of the classic 
indicators of marginalization -- from a focus on 
appearance (trivialization) to distance markers such as 
quotes or qualifiers -- NOW lS routinely presented in 
this period as a source organization that cannot be 
taken at face value. 
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II. 1970-1974 LIMITED LEGITIMATION AND 
CONTRADICTIONS 
By 1970 some changes can be seen in NOW's 
legitimacy and between 1970 and 1974 NOW began to 
undergo a limited process of legitimation as a news 
source. For example, in this period NOW began to be 
described in its own terms, and quotes and qualifiers 
disappeared from the organization's goals and claims 
more generally. By 1974, for example, NOW was frequently 
described as simply the "oldest and largest feminist 
organization in the country." 
This legitimation process was shifting and far from 
seamless. NOW's organizational legitimacy as a source 
depended on its issue context. Its organizational 
legitimacy was usually higher in this period when the 
story context was NOW's best known and (by now) most 
institutionalized political issues, such as the ERA, 
employment discrimination or educational discrimination. 
In other topic areas, especially those that touched on 
more radical or systemic analyses of discrimination or 
of a whole system of "sexism," they were just as likely 
to be ridiculed as respected. 
The organization was also more likely to be taken 
seriously when it was being compared to more "radical" 
groups than when it was being assessed alone. In this 
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middle period NOW became the beneficiary of news' 
hostility to more radical feminisms. 
2.1 ERA, Sex Discrimination and Civil Rights: 
NOW's News Legitimation Contexts, 1970-1974 
In the 1970-1974 period NOW began to be taken more 
seriously in news stories. For example, In a 1970 report 
of a speech given by Betty Friedan, NOW is described in 
a very straightforward way as a national organization 
with thousands of members: 
NOW which has about 35 national chapters with up to 
100 members each, is the oldest and the largest of 
-the women's groups ... Among its campaigns have 
been the demand for equal employment opportunities 
for women, day care centers, where mothers who want 
to go to work can leave their children, and the 
repeal of abortion laws. (New York Times, March 21, 
1970, p. 21.) 
The quotes that used to surround NOW's goals have 
been dropped and NOW's statements are taken at face 
value. Notice also here the much less inflammatory 
description of NOW's stand on abortion as seeking a 
lirepeal of abortion laws" rather than lithe right of 
women to terminate unwanted pregnancies." 
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This gradual change in the media coverage was 307 
recognized by NOW's 1970-1971 president Aileen Hernandez 
as one of the most significant changes to affect the 
organization: 
Mrs. Hernandez, dressed in a coral and white wool 
ensemble with a matching scarf in her hair, was 
very definite when asked what she thought was NOW's 
greatest accomplishment. "The media no longer 
look at our movement with such great humor," she 
said firmly. "We used to get asked," Do you mean 
you want men to become playboy bunnies? Nobody asks 
things like that anymore." (New York Times, May 2, 
1970) 
Unfortunately she can't say the same for reporters 
descriptions of what women sources are wearing! This 
kind of commentary about women sources fashion judgment 
was becoming less frequent over time, but was still 
sometimes used, especially in stories like this one that 
appeared on the women's pages. 
One key issue area in which NOW was treated as a 
serious source was in the context of the ERA. NOW's role 
in the legislative debate over the ERA was generally 
represented as serious and credible. The organization 
was talked about in this context as if it was a serious 
player, particularly by the Times' Eileen Shanahan. 
Generally Shanahan (and a handful of other women 
reporters) took women's political groups and issues 
seriously in this period. These stories were not always 
uncritical, but they did talk about NOW and other 
women's groups as political actors (rather than as 
fashion plates or "crusaders"): 
A group of maJor women's rights organizations 
announced today their consensus that a proposed 
substitute version of the equal rights amendment to 
the Constitution was inadequate. They thus killed 
for this year the last possibility of enactment of 
an amendment prohibiting governmental 
discrimination on the basis of sex ... The women's 
organizations said that the Bayh substitute would 
still permit many distinctions to be made on the 
basis of sex. (New York Times, November 12, 1970, p. 
19. ) 
This story has a completely different tone than 
earlier stories in which NOW is quoted. In this story, 
in which women's organizations find legislation 
"unacceptable," they "kill" substitutions, and act as 
political agents. This is a far cry from "feeling put 
out" as earlier stories had termed NOW's positions. 
These stories treat "discrimination" as a known and well 
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understood term for experience, not as something that 309 
NOW is "alleging." 
Shanahan subsequently covered the Amendment and 
other aspects of women's politics, including stories 
about NOW conferences, and front page analyses of the 
landmark AT&T discrimination/affirmative action 
settlement in 1973. Whether for personal political 
reasons, or because of the context in which she carne 
into contact with women's movement groups (i.e. as 
informed participants in a major legislative battle) 
Shanahan'S representation of women's groups was quite 
different than previous coverage. 5 She simply treated 
them as straightforward news sources. Her stories on the 
ERA were dense, factual, and somewhat dry, legislative 
stories in which NOW and other women's movement groups 
were treated as informed sources. Shanahan legitimated 
women's politics by treating it as news. 
On one occaSlon In 1975 Shanahan's sympathetic 
treatment of NOW became quite evident. When a Senate 
Labor Committee expedited an EEOC appointment too 
quickly for NOW to respond, Shanahan used NOW's 
"prepared testimony" as the basis for a story. Despite 
the fact that they had been unable to testify, NOW's 
material (statistics on the candidate's previous 
affirmative action commitments, his attitudes towards 
civil rights and so on) made it into the news anyway.6 
Generally by the mid 1970s NOW had become an expert 310 
source for journalists especially in areas of women's 
employment and sex discrimination law and policy. The 
organization is quoted alongside the NAACP In 
affirmative action stories, the AFSCME and other unions 
in economic stories, and with anti-discrimination groups 
generally in the front news sections of the paper. 7NOW 
leaders routinely testified to the Civil Rights 
Commission of New York and other cities and to 
congressional and senate committees. And in 1974, the 
NOW president was invited to the White House as one of 
the -nation's best known- women's organizations. Clearly 
NOW had corne to be seen as an important voice for women: 
Notes from a feminist leader's calendar: -Friday 
meet with President Ford. Tell him how to better 
the lot of women ... The first President of NOW to 
meet with a President of the United States, Miss 
De Crow said she hopes to have Mr. Ford's attention 
long enough to tell him the following: -I want to 
put a buzz in his head about running with a 
woman ... I will push for the appointment of women 
federal judges, and I want a commitment that if he 
has an opportunity to appoint a Supreme Court 
justice he will name a woman. There should be an 
affirmative action program for the White House and 
its staff. It is essential that someone read all 
the President's speeches and White House memos to 311 
make sure they have no sexist content. I want a 
commitment that if legislation is passed to chip 
away at the Supreme Court decision on abortion, 
that he would veto it. I want a commitment that he 
support any legislation that affects women and 
veto any that is anti-women. (New York Times, 
September 6, 1974) 
Sometimes that seriousness extended into control 
over a story's frame. In a Congressional Hearing in 1974 
for example, organized by Brooklyn Democrat, Shirley 
Chisholm, NOW and other women's groups responses were 
allbwed to define the story from the outset: 
Representatives from women's groups criticized 
today the Federal Government's record in fighting 
sex discrimination in educational programs and told 
a House subcommittee that special provisions 
against such discrimination should be included in 
pending vocational training legislation. (New York 
Times, April 22, 1974, p. 17) 
This kind of access, which has been called that of 
a nprimary definer n is rarely granted to those outside 
of institutional power circles. For NOW it is certainly 
a far cry from "self-styled militants" who "allege" 312 
"discrimination." 
2.2 The Limits of Legitimation: "Private" Contexts 
At the same time as ERA coverage and front page 
stories on sex discrimination were portraying NOW as a 
credible source, its representation in other topic areas 
and on the women's page was much more contradictory and 
more prone to trivialization. A story in 1971, for 
example, reports on NOW's work on sex role stereotyping 
on school, toys and texts, and ridicules it as a 
ridiculous focus on "discrimination in the toddler set:" 
·Women's liberation In the nursery? No more pink for 
girls and blue for boys, dolls for girls and trucks 
for boys, sewing kits for girls an football helmets 
for boys? That's how it could be if some believers 
in the women's liberation credo have their way. 
Having already crusaded for equal treatment of the 
sexes in the professions, academe and the home 
as well as in children's books-- they're now 
turning their attention to the playpen ... The New 
York chapter of the National Organization for 
Women, which just recently went before the New 
York City Board of Education with a study of 
discrimination against female students, teachers 
and principals in the public school system, is 
turning its attention to discrimination in the 313 
toddler set. (New York Times, May 12, 1971, p. 38) 
In this 1971 story, the idea of sex role 
stereotyping is pooh-poohed and feminism is described as 
a "credo," rather than a politics. The story's tone 
suggests that this is surely not a serious subject and 
that this time these women are just going too far. 
In general, whenever new or untried issues were 
mentioned (especially those that aimed their critiques 
at the general system rather than specific legislative 
concerns) NOW was put back in the "peculiar" box. In 
fact the limits of NOW's legitimation become quite clear 
over" time as we note that NOW was treated as a serious 
source only in those topic/issue areas that were most 
institutionalized and which best fitted existing models 
of political analysis. 8 Sex discrimination in 
employment, education and credit, for example, were 
issues that had developed legislative histories and 
institutional homes. However when NOW tried to bring 
feminist analyses "home" or to describe a more general 
system of "sexism" they were again ridiculed. 
NOW's expansion of its concerns in the 1970s from 
early focus on legal remedies and sex discrimination in 
employment, to more general critiques of racism, ageism, 
and sexism, ln all aspect of society, was presented in a 
way that suggested the organization was losing its 
focus: 
NOW Expands the List of What It's For and What It's 
Against 
The Houston Conference of the National Organization 
for Women ... committed NOW's 700 chapters to 
increased action on behalf of npersonhood n for 
older women, homemakers, nurses, volunteer workers, 
women in sports, naggrieved women and children of 
divorce,n women in poverty and even women in 
foreign countries. (New York Times, June 2, 1974, 
p. 18) 
This distinction is agaln made quite clear in a 
1970 report of a feminist address to the Rotarians. 
Issues such as equal pay are fine, but analyses that 
attack fundamental social and familial structures are 
outside of the game: 
As individuals the audience left little room for 
doubt as to where they stood on the matter of 
women's liberation. It was generally agreed that 
equal pay for equal work and equal opportunities 
for both sexes were valid points, but both men and 
women appeared equally bewildered and at times 
openly hostile to other statements of principle. 
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(New York Times November 4, 1970, p. 20.) 
2.3 Legitimation through Differentiation: 
The Reasonable and the Radical 
This distinction in treatment between NOW's 
institutionalized issues and its newer issues, was also 
reflected in news during this period by another process 
of differentiation and contextualization in which NOW 
was compared to other movement groups. Generally NOW 
gained from this comparison. It was presented as the 
Hreasonable H alternative to more Hradical H feminisms. 
In the early 1970s a number of radical feminist 
groups exploded onto the public scene and NOW began to 
seem-quite respectable by comparison. Journalists 
writing about the movement started to make distinctions 
between what was reasonable feminism and what was not, 
and NOW, for the most part, was a beneficiary of this 
distinction. Even as the writer in this 1970 piece 
reports on the younger groups' criticisms of NOW, it lS 
clear that the younger groups themselves are being 
presented as marginal: 
The largest of the groups within the movement is 
the National Organization for Women ... NOW works 
for passage and ratification of the Equal Rights 
Amendment and lobbies for federally funded day care 
centers. Then there are the radical women's groups 
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who dismiss NOW and its sympathizers as 
"bourgeois." Most of these groups are small; they 
often have names of significance only to the 
initiate such as Boston's Bread and Roses and New 
York's Redstockings. Many of these seem less 
concerned with restructuring the law than with, so 
far as possible, revolutionizing the female -- in 
some cases quite literally. There are some radical 
women who have said that only the development of an 
artificial uterus will truly "liberate" women, for 
it will free them from the "oppression" of 
pregnancy and birth. (New York Times, August 28, 
1970, p. 20.) 
The quotation marks here around "liberate" and 
"oppression" are similar to those that used to surround 
NOW's claims to "sex discrimination," but in the context 
of the more radical groups NOW is presented as more 
legitimate. 
Here we see one of the critical roles of 
journalists and news media in interacting with social 
movements -- as the first interpreters of movements for 
the public, journalists playa critical role in 
assesSlng the normality or deviance of new movements and 
new ideas for their audiences. In the coverage of 
feminism, journalists seemed to take on this task 
happily.9 In the name of an anonymous "Ms. Average 
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American" they assessed NOW and other feminist groups in 317 
terms of their relative nnormality" and separated 
feminism into the nreasonable n and the unreasonable. 
These were then packaged for readers in the appropriate 
linguistic frames. In this 1970 article, for example, 
the writer does a brilliant job of separating out for 
readers what is sensible feminism (equal wages and 
educational access ) and what is not (consciousness 
raising). All of this is achieved by general references 
to (normal) American women, like Mrs. Betty Newcomb who 
are midwestern (of course), married (of course), mothers 
(of course), and so concerned with nreal" problems: 
-But these are not the sort of theories that seem 
likely to produce much response from non-radical 
women, who are not so interested in restructuring 
the family as In getting the same wages as their 
male co-workers. Or like Mrs. Betty Newcomb of 
Muncie Ind., who lS married, the mother of four 
sons and an English teacher at Ball State 
University, they are women who care less about 
nconsciousness raising n than about persuading the 
local school system to stop discouraging girls who 318 
want to enter such "masculine" fields as 
engineering. (New York Times, August 11, 1970, 
p. 20) 
This differentiation work was not only performed by 
journalists, however. At the same time as this news 
story appeared, NOW's own media strategists were also 
working to differentiate NOW from the more radical 
groups and ideas of the movement. It was in 1970, for 
example, that NOW was accused of having "purged" the 
organization of its active lesbians, and throughout the 
early 1970s NOW's communications to journalists included 
"differentiation" strategies that would contrast NOW's 
stance to that of more radical groups. In a 1973 letter 
NOW's Public Information Office, for example, distanced 
themselves from other feminists whom they indicate were 
the "real" bra burners, whereas NOW was a group of 
"serious women and men" dedicated to change society 
"for the benefit of both sexes."lO 
Betty Friedan (who left NOW in 1970 and was 
involved in organizing the Women's Political Caucus), 
was also involved in fierce differentiation between 
different kinds of feminism and feminists at this point. 
In 1971, for example, she is quoted as saying that the 
younger feminists are unrealistic and chauvinistic (New 
York Times, March 23, 1971, p. 32). And in 1973 Friedan 
wrote and had published in the Times magazine, a long, 319 
critical umemoir u of her time in the movement in which 
she attacked the younger movement groups relentlessly. 
In the memoir Friedan took swipes at many of the 
movement's most visible members such as Steinem, Abzug, 
Brownmiller calling them uinfantillists" and even FBI 
infiltrators of the movement. This article, which is 
quite long and complex, represents quite significant 
access for a movement leader to the Times pages. 
Friedan's attacks on radical feminism garnered her much 
more space than anything she had ever said on liberal 
feminism's behalf (New York Times Magazine, March 3, 
1973) . 
. The radical feminist groups fought back against 
Friedan's attacks and this internal debate was then 
picked up and re-presented by the press, especially 
those statements by either uside" that were most 
dramatic or derogatory. The younger groups called 
Friedan Ubourgeois" and outdated and she called them 
uchauvinists" and uinfantilists": 
Susan Brownmiller, a member of the New York Radical 
Feminists, said in a recent magazine article that 
to her colleagues uFriedan, the mother of the 
movement and the organization that recruited in her 
image are considered hopelessly bourgeois." (New 
York Times, March 23, 1971, p. 32) 
News stories reported the claims of both "sides" in 
the dispute quite extensively, but In the end tended to 
side with Friedan or at least with more "reasonable" 
feminisms. A 1973 story, for example, reporting on the 
ongoing debate, sets the radical feminists up as 
"children" to Friedan's "mother." Thus a serious 
movement dispute about ideologies and strategies is 
reduced to pop psychology: 
It was billed as a "speak-out of the feminist 
community" to rebut alarms sounded by Betty 
Friedan, concerning a possible takeover of the 
. women's liberation movement by man-haters, lesbians 
and "pseudo radical infantilists," and infiltrators 
"trained by the FBI and CIA." It turned into a 
rather classic "kill the mother" fantasy-drama 
with Mrs. Friedan, the mother of women's 
liberation, described as outgrown by 
the daughters .... (New York Times, March 8, 1973, 
p. 52.) 
Overall news coverage of the differences and 
dissent in the movement in this critical 1970-1973 
period, focused on the dramatic and personal rather than 
ideological or strategic differences between the groups. 
And generally, the Times writers came down on the side 
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of more ·sensible· feminisms that fitted well within 321 
existing frameworks of rights and equality -- i.e. 
Friedan and NOW and against the more radical claims 
of the younger groups. NOW benefited from this 
differentiation, then, while other feminist groups were 
marginalized. 
This differentiation process, while it tells us 
something important about news can also be seen at least 
partly as a ·success" for NOW legitimation strategies, 
because these differentiation techniques were not only 
the result of news framing mechanisms but also the 
result of differentiation techniques on NOW's part. 
During this period (as I indicate in chapter six) NOW 
strategists also took the opportunity to differentiate 
NOW from the "younger" groups. In fact this may be one 
of the occasions when NOW's public identity strategies 
meshed almost perfectly with news processing: both NOW 
and news used the younger groups as a foil for 
·sensible" feminisms. 
III. INTERNAL DISSENT, 1974-1976: 
WHO DOES NOW REPRESENT? 
The third identifiable "stage" In NOW's 
representation In news, came during the 1974-1976 period 
when the organization itself was In internal turmoil. By 
the mid 1970's many of the "younger" feminist groups had 
disappeared from public view and women who were still 
interested ln working in organized political feminism 322 
had joined NOW. This new membership, combined with an 
ongoing tension between the grassroots chapters and the 
national leadership over internal democracy, NOW policy, 
and visions of feminism more generally, came to a head 
in the 1974-5 NOW elections for national leaders. 
At the 1975 NOW National Conference almost the 
entire standing NOW Board was replaced by a "majority 
caucus" of younger, more militant, leaders, and NOW 
headed into a period in which radical, long term goals 
were emphasized and the "mainstream" rejected. In a 
platform entitled "Out of the Mainstream and Into the 
Revolution" new NOW leaders expanded NOW's range of 
public concerns and began to articulate a different, 
more diverse and generalized feminist identity:11 
The news about NOW produced during this two year 
period (centering especially around 1975) encompassed a 
wider range of critique and more complex coverage than 
NOW's news representation had before. Perhaps because of 
the new openness of NOW leaders -- and so the 
availability to journalists of internal critiques to 
draw on -- the coverage during this period is complex, 
wide ranging, critical and, when taken as a whole, 
contradictory. As such it reflected the reality of NOW 
at this point. The organization was undergoing internal 
debate and struggle over future goals and leadership, 
and the usual tight control over media representations 
of internal dissent were relaxed. Indeed, as I argue in 323 
chapter six, one of the issues being contended in this 
internal struggle was the public identity of NOW and 
media's role in publicizing either a united front or a 
complex and inclusive image of NOW (see chapter six, 
Identity Control Strategies). 
Central to this period of coverage was an ongoing 
debate in news about just who NOW's members were -- and 
indeed who feminist were overall. Sometimes the 
organization's diversity was stressed as in this 1974 
story: 
The women at the NOW convention seemed to represent 
all ages, ethnic groups and walks of life. There 
were white-haired women with canes, teen-aged girls 
with their mothers-- and even a sprinkling of 
men. (New York Times, September 8, 1974, p.58.) 
A similar theme of "feminists are everybody" was 
also struck in this 1975 story about feminism in the 
"wild west:" 
There were "the ladies who lunch," the ladies who 
ranch, youthful college students in Levi's and 
middle aged mothers in J.C. Penney pant suits. (New 
York Times, May 3, 1975, p. 36) 
However this sense of NOW as encompassing all kinds 324 
of women came under attack too, and NOW was sometimes 
presented as being out of touch with the Haverage" 
woman. When NOW's 1975 HAlice Doesn't" Strike failed, 
the Times took NOW to task: 
HAlice Doesn't,H a nationwide strike called by the 
National Organization for Women, fizzled in much of 
the country yesterday because most Alice's did. 
They did what NOW had urged them not to do. 
They went to work, they did housework, they 
shopped, they cooked, and they cared for their 
children. HAlice did because she had to," said 
an editor for a Chicago publishing house who worked 
yesterday. HIt shows how out of touch with the 
world the NOW people are to call something like a 
strike. It's ridiculous. Most women are in 
positions where if they don't go to work, they'd be 
fired.H(New York Times, October 30, 1975, p. 44.) 
The critique/conversation about who NOW represented 
and why continued into 1976. Often the news debate had 
resonances of the criticisms that the Majority Caucus 
itself had mounted at the national convention. In this 
story, for example, the writer mounts the same critique 
that many of the majority caucus had about NOW's need to 
out to minority women, working class women and 
housewives: 
NOW Still Growing -- But It's Still White and 
Middle Class ... 
The National Organization for Women is now In its 
10th year and some of the more gloomy are 
expressing great reservations about its future. 
Its last national convention was followed by the 
formation of a significant splinter group. 
Criticism has been leveled from various quarters at 
the organization's alleged failure to reach or 
represent large segments of women in society. (New 
York Times, January 24, 1976, p. 20) 
This critique was accompanied by a long story which 
quoted extensively working class and minority women who 
worked in neighborhood projects, and whom the reporter 
asked to say what was wrong with NOW. In this long 
article, NOW's class and race base is examined and 
critiqued in a way that had not been seen before: 
For Working Class Women, Own Organization and Goals 
The women's movement ... is in her mind an 
amorphous middle class group involved in many 
things that don't touch her life and removed 
from the hopes, desires, fears and uncertainties of 
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most women. I feel the women's movement puts down 326 
women in general ... especially immigrant women who 
have always worked. When these women get a chance 
to stay home a few years they are being told they 
are oppressed and that they are slaves ... 
Groups like the National Organization for Women 
Yare talking about jobs for self fulfillment when 
people can't get jobs of any kind,Y Miss Noschese 
said. (New York Times, January 24, 1976, p. 20.) 
This new (and critical) focus on NOW's goals and 
membership, is not really be seen a Yfailure Y of news 
management, though, because at this time NOW leaders 
were quite deliberately expressing dissenting ideas and 
positions to journalists. As part of a new Yopenness Y in 
its dealing with the press and with grassroots 
membership, the new Majority Caucus Leadership may have 
in fact provided much of the raw material for these 
critiques. The tendency of earlier administration's to 
Ysoft pedal Y particular issues with media was critiqued 
by the Majority Caucus who wanted NOW to begin to be 
more Yup frontY with news media about the range of 
concerns and conflict in the organization as a whole: 
Down playing some issues for tactical reasons lS 
always a risky procedure. When we fail to 
articulate some of our goals we tend to drop them 327 
not only from our immediate demands but from our 
long term vision, It does not take much anxiety and 
circumspection to turn a multi-issued revolutionary 
movement into a one issue reform. 12 
After 1975, NOW's differentiation strategies, In 
which NOW's respectability had been played up at the 
expense of other movement groups, were also adjusted. In 
this later period NOW's relationship to the rest of the 
movement was usually presented to media as one of 
llsisterhood ll rather than as the respectable arm of the 
movement . 
. NOW is presented overall in this period as a highly 
contentious organization whose membership, leaders and 
agenda was in flux. However this was not a marginalizing 
representation. Although NOW does not corne off 
particularly well in these debates -- being presented as 
an elitist, white, middle class organization which was 
only partly true -- it is a debate in which NOW's right 
to be the subject of such serious analysis is now taken 
for granted. This overt, serious weighing of NOW's 
goals, future and membership is a far cry from its early 
representation as somewhat dubious and llself-styled. ll 
Though the organization did not always look good 
In this period, it is an indication of NOW's general 
increase in legitimacy that they are subject to this 
level of strategic critique at all. Reporters usually 328 
save this kind of attention the "how well are they 
doing their job" frame -- for electoral candidates. NOW 
is seen during this period as a legitimate organization 
which should be doing a better job of representing all 
women. It was exactly this identity as a voice for women 
that NOW's early leaders had tried to produce, and which 
it had been hard to persuade journalists there was any 
need for. 
IV. 1976-1980, SOLIDIFYING LEGITIMACY, 
HISTORICIZING NOW 
In the mid and late 1970s NOW's identity in news 
stories became more and more normalized. Indeed the 
organization even began to be historicized as a 
respected pioneer of "hard won rights" and to be seen as 
a fixture in the political process. An unsigned (and 
therefore institutional) Times editorial in 1977, 
entitled "Feminism Then and NOW," caps this progression 
to respectability as the Times itself recognizes NOW's 
importance: 
The quiet passage of the tenth annlversary of the 
National Organization for Women belies the profound 
change in America's consciousness generated by the 
women's movement. Initially feminist claims were 
jarring, even enraging ... In a decade the country 
has changed. The women's movement has unleashed a 329 
new literature, new social criticism, new talent. 
Few men would now be insensitive enough to sum up 
the movement's appeal the way one comedian did a 
few years ago: llSure my wife joined the feminists. 
Why not? They all want somebody to help with the 
dishes. ll Solid gains in legislation, business, 
labor and government, clearly have been made. 
(New York Times, May 3, 1977, p. 40.) 
This piece on Westchester NOW's reunion, for 
example, focuses on how feminism, and NOW membership has 
even been good for the health of the participants: 
... feminism is doing what Lydia E. Pinkham -- the 
inventor of a patent medicine for Hfemale ailments H 
-- and tranquilizers haven't been able to do; 
keeping us healthy, happy, busy, sober and 
married. (New York Times, June 26, xxii, p. 20.) 
The hook for this institutionalizing of NOW was 
officially its tenth anniversary. But in fact the 
general process of legitimation had been building up for 
some years prlor to it's official declaration in this 
editorial. 13 
This general legitimation as a long-standing 
participant in social change did not mean that NOW was 
treated uncritically. As I indicated in the previous 330 
section, NOW was routinely critiqued during this period 
for its imperfections in representing all women. And in 
this last period, NOW was also critiqued for its lack of 
sophistication as a "insider" player. Now that the Times 
had allowed NOW into the fold of serious civil rights 
organizations, it began to assess NOW's strategies, not 
as a social movement (i.e. as critical and/or radical) 
but as an "insider" who should know better than to be 
"unrealistic" or "extreme." 
During this period, for example, NOW had begun to 
take more of a role in electoral politics. But as far as 
the Time's was concerned NOW was not very good at this 
kind of politics. When in 1979 NOW decided not to 
endorse Carter for renomination because of his dismal 
record on getting the ERA ratified, the Times subjected 
NOW leadership to a heavy dose of patronizing advice. 
Under a general heading of "The Complaints of the 
Women's Lobby," the editorial said: 
We've held back comment on the rejection of 
President Carter's candidacy by the National 
Organization for Women. The nominating convention 
is eight months off and the election is 11 months 
off. Perhaps, we thought, there lS a way out of 
that tightly painted corner, or an explanation. 
Alas, the ineptitude stands unrelieved, NOW should 
try to get out of its corner even before the paint 331 
dries. (New York Times, December 19, 1979, p. 30) 
The Times tone In this period is one of scolding a 
recalcitrant child. NOW is being criticized for holding 
onto its outsider tactics, when it is now in the game. 
But being critiqued as a player (or as a not very good 
player) is something quite different from being a 
dubious newcomer. 
By 1981, as this editorial plece notes, the women's 
movement has corne of age as far as news is concerned: 
A Bad Time for Women? 
A columnist reporting recently on an argument 
between two writers quoted the following dialogue: 
He: HI am not here to argue with a feminist. H 
She: HI am not a feminist." 
To him Hfeminist" seems to be a kind of dirty word. 
Judging by the response, it is to her as well. Why, 
we'd like to ask them. Do you really know what it 
means? Or do you really mean what you're saying? 
that someone who espouses, to cite Webster, Hthe 
theory of the political, social and economlC 
equality of the sexes," isn't worth talking to? 
Still, being able to define feminism correctly is 
less important than being able to recognize the 
extraordinary growth of the women's movement. Since 
November, new memberships in NOW have been 332 
running at approximately 9,000 to 10,000 monthly, 
two to three times the preVlOUS average. No fewer 
than 24 women's groups have, in a joint statement, 
assailed certain of the Reagan Administration's 
budget cuts. Another new coalition includes several 
public affairs law groups, and a similar 
organization is being formed for food and hunger 
issues. There are, of course, many other women who 
see themselves threatened, less by a new 
administration than by the new roles into 
which they are being urged, and by what they 
interpret as denigration of their old ones. It 
. would be an error, then, to assume that females 
now constitute a political monolith. What lS 
certain, however, is that faced with what they 
perceive as an alarming insensitivity to certain 
human issues, some women are mounting strong and 
increasingly structured protests. Only ten years 
ago such political channels were close to 
nonexistent; 15 years ago they were close to 
inconceivable. This may indeed be a bad time for 
women, but there lS no longer any doubt that the 
women's movement is a remarkable revolution. 
(New York Times 1981, June 1, p. 16) 
This editorial plece lS extraordinary for its 333 
IIseal of approval" of NOW. But also for its alignment of 
the Times (lI we ") with feminism ("well, we would like to 
ask him why"), when in fact that had not always been the 
case at all. The editorial wipes out the Times own 
historical resistance to NOW, to feminism and to sex 
discrimination. Its own role in resisting "so-called 
equality" is erased and readers are now asked to stand 
with the Times on the side of sensible people and 
support the movement. It notes that "political channels" 
were closed to feminism 10 years ago, but fails to note 
that the Times itself was one of those channels. 
This is an important development in NOW's public 
legitimation, and it must be seen as a "successful" 
outcome for NOW media strategists. If the Times is an 
indicator of journalism more generally, then, by 1981, 
NOW had become a publicly legitimate voice at least for 
equality feminism. But it is important to note also, 
that it is a particular version of the movement that lS 
being centered here -- the Times supports a feminism 
that is about IIpolitical, social and economic equality." 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS: 
Conditional Legitimation for NOW 
In the early years, 1966-1970 NOW was generally 
trivialized in news through a combination of being 
treated as part of the fashion genre and through 
distancing techniques and descriptions that trivialized 334 
the organization's political positions. In the 1970-1974 
period NOW began to be presented as a more legitimate 
source. But this legitimation was limited and 
complicated by news tendency to process NOW differently 
in different issue and movement contexts. In 1975, as 
part of a larger process of dissent in the organization, 
NOW's representativeness, and membership, came under 
serious critique, but I argue that this critique was not 
necessarily marginalizing, because it took NOW seriously 
as an organization trying to represent all women. By 
1980/1981, NOW seems to have become institutionalized In 
the eyes of the Times editors at least. The organization 
was still critiqued, but stories and editorials 
surrounding NOW's 10th anniversary indicate that it had 
come to be perceived as a Hplayer" in national politics. 
These patterns in NOW's representation reflect its 
own active control and strategizing to some extent, but 
the NOW-news relationship was also structured by 
discursive categories and assumptions that news brought 
to the interaction, and which may also stretch beyond 
news to the liberal political discursive context of both 
news and NOW. In the early years, for example, despite 
NOW's investment in media work and its attempts to 
retain tight control of the organization's in media, it 
was not represented as a legitimate news source. NOW 
suffered as an organization in this period from the 
general Hnewness H of feminism to journalists, who 
responded by marginalizing and ridiculing NOW and its 
goals. In 1966 the idea of feminism and especially Hsex 
discrimination H was a new and challenging frame for 
gender relations, and in the first few years of 
interaction with news, NOW's articulation of this frame 
was not taken seriously. As NOW and other groups 
continued to articulate sex discrimination and sexism 
frames over time, and as their efforts resulted in 
legislation and EEO compliance, news also began to take 
these frames for experience more seriously, and to drop 
quotes and qualifiers from its representation of NOW's 
goals. It is the persistence of these strategic 
communications over time, though, that seems to be key 
here. 
In the 1970-1974 period when NOW was beginning to 
be taken more seriously, some of this legitimation 
process may be traced directly to the setting up of the 
Public Information Office and the systematic provision 
of information to journalists about women's issues. The 
information work NOW strategists did with women 
reporters (such as Shanahan) In making the ERA an lssue 
seems to have succeeded here. 
The differentiation process, through which NOW 
gained some legitimacy at the expense of the HyoungerH 
movement groups, was also influenced by NOW's 
strategies. As I indicate earlier in the chapter, it was 
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not only journalists who were involved in making 
distinctions between ureasonable" and uradical" 
feminisms. Some NOW strategists at this point also saw 
the rise of women's liberation groups as an opportunity 
to set NOW apart. In the long run, however, these kind 
of differentiation processes also worked against NOW 
itself. NOW was more likely to be seen as a serlOUS news 
source only in specific issue areas such as the ERA or 
sex discrimination, which by the 1970s had a developed 
institutional and legislative history. When NOW moved to 
address newer or more radical feminist topics, however, 
its reception was less friendly, and some of the old 
marginalizing techniques that had been used in 
presenting NOW in the early years reappeared In these 
stories. News' preference for uold u politics and 
equality (rather than radical) feminism which NOW had 
been able to use strategically to gain legitimacy as a 
group (compared to the UyoungerU groups) was also 
brought to bear on NOW at the level of issues. 
The question of whether NOW usucceeded" in its 
legitimation strategies, then, seems to be yes and no. 
Over time a general legitimation can be seen to have 
taken place in NOW's representation in the Times. But 
this legitimation had some important limitations. As in 
NOW's agenda-building activities, NOW's identity was 
processed within a discursive context of struggle over 
the boundaries of ulegitimate" politics more generally, 
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and which in the context of feminist and NSM politics 337 
can be seen as a struggle over public-private boundaries 
(McLaughlin, 1993; Fraser, 1992). 
Just as in agenda-building strategies and outcomes 
a pervasive public-private framework seems to be in 
place throughout NOW's interaction with the Times in 
this period. NOW's legitimation, for example, was more 
assured when it talked about traditional issues. But 
there was also some shifting of issues within the 
framework. Over time what news considered to be an 
illegitimate issue changed. In 1966, for example, the 
Times was less than friendly to sex discrimination as a 
frame for women's politics calling it llso-called 
dis'crimination ll and asking if a women's movement was not 
somehow ridiculous. But by 1981 sex discrimination in 
employment, education and so on, had become the 
legitimate aspect of feminism in the eyes of the Times 
The NOW-news struggle, then, was both structured 
and shifting. It was the result of systematic processing 
by news conventions, but over time it was also 
influenced by NOW's strategies and by its ongolng 
strategic communication and political mobilization. The 
same sorting mechanism was always at work here in which 
news decided what was legitimate or not (or in this case 
what is llpublic ll or not), but some llmovementll took place 
from one category to the other as a result of NOW's 
strategic framing and articulation of issues. NOW was 
able to llmake ll sex discrimination an lssue, it was less 338 
able to make child care an lssue, at least in this 
period. 
NOW's legitimation in the public sphere was 
connected to its own strategic choices, then, in that 
without that strategic interaction on NOW and other 
feminist group's part, it is doubtful if any of the 
Umovement U indicated in this chapter -- i.e. sex 
discrimination becoming legitimated as a frame -- would 
have taken place. But the NOW-news relationship was 
also part of a larger struggle over public-private 
politics that both constrained and enabled both 
journalists and activists, and in which NOW and news 
workers were only two of many players. 
NOTES 
1 See chapter six for more discussion of NOW's identity 
control strategies. 
2 For example, as I note later in this chapter, llsex 
discrimination" started out as a radical frame for 
women's experiences of inequalities and was resisted for 
a while by journalists and policy makers, but by the mid 
1970s this was one of NOW's more institutionalized 
issues and usexism" or child care were the areas in 
which it was taken less seriously. 
3 The context of the story is also highly contradictory 
-- the first serious magazine article on the movement in 
the Times and it is placed among ads for girdles and 
lingerie whose catch line is UMy Wife and My Wallet are 
in Great Shape (Thanks to Soft Skin)." 
4 Gitlin (198D) has illustrated how SDS was marginalized 
by playing on its youth and flamboyance -- i.e. news 
legitimacy centered around age/experience vs. 
youth/inexperience dichotomies. In NOW's case the 
marginalization was gendered -- i.e. it centered around 
male/female legitimacy fault lines. 
5 Shanahan is widely credited with making the ERA a 
major story, after she was alerted to it by women's 
rights activist, See Simpson (1979) and Robertson 
(1992) . 
6 New York Times, Wednesday May 21, 1975, p. 
7 See for example, New York Times, January 19, 1973, 
for an analysis of the AT&T discrimination settlement 
where NOW and the NAACP, are key spokespersons, or 
December 15, 1972, p.69, a story on the SEC and 
discrimination in stock market firms in which NOW and 
the Presbyterian church are sources; or May 8, 1973 for 
responses by "social reform groups" to proposed budget 
cuts that includes NOW and the AFSCME. 
8 It is worth noting here again, though, that what 
constituted this group of "institutionalized" topics was 
itself the outcome of previous struggle. The relative 
legitimacy of sex discrimination by the 1970s was the 
result of previous years of strategic communication. 
9 Reporters' willingness to stand in for the "public" is 
problematic first, because of their general lack of 
representativeness of the population, and second, 
because of their general lack of reflexivity about the 
specificity of their own socio-cultural backgrounds. For 
example, the reporter quoted above assumes that because 
feminist groups names did not have any resonance for 
her, that they would not for anybody. But both Bread and 
Roses and Redstockings would have resonated for people 
familiar with labor or feminist history. 
10 Letter from Dian Terry to Dick Cavett Show, NBC TV, 
June 1973, Public Information Office papers, NOW 
Collection, Schlesinger Library 
11 The flOut of the Mainstream" title was a deliberate 
reference to NOW's first public statement that it 
intended to bring women "into the mainstream" of 
political and social life in America. See NOW Statement 
of Purpose, 1966. 
12 NOW, 1975, Majority Caucus manifesto and "slate" 
published for the 1975 National NOW Conference in 
Philadelphia. NOW Collection, Schlesinger Library. 
13 In the same year (1977)three other stories also 
reflect on how attitudes have changed and how NOW has 
been a historical force; April 24, p. 26, March 25, p. 
B5, June 26, xxii, p. 20. 
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Chapter Nine 
News as a Political Resource? 
An Overdetermined Dialogical Model 
NOW's access to news, and its ability to use news 
to build a women's issue agenda and a legitimate public 
identity its "success" as defined in this study 
was clearly overdetermined. The organization's own 
ability to understand and interact with news over time 
was structured by its available resources, its strategic 
choices, and its identity at different times. And the 
outcome of that interaction -- the representation of NOW 
and its agenda over time in news content -- was the 
result, not only of shifts in these structuring factors, 
but also of the underlying categories and discursive 
constraints of both news and feminist discourses. 
The NOW-news interaction took place across mUltiple 
levels. It was, at the same time, an interaction between 
individuals (journalists and news workers), 
organizations, and, perhaps most complexly, between two 
discourses, news and feminism, which are substantially 
different system of knowledge. News, for example, owes 
much of its way of seeing the world to liberal, 
objectivist, philosophical underpinnings, which tend to 
assume a separation between public and private domains 
(van Zoonen, 1992; McDermott, 1994; Hackett, 1996). 
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Feminisms on the other hand, whether they are designated 341 
liberal, radical or pragmatist, have often been said to 
be constructivist, experientially based system of 
knowledge whose participants are engaged in blurring or 
breaking down this public-private boundary which 
historically has served to marginalize women's 
experiences and concerns (Fraser, 1992; Butler and 
Scott, 1992). 
Interactions at each of these levels (between 
individuals, organizations and discourses) affected and 
constrained the others, sometimes in contradictory ways. 
For example, journalists and activists drew on and 
reproduced the structures of their own discourses, but 
they' were also affected by each other in interaction. 
Interactions with feminists meant that journalists 
introduced issues like sexual harassment and terms such 
as nsexismn and nsex discrimination n into news and so 
into public discourse. And clearly NOW was influenced by 
news ways of seeing the word, as it deliberately encoded 
media conventions into its communications in order to 
attract and maintain relationships with journalists. 
The relative effects of these discourses on one 
another-- whether one transforms the other or whether 
there is fundamental disjuncture or agreement -- lS as 
likely to structure the NOW-news interaction as day-to-
day relationships between individuals. Indeed these two 
levels are inseparable -- it is through individuals' 
interaction day to day that these different discourses 342 
are brought together, elaborated or transformed in 
interaction. 
This complexity of mUltiple levels and multiple 
structuring factors means that NOW's relative "success" 
in the interaction has to be determined contextually 
within particular boundaries and trajectories, and at 
different levels. Different structuring factors are also 
likely to be more or less important at different levels 
of the interaction. In the rest of this chapter, then, I 
summarize and discuss some of the key relationship and 
structuring factors at different levels of this 
overdetermined interaction. First, I summarize the 
various (and overlapping) roles played by resources, 
strategies and identity in structuring NOW's media 
access possibilities. Then I summarize and assess 
patterns in the outcome of that interaction -- in news 
content. By analyzing patterns in the outcome of the 
NOW-news interaction (content analysis)in the context of 
information about NOW's shifting media strategies, 
agendas and identities (institutional analysis) it lS 
possible to identify the roles played by news 
practices, conventions and discursive categories in 
structuring this interaction separately from the roles 
played by NOW strategies. 
I argue overall that the press functioned as both a 
resource and a constraint in NOW's public communication. 
While news access made it possible for NOW to 
communicate to larger publics, news media also brought 
to bear on NOW's discourse, its own discursive 
categories and structures. In particular, I argue here, 
it brought to bear a pervasive public-private dichotomy, 
which news shares with liberal politics more generally, 
and which is inimical to feminism. 
The question for NOW, and other new social movement 
organizations, then, becomes less whether news media can 
be understood and used as a resource, but more 
strategically, how can the constraints and possibilities 
of news -- the structures of news -- be negotiated as a 
resource? As Giddens (1984) has noted, structure is both 
constraining and enabling. Structure can be oppressive 
when it is routinely reproduced through unreflective 
practice, but structures can also be enabling when the 
"rules" of a system are made accessible to the 
participants, who can then use them as resources. It is 
this reflexive appropriation of the "rules" of systems 
as resources which challenges deterministic models of 
social life. 
NOW seems to have been only partially successful in 
negotiating the structures of news. The organization did 
manage to learn about and use some of the structures of 
news -- to reflexively appropriate some of the rules 
but there were also areas of news, especially at the 
deeper discursive levels, that were not accessible to 
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NOW strategists, and could not be incorporated into 344 
their strategic interactions. Generally NOW seems to 
have been more successful in learning about and using 
the structures of news at the level of practices and 
routines, than at the ideological or discursive level 
where it was constrained (and processed by) the 
discursive constraints of news. 
The Structuring Role of Resources in News Access 
One of the most fundamental relationships that 
emerged in this study was that between resources and 
access to media. NOW's access to media was structured by 
its resource mobilization more generally. It was the 
income from membership that allowed the organization to 
spend money on media work. The class and professional 
background of NOW leaders, which translated into 
competence and media contacts, was also instrumental ln 
allowing it to interact with media. NOW's organizational 
form, of centralization and also representation across 
the country in chapters, made it possible both to 
control communication to media and to be seen as 
representative by media. 
Resources, especially information, competence and 
membership dollars are the first determining factors in 
NOW news access. Without such resources no interaction 
with media is possible at all. As Curran and Gurevitch 
(1991, p. 19) have suggested, when it comes to symbolic 
power resources are determining not in the lllast 
instance" but in the first. 
The relationship between resources and symbolic 
success is not a straightforward one, however. Resources 
may make interaction possible, but they do not determine 
success in controlling the interaction. While they tell 
us about the general parameters of the relationship they 
do not help us to understand how it is that material 
resources can be translated into news voice. It is in 
strategic analysis that the answer to how resources are 
transformed into symbolic success can be found. 
The Role of Reflexive Strategy 
Besides resources, NOW's strategic sophistication 
in interaction with news was a critical factor in 
structuring access. While resources made the interaction 
possible, it was NOW's development of a sophisticated 
media pragmatism which made continuous interaction with 
journalists possible. Over time NOW developed a more and 
more sophisticated version of its media pragmatism. From 
early attempts to control the group's identity through 
taking media conventions into account, to a fully 
fledged research project to determine how best to 
interact with journalists, NOW saw news as a potential 
movement resource and has set out to appropriate and use 
it for mass communication purposes. 
345 
This media pragmatism was somewhat contradictory as 346 
a strategy however. It produced both access to news (and 
so to publics and the public agenda) and limitations in 
NOW's public communication. It was this pragmatism, for 
example, which allowed NOW to become a useful source for 
women reporters. But it was also media pragmatism which 
distorted NOW's identity in the first few years as NOW 
leaders avoided talking about subjects such as 
lesbianism. 
Similarly NOW's strategy of finding and supporting 
sympathetic women reporters had both productive and 
limiting outcomes. As chapter seven illustrates, a large 
percentage of news stories about NOW were produced by 
women reporters, and in particular by a handful of 
recurring writers (e.g. Eileen Shanahan, Peggy Simpson, 
etc.) with whom NOW built relations over time. The 
significant resources NOW invested in becoming sources 
to these women reporters seems to have paid off in 
serious coverage. 
However, this strategy of interacting with and 
supporting women reporters meant that the limited access 
women journalists had at this time to front page news 
and institutional beats also limited NOW's media access. 
As chapter seven illustrates, even though 2/3 of the 
stories were written by women, most of the front page 
NOW stories were written by men. It seems that gendered 
assignments and sexism within news organizations makes 
women reporters less influential gateways into news for 347 
feminist sources at the same time as they are the 
journalist who may be most likely to pay attention to 
women's politics. 
It may also be the case that NOW's media pragmatism 
contributed overall to its own "processing" by news 
media in terms of public-private categorizations. As I 
suggest above, incorporating the news "values" of 
journalists in order to get their attention, may have 
meant that NOW was also sometimes invoking a discursive 
system that was inimical to feminist discourses. 
Speaking in "media logic" gained the attention of 
reporters -- and so access to the public sphere -- but 
it"also meant restricting public communication about 
NOW's identity and political concerns and may have meant 
that early NOW leaders thought less like feminists. In 
the early years, for example, NOW leaders often erased 
or ignored issues and concerns of NOW membership in an 
effort to appear "respectable" to news media and policy 
makers. For example, in the early years NOW leaders 
erased the organization's lesbian membership from its 
public identity, and in the 1970-1974 period NOW 
strategists were willing to publicly marginalize the 
younger movement groups in order to increase NOW's 
perceived news legitimacy as the "reasonable" arm of 
feminism. As a social movement organization with 
normative and philosophical goals, as well as strategic 
alms, NOW's focus on its media identity may have cost it 348 
some legitimacy within the movement. 
NOW's media pragmatism, then, was successful at 
producing access, but that access Ycost" the 
organization in terms of ideological constraints in its 
public communication, and in the long run this media 
savvy may also have made it easier for news discourse to 
process NOW's discourse through its own discursive 
framework because NOW has already encoded news 
conventions into its own communications. 
Ideology/Identity and Discursive Interaction 
NOW's organizational identity also structured its 
interactions with news media, but not in any 
straightforward or predictive way. Rather NOW's shifts 
in identity (e.g. its goals, leaders, or policies) over 
time, also affected its communication strategies, and it 
was shifts in these communication strategies as much as 
any identity shifts that usually resulted in changes in 
NOW's news legitimacy (the measure of identity Ysuccess Y 
used here.) 
In the early years, 1966-1970, for example, NOW was 
generally trivialized ln news through a combination of 
being treated as part of the fashion genre ,and through 
distancing techniques and descriptions that trivialized 
the organization's political positions. This 
trivialization period ends around 1974, however, and NOW 
begins to be seen as a legitimate speaker in news media 349 
. This change in representation is not really the result 
of significant changes in NOW's identity though. Rather, 
it is the result of an intensification of communication 
efforts. The early 1970s to 1974 was a period of intense 
communicative activity on NOW's part, with the NOW PIO 
especially playing a role in increasing news visibility. 
It was also during this period that NOW strategists 
began systematically supporting women reporters and this 
information "subsidy" work seems to have succeeded here 
in making the ERA a public issue among other efforts. 1 
In 1975, again, shifts in NOW's representation were 
more tied to shifts in strategy than tied directly to 
idEntity questions. News representations of NOW in the 
1974-1976 period, for example, showed NOW as a complex, 
contentious organization, but to a large extent this new 
public identity was the result of loosening of control 
over its public image by new NOW leaders. The 
organization did change its identity during this period, 
but it was the effects that this shift had on 
communication strategies that affected NOW's 
representation. The new majority leaders wanted a more 
open public identity for NOW that was inclusive, and 
they were willing to risk media ridicule for this 
purpose, so they changed NOW's media strategy from a 
careful, controlled public communication about NOW that 
sanitized the organization and stressed its respectable 
elements, to a strategy that more accurately represented 350 
NOW's own internal diversity, 
Clearly identity does play a role -- when we 
compare NOW to the "younger" feminist groups it becomes 
clear that a group's overall identity will structure its 
media interactions. But it is difficult to carve out an 
independent role for NOW's identity in structuring media 
access Rather, NOW's identity structured its media 
strategies which affected its representations. Over time 
the relative legitimacy of NOW's public identity (the 
identity "success" measure used here) was the result, 
then, of news conventions and practices interacting with 
NOW's media strategies. There seems to be no strong 
independent determining role here for identity per se. 
News Outcomes: Successes and Limitations 
These structuring factors -- resources, strategies 
and identity --help explain NOW's interaction patterns 
with media, but in order to understand the interaction 
-- and indeed to assess the relative "success" of NOW 
strategies in controlling the organization's identity or 
agenda -- we need to look also at the outcomes of the 
interaction in news content. It is only by looking at 
both NOW strategies and news content, that we can In 
fact separate out a role for news discourse structures 
in this interaction. 
NOW was successful in some important ways in its 351 
interaction with news media. The organization was able 
to access news media and in doing so it helped to build 
a public agenda for llwomen's issues. ll As chapter seven 
illustrates, NOW was able to achieve basic access to 
news and to produce voice in the news most of the time. 
NOW leaders and strategists were quoted in news stories 
NOW more than half of the time. This kind of access and 
llvoice" do not necessarily equate with NOW's control 
over its representation or its agenda, but they are both 
necessary, if not sufficient, conditions for such 
control. 
With some important exceptions (such as 
homosexuality and poverty) news stories about NOW 
represented the range of its issues accurately. And 
indeed, the Times silence on the issue of homosexuality 
may have also been a kind of llsuccess" for NOW, whose 
early leadership at least, found the topic too 
controversial and divisive to make it central to the 
organization's agenda. 2 
NOW was also able to transfer its sense of 
importance to news media with several issues, such as 
the ERA and sex discrimination in employment, though its 
ranking of other issues such as family/child care issues 
was less successful. 
As chapter eight describes, NOW was also successful 
in building legitimacy for itself as a serious civil 
rights organization, though this legitimacy was limited 352 
in important ways and it was only achieved over a long 
period of time. From an early period of marginalization 
(1966-1970) In which NOW and its goals were generally 
trivialized In news, NOW then underwent an overall 
legitimation beginning in the early 1970s. By 1980 the 
organization was seen as a serious political player and 
a champion of "hard won rights" by the Times. In this 
later period NOW's treatment was still often critical, 
but stories and editorials surrounding NOW's 10th 
anniversary indicate that it had corne to be perceived as 
a "player" in national politics. 
The Limits of Media Access 
Despite the considerable reflexive news skills 
developed by NOW strategists, the organization and its 
discourse were still "processed" in constraining ways by 
the Times. NOW's feminist discourse was quite 
systematically processed through a pervasive 
public/private framework that tended to legitimate (i.e. 
put up front as news) those subjects that could most 
easily be connected to liberal discourses (e.g. those 
traditionally associated with individual rights and 
state or public concerns) and to marginalize or de-
politicize others by placing them in the context of 
traditional "feminine" or lifestyle contexts. This 
placement was not inevitable or determined -- for 
example abortion stories, depending on their context 353 
(i.e. legal or protest) and their writer might be placed 
in different locations at different times-- but it was 
pervaslve. 
A similar process seems to have been in effect for 
NOW's organizational legitimacy. As chapter eight 
illustrates, after initially marginalizing 
representations, NOW then underwent a general 
legitimating process and began to be cited as the 
central feminist organization in American public life. 
This general increase in NOW's perceived legitimacy, 
however, was constrained by the issue and movement 
contexts in which NOW appeared. If NOW was being quoted 
in the context of its more institutionalized issues --
such as sex discrimination in employment, for example --
the organization was more likely to be treated seriously 
than if it was talking about sexism In children's toys. 
NOW's increase in organizational legitimacy was 
also gained at the expense of other more Hradical" 
groups in the movement. In the early 1970s especially, 
NOW became a strategic signifier of the acceptable 
boundaries of feminism, while the younger branch groups 
were credited with more "unreasonable" demands. 3 
This Hprocessing" of NOW's identity or agenda was 
not itself static over time, however. As news processed 
NOW through its public-private framework the contents of 
these categories were themselves shifting over time. 
What news considered an illegitimate issue In 1966 (e.g. 354 
"so-called true equality for women") had become by 1981 
the legitimate aspect of feminism in the eyes of the 
Times. 
The NOW-news struggle was both structured and 
shifting. It was the result of systematic processing of 
NOW by news into legitimate/illegitimate categories. But 
it is also clear that some issues and frames move 
between these categories over time as a result of 
ongoing strategic communication. 
NEWS DISCOURSE AND UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES 
News functioned as both a resource and a constraint 
In NOW's public communication. While news access made it 
possible for NOW to communicate to larger publics, news 
media also brought to bear on NOW's discourse, its own 
discursive categories and structures. In particular, I 
argue here, it brought to bear a pervasive public-
private dichotomy, which news shares with liberal 
politics more generally. In this framework, NOW's more 
"public" lssues -- i.e. those that conformed to 
conventional news (and liberal political) judgments of 
importance (e.g. employment issues and the ERA), were 
highly ranked and placed in the news sections, More 
traditionally "private" issues (such as family/child 
care concerns) were ranked low (in agenda setting terms) 
and placed on women's pages. In filtering NOW's 
discourse through this public-private framework, news 355 
was reproducing some of the very constraints that 
feminists had set out to negotiate in their attempts to 
llmake public ll formerly llprivate" (and gendered) issues 
whose lack of public attention has been a source of 
oppreSSlon for women (Fraser, 1992; Butler and Scott, 
1992; McDermott, 1994). 
The question for NOW, and other new social movement 
organizations, then, becomes less whether news can be 
understood and used as a resource, but more 
strategically, how can the constraints and possibilities 
of news -- the structures of news -- be negotiated as a 
resource? As Giddens (1984) has noted, structure is both 
constraining and enabling. Structure can be oppressive 
when it is routinely reproduced through unreflective 
practice, but structures can also be enabling when the 
llrules" of a system are made accessible to the 
participants, who can then use them as resources. It lS 
this reflexive appropriation of the llrules" of systems 
as resources which challenges deterministic models of 
social life. 
NOW seems to have been only partially successful in 
negotiating the structures of news. The organization did 
manage to learn about and use some of the structures of 
news -- to reflexively appropriate some of the rules 
but there were also areas of news, especially at the 
deeper discursive levels, that were not accessible to 
NOW strategists, and could not be incorporated into 356 
their strategic interactions. Generally NOW seems to 
have been more successful in learning about and using 
the structures of news at the level of practices and 
routines, than at the ideological or discursive level. 
For example, NOW strategists learned about and used the 
event orientation of news, and they planned events In 
order to have a chance to talk about issues more 
generally. And NOW strategists learned about and used 
news convention in their Hsubsidizing H of women 
journalists. But the organization was less successful In 
negotiating the discursive constraints of news through 
which NOW's discourse was processed according to issues 
as public (important) or private (less important). These 
discursive constraints - which I argue here are 
manifested in public/private distinctions -- thus became 
constraining for NOW's public communication. 4 
Giddens (1984) suggests that we can understand 
structure as a combination of rules and resources; and 
it is by learning about and appropriating those rules 
and mobilizing resources that structures become 
enabling. But it is necessary first to bring knowledge 
of the rules (which are usually deeply embedded in 
routines and practices) to the surface for conscious 
appropriation. NOW seems to have managed to mobilize 
some resources and to learn about and use some of the 
rules involved in news structures. For example, the 
organization appropriated some of the convention of news 357 
writing and news gathering. But NOW did not access the 
structures (or "rules") of news at the epistemological 
level. Yet it may be that it is these discursive level 
constraints of news structures that will be most 
critical to the NSMs. As many observers have noted, the 
symbolic challenge of the NSMs is often at exactly this 
level -- they challenge the parameters of debate and 
propose new ways of seeing or relations to one another 
and to the world (Boggs 1986; Larana et al, 1994). If 
the NSMs are to try and mount this challenge through the 
use of news, it lS important that they begin to access 
the constraints of news at the discursive level, and 
incDrporate that knowledge into their media strategies. 
News as an NSM Resource? 
News, is a resource, then, but like signification, 
or knowledge more generally, it is a resource whose 
strategic use requires that sources articulate their 
experiences within its terms. Like other forms of 
discourse, news is a system of meaning, one that comes 
with its own encoded and implicit assumptions about 
reality (Van Dijk, 1988; Hartley, 1982; McDermott, 
1995). Using that discourse constrains what it is 
possible to say. And it is only by understanding very 
well the rules of the discourse that its constraints can 
be negotiated or overcome. 
Even as NOW leaders strategically and reflexively 358 
translated their concerns into Hnews-speak H the 
underlying categories of news discourse (such as that of 
pUblic-private divides or legitimate and illegitimate 
Hpolitical H issues) were being invoked by both NOW 
strategists (as they invoked news conventions) and media 
workers to process NOW's feminism. This may not have 
been deliberate on the part of news workers. Rather, 
news processes feminism through the routine use of the 
editorial practices that embody these discursive 
categories. The editorial practice of sectioning the 
newspaper into HfrontH and HbackH sections (with 
corresponding importance) and the Hobviousness" to 
journalists of what constitutes real or Hhard" news and 
what is Hfeature" or lifestyle material -- and so what 
belongs in each of these sections -- is one of the ways 
that news institutionalizes the public-private divide 
that feminist have noted underlies much liberal 
discourse (Fraser, 1990: McLaughlin, 1993).5 In short, 
NOW leaders may have become as much Hspoken by" news 
discourse as they were its speakers. 
This kind of "processing" of movement discourses by 
news media is a result, not only of individual 
journalists and activists in interaction, or even of 
organizational relations, but of the interaction of 
different discourses at the epistemological level. When 
feminists and journalists interact they bring with them 
two systems of meaning that are also in 359 
interaction. 6These discourses may draw on fundamentally 
different ways of seeing the world. 
News discursive categories and processlng may not 
In themselves be fatal to movements -- if they can 
become known to strategists. Movement communications 
strategists have been adept at monitoring and 
appropriating aspects of news practices and conventions 
more generally -- such as learning about and 
manipulating sourcing practices, planning public 
"events" and incorporating newsworthiness judgments into 
their activities and communications. It may be that they 
can also find ways to incorporate and appropriate some 
of news' deeper discursive conventions too. 
Bruck (1992) has called this approach to struggle 
for change one of the "active negotiation of 
constraints" in which the goal is to both recognlze and 
work against the constraints of dominant discourses and 
practices. In this approach it may be unlikely that 
movements can abolish the mechanisms of discursive 
control that media and other dominant discourses use to 
contain meanings in the world in the short term, but 
they may through active and strategic, negotiation of 
these constraints move issues, ideas and identities from 
one category to the other and by doing so (eventually) 
undermine the categorization process itself. 7 In the 
case of NOW and other feminist groups this means ongoing 
strategic communication to II move II formerly private 
(domestic, illegitimate) issues into the public 
(legitimate, political, open to collective amelioration) 
domain. 
And, indeed, over time there is some evidence in 
this study, and in public shifts more generally, that 
feminist strategic communication has moved some issues 
and frames from one category to the other. When NOW 
first espoused the term "sex discrimination" in 1966, 
for example, the Times did not take it seriously, 
noting that a civil rights movement for women was 
somewhat ridiculous and presenting IIsex discrimination" 
as a ridiculous claim to parallel women's inequality to 
rac"e discrimination. But by 1980, sex discrimination 
(and the equality/rights framework to which it belongs) 
was seen by the Times editors as part of "hard won" and 
reasonable feminist agenda. Though NOW's (and other 
feminist groups) legitimation was limited, then, without 
such strategic interaction it is doubtful if any of this 
Hmovement" would have taken place at all. 
This kind of Hactive negotiation of constraints" 1S 
likely to be successful, however, only if challengers 
come to accurately understand and challenge the embedded 
assumptions of news structures. In this study NOW was 
actively involved in the negotiation of constraints in 
the form of news practices and conventions, but it was 
also constrained by these conventions at another level. 
360 
While learning about and uSlng the HrulesH as resources 361 
at one level (practice and conventions) the group failed 
to see and anticipate the constraints of another level 
(epistemological). By becoming aware of such 
constraints, their active negotiation may be possible ln 
the future. 
Some groups will find this kind of strategic 
communication more difficult than others -- it requires 
resources, skills and the ability (and desire) to frame 
one's own discourse and identity in strategic ways. But 
it is here -- in the day-to-day strategic mobilization, 
articulation and communication of new knowledges by 
social movements as much as anywhere, that the 
possibilities and constraints of social change ln 
complex, mediated societies are to be found. 
NOTES 
1 Some of this increase in legitimacy may also, of 
course simply be the result of continuing to exist over 
time. Shoemaker (1982) has noted that perceived 
legitimacy is constituted partly through viability over 
time. But in any case, it was less a cataclysmic shift 
in NOW's identity that shifted its perceived legitimacy, 
but rather persistent and continuous communication 
efforts over time. 
2 Mannheim (1991) notes that silence can in fact be a 
successful outcome of strategic communication -- keeping 
some stories out of the press is sometimes as difficult 
as getting others in. 
3 NOW also played a role in this differentiation. In 
1972/3, media strategists for NOW also began to use the 
younger groups radicalism as a way of increasing NOW's 
prestige, by differentiating NOW as the Hserious H 
feminist group. 
4 There is no guarantee of course that knowing about 
rules will make it possible to change them, but 
certainly not being aware makes it unlike that change 
can be attempted. 
5 See chapter three for a discussion of the 
"publicizing" aspects of feminism which tries to extend 
public concern and state resources to formerly "private" 
issues and relations. 
6 They also bring with them mUltiple other discourses 
such as that of race, sexuality, class, and so on. But 
in this discussion I am limiting the complexity of 
journalist-strategist interactions to seeing them as 
agents of news and feminist discourses. 
7 If there is nothing left in the "illegitimate" 
category of the dichotomy, then the dichotomy itself 
fails to be useful. 
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